



SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

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January 2007

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Human Trafficking in South Asia : and the Indian Factor

SADIQ A. GILL & FARHAN NAVEED YUSAF

Abstract

Human Trafficking in South Asia is not a new phenomenon, where it has been a source of income for centuries, only recently has it been recognized as a global menace.

Trafficking, provides workers for the sex industry and the cheap labour. India Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for Trafficking while Pakistan is the transitional passage. Traffickers lure their victims by false promises of high paying jobs and fraudulent marriages in foreign countries.

Trafficking is linked to poverty, and need for low cost labour.

The governments of this region are now starting to control this menace by providing protection to the potential victims through laws to monitor and control Trafficking.

Human trafficking in South Asia is not a new phenomenon. For centuries kidnapped or bonded labour has existed and in some communities has been a source of income besides subsistence agriculture. Hence human trafficking has been a part of the traditional economy within South Asia. It has only recently been recognized as a global concern as trafficked persons are found in a growing number of countries. Recent studies and analysis are demonstrating changes in the process and economy of trafficking in the South Asian, where it is becoming more integrated into transnational crimes and the demands for trafficked labour adjusts itself to global economic demands.¹

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Trafficking is linked to the lack of secure livelihoods. It forces people to leave their homes, in search of income to improve the lives of their families. South Asia has one-fifth of the world's population, of which over 500 million live in absolute poverty, with an income of less than a dollar a day. Various studies and researches show that children, especially girl children and women bear a disproportionately large burden of deprivation and exploitation resulting from poverty related issues.

South Asia is a region of various forms of inequities and disparities economic, social or political. Within this region, several forms of socially sanctioned violations and practices related to issues of sex and sexuality, reinforce discriminatory norms and values intensify stigma and marginalization. Such norms and practices further influence masculine and feminine identities and socialize men and women into specific gendered-roles that are crucial determinants in exacerbating the multiple vulnerabilities of women and men to a plethora of developmental challenges, including illegal migration, trafficking and HIV / AIDS.²

The current globalization processes are creating livelihood opportunities in urban areas and specific sectors are leading to diminishing choices in rural settings, thus prompting greater human mobility, driven by both 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such trends reflect underlying patterns of poverty, marginalization and disempowerment. Several economic liberalization policies have entailed a progressive 'feminization of poverty', coupled with decreasing rural participation rates for both men and women are rising female-underemployment. The number of women living in poverty and the number of women headed households living below the poverty-line have increased during the last decade, impacting significantly on the well being and human security of children, often leading to trafficking.³

SOURCE AND DESTINATION

Many countries in this region act as source and destination countries, although India being the largest destination country, with neighbouring Nepal and Bangladesh being the major source countries. A substantial number of women and children are trafficked to work in the sex industry, other victims of trafficking also end up in the domestic, construction, agriculture, and garment production industries, or as beggars and hawkers. Bangladeshis and Nepalese migrants use India as a transit country en-route to Pakistan or the Middle East, India itself acts as a country of origin for the thousands of people who migrate to the Middle East and West. A large percentage of India's trafficking also occurs internally, with victims, usually children, being moved from poorer states to big cities such as Calcutta, Delhi and Mumbai. Asian Development Bank (ADB) has asserted that :

“Trafficking to provide workers for the sex industry or cheap labourers is on the rise in Asia. An estimated two million people are trafficked worldwide annually, including 150,000 from South Asia and 225,000 from Southeast Asia. The United Nation's estimates reveal that over the last 30 years, trafficking for sexual exploitation alone has victimized some 30 million people – mostly poor women and children”.⁴

Other regional trends include trafficking from Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia to Pakistan. It was reported in 1991, that about 20,000 young girls and women of Bangladeshi origin between the ages of 12 and 30 were sold in Pakistan. In addition to internal and regional trafficking, many South Asian children have been trafficked beyond the region. There have been reports of Nepalese girls ending up in Hong Kong, and thousands of boys, some as young as five, being trafficked to Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar to work as camel jockeys. Sri Lanka is also another primary source country for

trafficking to the Gulf region, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Bahrain for work in exploitative conditions, which also makes them vulnerable to sexual abuse.⁵


According to Sustainable Development Policy institute⁶, in Bangladesh women and children are falling victims to trafficking mainly for the purpose of prostitution, sexual abuse, forced labour camel jockeying, cheap labour, bonded labour, domestic servitude, selling of organs and marriage. In case of women and girls, the destination is usually the sex-market both within the country and outside. In the case of boys, the destination is usually Middle Eastern countries where they are engaged as camel jockeys. In most cases the girls, who are trafficked abroad, are trafficked through India. In case of the boys, India is usually treated as a country of transit to the Middle East. On the other hand, within the country, an alarming number of boys and girls are forcefully engaged in prostitution. The girls are engaged both in brothels and the street sex-market, while the boys are almost exclusively engaged in the street sex market.

Trafficking in South Asia is complex and multifaceted, both a development and a criminal problem. The main destination of people from South Asia is the Middle East; but many stay within India and Pakistan. There is extensive trafficking of women and girls from Bangladesh to India, Pakistan, Bahrain, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. UNICEF estimates upto half a million Bangladeshis have been trafficked in recent years and upto 200,000 Nepali women and girls are working in India's sex industry. A small number of women and girls are trafficked through Bangladesh from Burma to India. Young boys from South Asia are trafficked to the UAE, Oman and Qatar and forced to work as a camel jockeys.⁷ The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has highlighted prevalence of human trafficking in South Asia in the following words :

"In South Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for trafficking, while India and

Pakistan are considered countries of destination. In all these countries, there is extensive domestic movement. As in East and Southeast Asia, the reasons include prostitution, marriage, and sometimes fake marriage with unknown persons who could be traffickers. In some communities in India and Nepal, commercial sexual services have been falsely linked to religious and cultural practices, which make them deeply ingrained, complex and difficult for governments to tackle. Children represent a particularly large group of those being trafficked in the region; while in Sri Lanka most children transported for sexual services are likely to be boys".⁸

Asian Development Bank has found that in South Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal are the main countries of origin for trafficking, while India and Pakistan are countries of destination or transit other to the Gulf States or Southeast Asia. Calcutta in India, is regarded as a major transit point for other destinations. However, large-scale trafficking in persons also takes place within these countries.⁹



Source : Asian Development Bank, Combating Trafficking of Women and Children in South Asia : Regional Synthesis Paper for Bangladesh, Nepal and India, 2003.

Structural changes in the economics of South Asia have resulted in loss of livelihood for many subsistence farmers, through commercialization or declines in productivity / returns from certain crops. The proportion of casual workers has increased in the agriculture sector, thereby demanding flexibility and mobility from the labour force. For women, the decline in ... female labour increase vulnerability to trafficking. Landlessness is also increasing in some countries for varied reasons. Pressure from increasing population density, environmental erosion, natural disasters, without corresponding increases in employment opportunities in other sectors. There have been substantial livelihood losses in areas where the demand for traditional skills is declining (for example for weavers in India). These conditions lead to increasing numbers of women and men moving in order to seek alternative livelihood options and hence become more vulnerable to being trafficked.

MODUS OPERANDI OF TRAFFICKERS

The modus operandi of traffickers includes luring their victims by means of attractive promises such as high-paying jobs, glamorous employment option, prosperity, and sometimes-fraudulent marriages. Parents and other family members are fooled or otherwise taken in by false promises and deceptions. It has been widely perceived that in many cases family members and other relatives play an important role in recruitment by colluding with the traffickers for which they may receive payment. In Nepal this is particularly prevalent in regions where girls have traditionally been sent knowingly by families as entertainers or commercial sex workers, which perceived as an important source of income for the families.¹⁰

Along the borders between Bangladesh, India, Nepal and India, the enforcement officers and checkpoints are few in numbers and widely dispersed. Thus it is hard to maintain strict vigilance of who is crossing the border. Border security forces are well aware of the problems of illegal / irregular migrants and trafficking, but do not have facilities or resources to quickly distinguish between different types of migrants.

Enforcement officers sometimes resort to pushing back irregulars or illegal migrants picked up during the day without distinguishing between trafficked persons and illegal migrants. Although governments are aware of loopholes at the border, they are unable to address the problem due to institutional, political and international influences. Those who have been trafficked remain at risk of being found again by the traffickers and sent back across the border, and are generally unable to return home anyway. In some instances traffickers cross the border on fixed days of the week at fixed hours. It is said that this is common knowledge in surrounding communities, and NGO find it difficult to believe that State enforcement agencies are unaware of such activities. It is the common perception that the networks of smugglers / agents are organized and protected.¹¹

CAUSES OF VULNERABILITY TO TRAFFICKING

There are multiple factors that serve as causes of vulnerability to trafficking some of which are as under :

1. **External Factor.** A range of policies and environmental circumstances influence the incidence of poverty and vulnerability to risks for migrants to being trafficked.
2. **Impacts of globalization** have included the spread of modernization with greater access to transport, media etc., but also for many, the disappearance of traditional income sources and rural employment, pushing the poor and unskilled to migrate to survive. Asia has also become a center for low-cost, labour intensive manufacturing operations. Competition among countries in South Asia has driven the cost of labour further down encouraging some employers to use illegal practices (such as bounded labour) to access cheaper labour sources.
3. **Conflicts and natural disasters** that force communities to move, often en-masses to meet their basic needs. When individuals within those communities have no skills or

education, and are exposed to health risks, their capacity to secure sustainable livelihoods is limited, and their risk to trafficking heightened.

4. **External migration polices** that exclude many unskilled people, particularly women, from legal migration and are therefore forced to seek alternative livelihood options through illegal means. Human smugglers forge documents of transportation to other countries where they promise to link migrants with job opportunities. These are often the same smugglers who traffic labour (*i.e.*, coerce migrants into certain types of work, create debt bondage conditions, or refuse migrants freedom to return home).

Those working in illegal situations are more susceptible to coercion by traffickers. It is anticipated that migration policies will continue to discourage migration of unskilled labour, or that labour movements will be confined within South Asia and to certain Southeast Asian countries and this situation will continue. These countries have poor records of protecting the rights of irregular and illegal migrants or trafficked persons, which perpetuate conditions that offer profits to opportunistic traffickers. For example, there is currently no migration policy in Bangladesh to address the impacts of these trends, or to promote development benefits from safe migration.

Poverty

An examination of the highest source areas for trafficking of women and children points towards a need for those living in poverty to meet their basic needs, through whatever means available. For those at risk of (or already living in) conditions of poverty, underemployment and unemployment remain high, and levels of functional landlessness are increasing because of population density, environmental erosion, or natural disasters without corresponding increases in employment opportunities in other sectors. In the industrialized sectors, the proportion

of casual workers has increased, and structural change in many sectors is leading to dislocation and unemployment for thousands. These conditions lead to increasing numbers of women and men moving in order to seek alternative livelihood options and hence becoming more vulnerable to being trafficked.

According to US State Department, Trafficking in Persons is characterized by subjugation, submission and lack of freedom. The overwhelming majority of those trafficked are women and children. Traffickers often prey on individuals who are poor, unemployed or underemployed, and who lack access to social safety nets. Sometimes the victims are lured with false promises of good job opportunities and better lives; but they are later exploited and forced to work under brutal and inhuman conditions.¹²

Poverty drives many to take "unthinkable" decisions and commit "undesirable" acts that include the handing over a child to another family member or even a stranger on the promise of offering a better life for them. These promises may also include the prospect of sending back remittances to help other family members. There are many cases in Bangladesh of families of young girls being trafficked to brothels in India openly acknowledging that their daughters are living under difficult and harmful circumstances, but seeing no other option for their survival. Living under these conditions of extreme poverty also means that the promises of good jobs in places such as Mumbai and Delhi encourage people to migrate without a clear idea of what they will find outside their communities. As Hameeda Hussain has asserted that :

"The site for recruitment [for trafficking] is usually a poor area marked by food insecurity and unemployment. For example, in the northern districts of Bangladesh women can find only seasonal work at very low wages. Thus, parents do not delay in accepting offers of marriage or employment for women and children particularly where there is promise of payment".¹³

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

IDPs are also highly vulnerable to being trafficked. The term IDP does not share a universally agreed definition by the international community. Conditions such as violence, human rights violations, environmental disaster, natural calamities, political unrest, and loss of land and property, all displace families, forcing them to search for places of refuge. As IDPs are generally without resources and without official government recognition, their status makes them more susceptible to adverse situations such as trafficking. Social disintegration and overall economic decline is intensifying the numbers of *de facto* IDPs. It is estimated that nearly one third of the total male labour force has migrated to India or other countries for menial jobs and mercenary services. The armed conflict is interrupting basic services, restricting development assistance, and breaking down family and community networks as men either join the conflict or migrate to seek employment elsewhere to support their families. This leaves many women in the affected districts looking after their children alone and scraping together an income under increasingly difficult circumstances. Women are also vulnerable to rape and sexual exploitation that are common features of conflict.

This type of suffering is leaving deep psychological wounds, which can severely undermine the capacity of both women and their communities to recover; and women are crucial to the recovery process of both their families and the wider community. Few services are available to these migrants and employment opportunities are very limited. These IDPs become a target for organized traffickers who easily recognize their desperation and lack of choices.

Social Attitudes and Practices

It is frequently stated that poverty in South Asia is characterized by social exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, and caste. These characteristics of social exclusion are reinforced by tradition and are institutionalized in politics, education, health and access to development resources.

Gender

Social exclusion based on gender can be seen as a major contributing factor to the risks of being trafficked. Gender-based discriminations, as suffered by individual girls and women, is perpetuated and institutionalized in the family and community. Gender stereotypes are used to reinforce women's low status. Women are not encouraged to challenge control by men and are expected to accept their position in life without complaint. These stereotypes also reinforce among young women a sense of helplessness and of being unprotected without a man. All these factors play into the hands of opportunistic traffickers who can easily control young women and break their spirit.

Rural society in South Asia is especially resistant to educating girls and women. Rural women tend to have more children, be poorer, and in their struggle to survive, have little or no time and energy to spare on adult literacy programs even if they are available. Children of female-headed households in rural areas are often put to work in order to ensure the survival of the family rather than continue in school. In Nepal even though over 50% of rural children are enrolled in primary school, only 23% of girls attend secondary school. Education is considered as a hindrance to marriage prospects for girls in many communities, as an educated woman is viewed as a potential threat to her husband and may upset the status quo within the family.

Ethnicity / Caste

Gender-based discrimination is reinforced through traditional social practices and builds on ethnicity and caste. In India, this can be well illustrated by the traditional Devdasi practices (illegal in India since 1988) in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, the Jogin in Andhra Pradesh and the Bhedias or Sansui in Madhya Pradesh.¹⁴ Parents from certain scheduled tribes (who are typically poor) marry girls to a deity or a temple. The marriage usually occurs before the girl reaches puberty and requires the girl to provide sexual services for upper-cast

community members from the temple. Such girls are known as jogini. They are forbidden to enter into a real marriage. A study for the National Commission for Women (NCW) India indicated that 62% of women CSWs belong to the scheduled castes and 30% to scheduled tribe groups. In many instances, traffickers recruit and send Devadasis to state or districts where there is less strict enforcement of the caste system.

In western Nepal where the trafficking of girls into sexual slavery has a long history, traditional customs like Deuki, Badi, Jari and Jhuma all have become synonymous with prostitution. According to the Deuki System, girl children were dedicated to deities. Since these girls were neither educated nor had any resources or skills, prostitution was the only alternative for survival. Where these practices continue, they represent a highly exploited and socially ostracized class. Some "untouchable" Hindu castes, as the Badi in western Nepal, are also designated as sex workers. The Badi people were originally a musician caste being entertainers, doing sex work occasionally as a peripheral income source.¹⁵

During the past 50 years, modern media and technology have eliminated the demand for their singing and dancing, and hence these girls and women now rely entirely on CSW, as caste exclusion has denied them education or access to other forms of employment. Leading them to earn through sex work, had meant that girl children are valued among the Badi—"He's very rich—he has many daughters." Their families now routinely sell these girls to traffickers for work elsewhere in Nepal or India without consideration of the harm this may cause them.

Women and Children : Especially Vulnerable

Trafficking in persons, especially in women and children is not new. However it appears to be increasing and acquiring grave new dimensions in the recent context of globalization. The recent re-emergence of trafficking of women and children is due to the exploitation by organized world-wide syndicates of the adverse socio-economic condition of poor

countries. Women and children in particular, are bought and sold to cater to needs of sex slavery, prostitution, illegal marriages, bonded labour, camel jockeys, baby farms, and entertainment purposes. Instances of organ trade is also under-taken although there are means of verification or substantiation of this.¹⁶

Women and children are more vulnerable to being trafficked because of the following factors :

Factors Contributing to Demand

- Women's perceived suitability for work in labour-intensive production and the growing informal sector which is characterized by low wages, casual employment, hazardous work conditions and the absence of collective bargaining mechanisms;
- The increasing demand for foreign workers for domestic and care-giving roles, and lack of adequate regulatory frameworks to support this;
- The growth of the billion-dollar sex and entertainment industry, tolerated as a 'necessary evil' while women in prostitution are criminalized and discriminated against;
- The low risk-high profit nature of trafficking encouraged by a lack of will on the part of enforcement agencies to prosecute traffickers (which includes owners / managers of institutions into which persons are trafficked);
- The ease in controlling and manipulating vulnerable women;
- Lack of access to legal redress or remedies, for victims of traffickers; and
- Devaluation of women and children' human rights.

Factors contributing to supply

- Unequal access to education that limits women's opportunities to increase their earning in more skilled occupations;
- Lack of legitimate and fulfilling employment opportunities particularly in rural communities;
- Sex-selective migration policies and restrictive emigration polices / laws, instituted often as a "protective" measure, limit women's legitimate migration. Most legal channels of migration offer opportunities in typically male-dominated sectors (construction and agriculture work);
- Less access to information on migration / job opportunities, recruitment channels, and a greater lack of awareness of the risks of migration compared to men;
- Disruption of support systems due to natural and human created catastrophes; and
- Traditional community attitudes and practices, which tolerate violence against women.

Trafficking is by and large a gendered phenomenon. Although trafficking of men is also taking place within and from the region. Since the last decade evidence from major government and NGO sources indicates that the incidence of trafficking of women and children has escalated considerable. For example, the majority of trafficking in India, both trans-border and in-country, happens for the purpose of commercial sex work, and over 60 percent of those trafficked into sex work are adolescent girls in the age-group of 12-16 years. In South Asia, women are now reported to constitute up to 35 percent of new HIV infections.¹⁷ A complex web of socio-cultural and macro-economic factors affect women's vulnerability to HIV including poverty, migration, urbanization, gender inequalities compounded by women's lack of

autonomy, abuse within and outside families, insufficient access to health care services, violence and ethnicity. Significantly, these factors also influence women's vulnerability to trafficking.

South Asia is witnessing an alarming trend of increasingly younger girls being trafficked into the sex trade; the average age of girls trafficked from Nepal into India has fallen over the past decade from 14-16 years to 10-14 years. In Mumbai and other Indian cities, girl children as young as eight or nine are sold at auctions. One common myth fuelling the demand for young girls in South Asia is that sex with a virgin can cure Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and HIV / AIDS. The multiple vulnerabilities to trafficking and HIV / AIDS faced by women and girl children in the region are further reinforced by socially sanctioned forms of violence. These take various forms : rape, trafficking commercial sexual exploitation, dowry-related violence, female infanticide, domestic violence and violence in conflict situations. The lives of millions of women in this region remain defined by traditional practices that enforce disempowerment and endorse unequal treatment.

Although difficult to be precise about the exact numbers of women and children trafficked. Estimates based on the reports of law enforcement agencies, researchers and groups working with survivors and communities indicate that hundreds of thousands of women and children have been or are vulnerable to being trafficked from South Asia. Police estimate that more than 15,000 women and children are smuggled out of Bangladesh every year and NGOs estimate that 160,000-250,000 women and girls from Nepal are held in India's brothels; 35 per cent of them taken on the pretext of marriage or offers of lucrative jobs. NGOs report that the numbers are growing, and that trafficking is affecting communities where it was previously unknown.¹⁸

The overwhelming majority of children vulnerable to trafficking are those belonging to poor families with few or no skills or assets, often

working as seasonal labourers or in factories or at construction sites. Those most at risk include :

- Children separated from their families or with disrupted family backgrounds (e.g., orphans, victims of abuse, unaccompanied children, children from single-parent families, or from families headed by children)
- Economically and socially deprived children (unemployed, poor rural and those without access to education, vocational training, or a reasonable standard of living)
- Children from other marginalized group (e.g., certain minorities, internally displaced persons) and children from the conflict areas themselves.

The demand for child labour is increasing. Employer's prefer children because they are naïve, uncomplaining, easily controlled, vulnerable, desperate, and dispensable. The children's age ranges from 5 to 16 years with 13 years being the average age.¹⁹ Most of these children find jobs as porters, domestic servants, carpet weavers, transportation helpers, rag pickers, and shoe shiners. Some of these children are trafficked into CSW, some are used for organ transplanting, and some find jobs in the circus. In all these cases, the traffickers and employers are violating these children's basic rights.

Among street children in urban settings these vulnerabilities intensify other power relationships. For example, from the very beginning of street life, girl children are considered as "fallen", putting them at extreme risk of sexual abuse / assault from other boys and men. Children are also reluctant to leave abusive relationships that nonetheless provide them with some stability. Traffickers play upon this type of dependence and vulnerability in order to maintain control over these children. From the very beginning of the street life, the girl children are considered as 'fallen'. ...For these children, the gender-based division of

labour makes no other jobs as accessible as prostitution. Thus, there exists a social pressure, generated from male-charged sexist social moral values, which makes (street girls)... vulnerable to sexual abuse reduces their choice of profession and thereby makes them highly vulnerable to prostitution".²⁰

Many children are moving around alone in the most vulnerable conditions to being trafficked. Even when they arrive with their parent(s), the pressure of urban life on new migrants can overcome their tenuous family ties and these children end up on the street alone. There are few facilities available that can serve as shelter or temporary homes for street children. While there are only limited and often substandard facilities available, many trafficked adults and children prefer the option of remaining in exploitative or abusive living conditions under the control of traffickers, or returning to life on the streets. Children without birth certificates not only represents recognition of a child's existence under the law. Traffickers find many of their victims in remote villages where poverty is high and registration rates are low, knowing that girls without papers are less likely to run away from their perpetrators.

Trafficking of children could be for sex or cheap labour. Helpless in the stifling environment, young boys end up working 14 hours in hazardous occupations like tanning leather, or making explosives firecrackers, carpets, or garments. Repeated, monotonous activity, with little reward or monetary gain, leaves the child physically and mentally spent and consequently powerless to resist physical or sexual abuse, should it happen. Young boys who run away from home in search of a better life, a future in films, or lured by older boys end up on the streets in the cities or are finally "sold" into labour. Others end up as sex workers in popular tourist destinations.²¹

INDIA

India is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the bonded labour and commercial sexual

exploitation. The large population of men, women, and children, numbering in millions in debt bondage face involuntary servitude in brick kilns, rice mills, and zari embroidery factories. Some children endure involuntary servitude as domestic servants. Internal trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced marriage also occur. The Ministry of Home Affairs estimates that 90 percent of India's sex trafficking is internal. India is also a destination for women and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh trafficked for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.

In addition, boys from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are trafficked through India to the Gulf States for involuntary servitude as child camel jockeys. Reportedly, Bangladeshi women are trafficked through India for sexual exploitation in Pakistan. Moreover, Indian men and women migrate willingly to the Gulf for work as domestic servants and low-skilled labourers, but some later find themselves in situations of involuntary servitude including extended working hours, non-payment of wages, restrictions on their movement by withholding of their passports or confinement to the home, and physical or sexual abuse. The Government of India does not fully comply with the minimum standards required for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. India is placed in Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year due to its failure to show evidence of increasing efforts to address trafficking in persons. India lacks a national law enforcement response to any form of trafficking, but took some preliminary measures to create a central law enforcement unit to do so. However, India did not take steps to address the huge issue of bonded labour and other forms of involuntary servitude. The Indian Government also did not take meaningful steps to address its sizeable trafficking-related corruption problem.

The government drafted, but had not yet introduced to parliament, amendments to the Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act (ITPA) that would afford greater protection to sex trafficking victims and stricter

penalties for their traffickers and for clients of prostitution. The central government also further empowered the coordination office for anti-trafficking elevating the stature of the Department of Women and Child Development (DWCD) by creating a Minister of State for Women and Child Development (MWCD). India should consider designating and empowering a national law enforcement agency with investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction throughout the country to address its interstate and international trafficking problem. The government should similarly consider taking greater measures to rescue and protect victims of bonded labour and to prosecute their traffickers or employers, giving them sufficiently stringent punishments to deter and that adequately reflect the nature of the heinous crime of trafficking. It is particularly important to strengthen and enforce sentences applied to individuals convicted of exploiting bonded labourers. India should also improve its long-term protection of trafficking victims and institute nation-wide public awareness programmes to educate all segments of the population on the dangers of trafficking.

Prosecution

The Government of India last year sustained modest efforts to punish trafficking crimes. However, there were no significant improvements. The government's laws criminalizing labour forms of trafficking such as bonded labour or forced child labour prescribe no more than three years' imprisonment. The government, at all levels, neither vigorously investigated nor prosecuted acts of any form of trafficking, nor did it report a significant number of convictions or sentences for acts of trafficking. Moreover, there were no reports of government efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, or sentence public officials who participated in or facilitated trafficking in persons crimes.

Although India's Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act (ITPA) adequately criminalizes and prescribes punishment for trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. This law was generally not used for effective prosecutions of trafficking in most parts of the country. The central government has moved forward, however, with amendments to

the ITPA aimed at increasing penalties for repeat traffickers and clients of prostitution and eliminating provisions used to punish victims of trafficking. In 2004, the central government reported 6,341 persons convicted under the ITPA, but it did not provide data as to how many of these were convictions of women in prostitution for the offense of solicitation. The Government of India did not provide comprehensive statistics for the number of investigations, arrests, prosecutions, or convictions achieved during 2005 to punish traffickers for commercial sexual exploitation.

Independent sources report that the municipal government of Mumbai (India's largest city with concentration of victims of commercial sexual exploitation) arrested 13 suspected sex traffickers in 2005, but did not prosecute or convict any traffickers. Similarly, the city governments of Calcutta and Chennai registered 25 and 109 arrests of sex traffickers respectively, but provided no indication that these cases were ever prosecuted. The state of Maharashtra reported 82 prosecutions of trafficking offenses and the conviction of eight traffickers in 2004. During the current year, little progress was made in combating trafficking of persons for the purpose of labour exploitation. Despite estimates that millions of men, women, and children are victims of forced and bonded labour, the government provided no indication that the perpetrators of these crimes were seriously punished. The Bounded Labour Abolition Act of 1976 criminalizes the use of the bonded labour system with penalties including up to three years in jail and 2,000 rupees (\$45) in fines. International NGOs and the ILO estimate that there are 10 to 40 million bonded labourers in India; the Government of India did not provide an estimate. Moreover, it did not provide any data on prosecutions or convictions for bonded labour offenses for the reporting period. Independent sources report some prosecutions and convictions in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, with punishments limited to fines.

The Child Labour and Juvenile Justice Acts prohibit the labour exploitation of children. Under the Child Labour Act, employers are

subject to imprisonment of up to one year and a fine of at least 10,000 rupees (\$227) for forced child labour. The Juvenile Justice Act mandates imprisonment of three years or less for forced or bonded labour of children. In November, the Delhi police rescued 694 children caught in forced labour in zari embroidery factories and over 16,000 children were rescued from workshops in Mumbai between June and September 2005. These local governments, however provided no information regarding arrests or prosecutions of the factory owners exploiting these children.

In 2005 the Government of India took steps to implement nationwide police training program on trafficking. The Bureau of Police Research and Development began preparing a national anti-trafficking training module for investigative officers, and it conducted seven training workshops around the country in 2005. This nascent training programme aimed to sensitize law enforcement officers to trafficking for sexual or labour exploitation, will assist state and national level law enforcement authorities in preventing corruption and improving their capacity to combat trafficking. In addition, India should consider instituting a comprehensive database to compile state level statistics related to the rescue of victims of sex trafficking and forced or bonded labour, as well the arrest and prosecution of their traffickers or exploiters. Endemic corruption among law enforcement officials impedes India's ability to effectively combat trafficking in persons. In terms of trafficking for sexual exploitation, corrupt law enforcement authorities reportedly continue to facilitate the movement of trafficking victims, protect brothels that exploit victims, and protect traffickers and brothel keepers from arrest or other threats of enforcement. In the area of bonded labour and forced child labour, some corrupt police officials continue to protect businesses and managers who rely on forced labour and take bribes to stop enforcement or judicial action. During the reporting period, there were no reports concerning the Government of India's steps to address official complicity in trafficking in persons.

Protection

The Government of India continues to provide inadequate and uneven assistance to the vast majority of trafficking victims. Existing national programmes to provide protection and rehabilitation to victims of sex trafficking, forced child labour, or bonded labour, were not implemented effectively in some areas. Some of India's 28 states however, showed resolve in addressing victims' needs. For example, the state of Tamil Nadu operates five shelters for women and girls, including victims of trafficking, and the government of Andhra Pradesh state runs six similar homes. The state government Maharashtra is expanding the capacity of its existing Mumbai shelter. Government shelters are found in all major cities, but the quality of care they offer varies widely; allegations of victims further exploited in government shelters have been reported. The Government of India relies heavily on NGOs to provide services to assist victims. Child Welfare Committees operate in each district of each state to protect child victims of trafficking; they often refer such victims to local NGOs for care. The Government of India continues to provide funding to NGOs to build shelters for victims of trafficking under its Swadhar Scheme, although some NGOs have charged that the implementation of this programme has been marked by inefficiency and corruption.

Overall, protection for victims of trafficking is weak with regard to comprehensive care. Many shelters do not have the capacity to provide protection to trafficking victims for more than a few months, leaving some victims vulnerable to re-trafficking once they leave the shelters. In addition, victim witnesses rarely receive adequate protection to prevent retribution from their traffickers. For those trafficked from other countries, repatriation assistance is sparse. Anecdotal information suggests that victims are accompanied to the border without sufficient reintegration aid, rendering them susceptible to re-trafficking. Victims of bonded labour are provided 20,000 rupees (\$540) co-funded by the national and state governments upon their rescue, but this programme of rehabilitation is unevenly implemented across the country; it is unclear whether state or local governments afford other services to bonded labour victims.

The government can improve its protection efforts by instituting short-or long-term care as appropriate for trafficking victims, as well as shelter facilities to assist them. The repatriation process should be improved to ensure that victims are sufficiently reintegrated and programmes to protect witnesses are established that will adequately safeguard victims from retribution. To protect Indian nationals trafficked abroad, the government should consider training overseas diplomatic officials in identifying and assisting trafficking victims caught in involuntary servitude.

India's efforts to prevent trafficking in persons were limited this year (2006). To address the issue of bride trafficking, the government instituted public awareness programmes to educate parents on the laws against sex-selective abortions and infanticide causing gender imbalance in parts of India and driving the demand for purchased brides. The newly created MWCD has continued the past work of the DCWD in hosting quarterly meetings with other government agencies and local NGOs to share anti-trafficking ideas and facilitate cooperation on preventing trafficking in persons.

The government also aimed to prevent child labour by offering financial incentives to parents to keep their children in school. Nevertheless, the central government was unable to guard its long, porous borders with Bangladesh and Nepal through which several thousand trafficking victims reportedly enter India each year. The government does not take adequate measures to prevent internal trafficking for sexual exploitation or involuntary servitude despite the prevalence of such trafficking to major cities, and increasingly in smaller cities suburbs.

The Government of India also did not institute a broad public awareness campaign to notify the public of the consequences of engaging in trafficking crimes. India should increase awareness of trafficking issues in rural areas where there is a high risk of trafficking. India should also better monitor its borders to interdict trafficking victims and trafficking rings. In addition, the government should also consider offering training for men and women traveling overseas for employment, to avoid situations of involuntary servitude abroad.

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Statistical Portrayal of Rural Population Change in Punjab-Pakistan

SAFDAR ALI SHIRAZI & M. H. BOKHARI

Abstract

This paper attempts to find the rural population change in Pakistan, as rural population in developed regions of the world is declining gradually and most of the rural population lies in less developed areas. Pakistan, being a less developed country, has most of its population living in rural areas. In 1990, nearly 90% of the total population was rural. In 1951, it decreased to 82% and until now, it is 66% of the total population. Over the time, there have been different patterns of change in growth, which has been examined through the comparison with its urban counterpart during the last four censuses. The data gathered from previous censuses indicates a decline in rural population. Urban population is continuously increasing from 17.3% in 1951 to 31.2% in 1998. This depicts the gradual decline of rural population. The average annual growth rate in rural areas accelerated during 1951 to 1972 while it has shown slightly declining trend during 1981-1998. The increase in rural growth rate in 1972 can be viewed in context of overall population growth rate. However, there is possibility that the effect of political factors, coverage and content questions may have affected the 1972 census results. In order to find a statistical portrayal of the rural population change in Punjab-Pakistan at district level, the data gathered from four censuses has been statistically treated and the summary results have been drawn.

INTRODUCTION

A major transformation during the twentieth century has been the growth of urban centers and the concentration of population in urban areas. Throughout human history, the world has been primarily rural. However, this situation will change in the near future owing to the rapid

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growth of urban areas. As of mid 1998, 47 percent of the world population lived in urban areas. This urban population is growing three times faster than its rural counterpart is as a result; half of the world population is expected to be urban by 2006. Approximately three fifth of the world population will be living in the urban areas by 2030.¹ According to World Population Data sheet (2006), 52% of the total population of the world is living in rural areas. While just 23% population of the more developed regions of the world is rural against 58% of population in less developed regions. On continental level 62%, population of Asia is rural. In south central Asia 70% of the total population is living in rural areas.² The rural gain for the world as a whole is diminished because of a slow rural decline in the more developed regions.³ The demographic present and future of rural population lies preponderantly in the less developed regions. These areas contained 85 percent of the world rural population in 1975.⁴ Which has shrunk to 59 percent in the mid of 2005.⁵

As a less developed country of the world, Pakistan is primarily a rural country having bulk of its population in rural areas over the years. In the census of 1901, 90.2% of the total population was rural. In 1951, it decreased to 82.2%. For the last census held in 1998 it has decreased to 67.5%.⁶ In 2005 nearly 66% of population is living in rural areas.⁷ Although rural population has a declining trend over the years but still it is the larger part of Pakistan's population.

The spatiotemporal patterns of growth of population in rural areas of Punjab have been different in various censuses. If one trace its roots in the past, can easily find the pattern of rural population over the time. To find out the extent of change, rural population is usually examined with its urban counterpart. The figures in the table 1 are showing the percentage of rural and urban population to the total population of the Punjab in the decennial censuses from 1901 to 1998. Figures in the table clearly present the declining trend of rural population over time. As in 1901, 91.3% of the total population was rural. In 1951, it decreased to 80%. This gradual decline continues, as it was 68.7% in 1998. These evidences from the past through some light upon the agglomerations in urban areas and consequent process of urbanization in the region. These differences have been found even after the partition of Punjab in 1947.

THE PROBLEM

Growth of population all over the world keeps variation of number on the base of its two main characteristics; urban and rural. Population growth is considered separately in both urban and rural areas, as urbanization has become an accelerated process in present world. Most countries of the world now have more urban population than in past. Continuous rural to urban migration has resulted in an upward growth of population in urban areas, which is much higher and faster than rural areas. In the case of Pakistan, percentage figures of urban population to the total since the beginning of the regular censuses in the country indicate a generally accelerating growth of urban population. All the above situation shows the decrease of rural population growth as compared to the urban population but still rural population is more in number as in mid 1998, 53 percent of the world population lived in rural areas. In 2003, 51.7 percent of the population lived in rural areas with a very slower annual growth rate (2000-2005) of 0.4 percent. Being a less developed country of South Asia, Pakistan is ranked as the 6th most populous country of the world and 3rd in Asian region. Growth rate of the population of Pakistan is highest in South Asia as it was 2.61 percent in 1998 and was estimated to be 1.98 percent for 2004. Although Pakistan appears to have made a breakthrough in achieving a decline trend in fertility and population growth rate, these changes are modest and below the desired level, making the situation almost same. In terms of rural population, 2/3 of the population is living in rural areas. Rural sector accounts for 67.5 percent (1998) of the total population of Pakistan. In 2003, about 65.9 percent of rural population was living in Pakistan with an annual rural growth rate of 1.9 percent in 2000-2005. Although urbanization is steadily increasing in Pakistan but still it is largely a rural country of the world. Our study area-the Punjab is a region of the northwest Indian subcontinent bounded by the Indus River in the west and the Yamuna in the east. The word "Punjab" comes through Hindi from Persian panj-āb, "five rivers," referring to tributaries of the Indus. Persian panj is closely related to Hindi pañc, pronounced (pūñch), "five," the source of our punch, a drink that originally contained five

ingredients. The Persian and Hindi words are descended from Indo-European *penkwe*, which appears in Greek as *pente*, as in *pentagon*, and in English as *five*. The *āb* in *panj-āb* comes from the Indo-European root *ab-*, "water, river," and is also found in our word *julep*, which comes ultimately from Persian *gulāb*, "rose water."⁸

GROWTH RATES OF RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION IN PUNJAB-PAKISTAN

In rural and urban areas, the proportion of rural and urban population has been different in different censuses. Table 1 clearly reveals a downward trend in the proportion of rural population in the Punjab since 1901 when rural population was 91.3 percent as against 68.7 in 1998. The fact is that Punjab remained overwhelmingly a rural province of the country. Table 2 and figures 1 & 2 shows the proportion of rural and urban population of Punjab from 1951 to 1998. The proportion of population categorized as urban has been continuously increasing from 17.3% in the census of 1951 to 21.5% in 1961, 24.4% in 1972 and 27.6% in 1981. It was 31.3 % in the latest census undertaken in 1998. These increasing proportions of urban share of population reflect the declining trend of their rural counterparts. In the table 2, data on rural and urban population compiled from census reports clearly reveals the average annual growth rate of urban and rural population of Punjab. As for urban areas, it was 5.34% during the intercensal period from 1951-61. It increased to 6.76% in 1961-72 and has been over 4% in the subsequent two census of 1981-1998. Similarly, the average annual increase of population in rural areas accelerated significantly from 1.66% during the 1951-61 to 3.06% in 1972 and then slightly declined to over 2% in 1981 to 1998. Figure 2 graphically presents the average annual growth rate of rural and urban population of Punjab during 1951-1998.

TABLE -1

**Percentage Share of Rural and Urban Population
in Punjab-Pakistan, 1901-98.**

Census Year	Total Population (In, 000's)	Rural Population (In, 000's)	Urban Population (In, 000's)	% of Total Population	
				Rural	Urban
1901	10300	9400	900	91.3	8.7
1911	11000	10000	1000	90.9	9.1
1921	11800	10600	1100	89.8	10.2
1931	13900	12200	1700	87.8	12.2
1941	17200	14700	2500	85.5	14.5
1951	20540	17040	3500	83.0	17.0
1961	25463	20003	5460	78.6	21.4
1972	37610	28310	9300	75.3	24.7
1981	47292	34241	1305	72.4	27.6
1998	73621	50602	2302	68.7	31.3

Source : Population Census Reports of Pakistan 1961, 1972, 1981, 1998.

Fig. 1

Proportion of Rural & Urban Population in Punjab-Pakistan, 1951-98.




TABLE -2


Proportion and Growth Rate of Rural & Urban Population in Punjab-Pakistan, 1951-98.

Census Year	Percent Rural	Annual Growth rate	Percent Urban	Annual Growth rate
1951	82.7	—	17.3	—
1961	78.5	1.66	21.5	5.34
1972	75.6	3.06	24.4	6.76
1981	72.4	2.23	27.6	4.21
1998	68.8	2.32	31.2	4.33

Source : Population Organization, Provincial Census Reports of Punjab-1998.

Fig. 2

Average Annual Growth Rate of Rural & Urban Population
in Punjab-Pakistan, 1951-98.



RURAL POPULATION CHANGE AT DISTRICT LEVEL IN PUNJAB-PAKISTAN

There were 34 districts in 1998 census however; this was not the same figure for the past censuses held in 1951, 1961, 1972 and 1981. Since the last censuses, there have been certain changes in the boundaries of administrative units and according to Population Census Organization, it was considered advisable that the census data of last censuses may be presented according to the boundary position at the time of 1998 census. Therefore, the census data of all the four previous censuses of Pakistan has been adjusted according to the administrative boundaries as on 1st March, 1998.⁹

The population data of the urban areas has been published, as they existed at the time of the respective census, irrespective of the fact that these were wholly or partly rural at the time of other censuses.¹⁰ The

nature of the present research is also dependent on comparable sort of data so the notable variations in the secondary data are the result of different administrative boundaries at the time of each census. However, the intercensal rural population change, during the period of 1951 to 1998 has been examined by applying different methods, to show variations in the size of rural population. Intercensal growth and average annual growth of the rural population of Punjab and its constituent districts have been shown in the table 3 and 4.

Socio-economic conditions play a key role in determining the population growth of any area. Different socio-economic conditions are present in districts of Punjab so these districts show great variation in population growth. Some districts have shown great change in the growth of population while some indicate lowest percent change. To discuss the district level change in the growth of rural population of Punjab, every intercensal period has been divided in to seven categories (First six category consist of 5 districts, but last one has 4 districts) of the districts of Punjab for the demonstration of rural population change at district level during each intercensal periods individually (Fig.3 &4).

RURAL POPULATION CHANGE IN PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS, 1951-61

Category A

This category consists of the districts of Layyah (71.41%), Rahim Yar Khan (46.80%), Bahawalpur (37.58%), Bhakkar (36.20%), and Khushab (33.74%). Together these five districts increased their population from 1627736 in 1951 to 2333744 in 1961 at an intercensal growth rate of 43.37%. Their total share in Punjab's population increased from 9.59% to 11.67% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

Category B

This category comprises of the districts of Lodhrain (26.92%), Bahawalnagar (23.81%), Rajanpur (23.23%), D. G. Khan (22.56%) and

TABLE -3
**Intercensal Increase of Rural Population
 In Punjab-Pakistan by Districts, 1951-98**

Sr. No	District	Intercensal Increase			
		1951-61	1961-72	1972-81	1981-98
1	Attock	6.38	38.26	15.78	34.69
2	Bahawalnagar	23.81	26.69	24.10	47.82
3	Bahawalpur	37.58	41.69	32.75	57.36
4	Bhakkar	36.20	49.62	29.37	55.18
5	Chakwal	8.08	36.37	11.43	33.89
6	Dera Ghazi Khan	22.56	44.27	40.07	72.11
7	Faisalabad	13.44	49.34	3.01	34.35
8	Gujranwala	19.92	57.32	7.66	42.45
9	Gujrat	9.16	37.86	9.38	40.70
10	Hafizabad	16.44	49.02	16.75	39.29
11	Jhang	22.55	42.25	20.27	42.17
12	Jhelum	3.26	38.65	6.53	37.98
13	Kasur	10.50	36.52	24.14	53.24
14	Kahnewal	18.74	35.75	24.49	49.51
15	Khushab	33.74	42.80	18.52	36.53
16	Lahore	12.03	25.92	43.14	99.41
17	Layyah	71.41	82.84	33.12	61.78
18	Lodhran	26.92	52.86	30.52	50.36

19	Mandi Bahauddin	18.76	43.01	16.20	28.57
20	Mianwali	12.72	35.15	36.25	46.24
21	Multan	17.21	55.10	25.98	53.68
22	Muzzafargarh	21.13	48.22	35.32	71.01
23	Narowal	2.56	50.91	6.33	35.73
24	Okara	8.53	29.39	28.35	41.49
25	Pakpattan	14.13	36.61	33.83	51.12
26	Rahim Yar Khan	46.80	32.48	29.01	63.77
27	Rajanpur	23.23	50.02	41.11	63.50
28	Rawalpindi	16.30	43.29	13.69	42.38
29	Sahiwal	19.48	24.24	34.37	42.66
30	Sargodha	22.16	33.53	18.46	36.01
31	Sheikhupura	12.27	49.50	22.56	41.67
32	Sialkot	8.34	43.16	11.45	51.43
33	Toba Tek Singh	11.61	53.06	0.17	38.70
34	Vehari	22.13	43.76	24.72	52.94
	PUNJAB	17.76	42.20	20.46	47.78

Source : Computed from Census Publication No. 161, Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, Islamabad Government of Pakistan.

Rural Population Change in Punjab-Pakistan 1951-98

Fig.3

0 50 100 150 km
Scale 1:2 000 000

million persons




TABLE -4
Average Annual Growth Rate of Rural Population
in Punjab-Pakistan by Districts, 1951-98


Sr. No	District	Average Annual Growth Rate			
		1951-61	1961-72	1972-81	1981-98
1	Attock	0.63	3.29	1.86	2.04
2	Bahawalnagar	2.38	2.29	2.84	2.81
3	Bahawalpur	3.75	3.58	3.87	3.37
4	Bhakkar	3.62	4.27	3.47	3.24
5	Chakwal	0.80	3.13	1.35	1.99
6	Dera Ghazi Khan	2.25	3.81	4.73	4.24
7	Faisalabad	1.34	4.24	0.35	2.02
8	Gujranwala	1.99	4.93	0.90	2.49
9	Gujrat	0.91	3.25	1.10	2.39
10	Hafizabad	1.64	4.21	1.98	2.31
11	Jhang	2.25	3.63	2.39	2.48
12	Jhelum	0.32	3.32	0.77	2.23
13	Kasur	1.05	3.14	2.85	3.13
14	Kahnewal	1.87	3.07	3.89	2.91
15	Khushab	3.37	3.68	2.19	2.14
16	Lahore	1.20	2.23	5.10	5.85
17	Layyah	7.14	7.12	3.91	3.63
18	Lodhrah	2.69	4.54	3.60	2.96

19	Mandi Bahauddin	1.87	3.70	1.91	1.68
20	Mianwali	1.27	3.02	4.28	2.72
21	Multan	1.72	4.74	3.07	3.15
22	Muzzafargarh	2.11	4.15	4.17	4.17
23	Narowal	0.25	4.38	0.74	2.10
24	Okara	0.85	2.52	3.35	2.44
25	Pakpatan	1.41	3.32	3.99	3.00
26	Rahim Yar Khan	4.68	2.79	3.42	3.75
27	Rajanpur	2.32	4.30	4.85	3.73
28	Rawalpindi	1.63	3.72	1.61	2.49
29	Sahiwal	1.64	2.08	4.06	2.50
30	Sargodha	2.21	2.88	2.18	2.11
31	Sheikhupura	1.22	4.26	2.66	2.45
32	Sialkot	0.83	3.71	1.35	3.02
33	Toba Tek Singh	1.16	4.56	0.02	2.27
34	Vehari	2.21	3.76	2.92	3.11
	PUNJAB	1.77	3.63	2.41	2.81

Source : Computed from Census Publication No. 161, Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, Islamabad Government of Pakistan.

Fig. 4

CHANGE OF RANKS ACCORDING TO INTERCENSAL GROWTH RATES OF RURAL POPULATION IN PUNJAB, 1951-98.



Jhang (22.55%). Together these five districts increased their population from 2124158 in 1951 to 2623634 in 1961 at an intercensal growth rate of 23.51%. Their total share in Punjab's population increased from 12.51% to 13.12% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

Category C

The third category comprises of Sargodha (22.16%), Vehari (22.13%), Muzaffargarh (21.13%), Gujranwala (19.92%) and Sahiwal (19.48%). This category has shown a total numerical change of 3543340 in 1961 from 2927697 in 1951 with an intercensal growth rate of 21.02%. Their total share in Punjab's population increased slightly from 17.24% to 17.72% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

Category D

The fourth category comprises of the districts of Mandi Bahauddin (18.76%), Kahnawal (18.74), Multan (17.21), Hafizabad (16.44%) and Rawalpindi (16.30%). These five districts increased their population from 2266436 in 1951 to 2664290 in 1961 with intercensal growth of 17.55%. Their total share in Punjab's population remained nearly constant from 13.35% to 13.32% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

Category E

The fifth category consists of Pakpattan (14.13%), Faisalabad (13.44%), Mianwali (12.72%), Sheikhpura (12.27%) and Lahore (12.03%). Together these five districts increased their population from 3063380 in 1951 to 3461912 in 1961 with an intercensal increase in growth of 13.00%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 18.04% to 17.31% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

TABLE-5

Rural Population Change in Punjab by Categories 1951-61.

Category	Population 1951		Population 1961		Change (1951-1961)	
	Number	% of Punjab	Number	% of Punjab	Number	%
A	1627736	9.59	2333744	11.67	706008	43.37
B	2124158	12.51	2623634	13.12	499476	23.51
C	2927697	17.24	3543340	17.72	615643	21.02
D	2266436	13.35	2664290	13.32	397854	17.55
E	3063380	18.04	3461912	17.31	398532	13.00
F	3273708	19.28	3585380	17.93	311672	9.52
G	1689571	9.95	1775752	8.88	86181	5.10
Punjab	16972686	99.96	19988052	99.95	3015366	17.76

Source : Computed from DCR's of Punjab-1951-61 and Table 3&4.

Category F

This category consists of T.T. Singh (11.61%), Kasur (10.50%), Gujrat (9.16%), Okara (8.53%) and Sialkot (8.34%). This category has shown an increase of 3585380 in 1961 from 3273708 in 1951 with an intercensal increase of 9.52%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 19.28% to 17.93% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

Category G

The seventh and last category consists of the districts of Chakwal (8.08%), Attock (6.38%), Jhelum (3.26%) and Narowal (2.56%) in between 1951 to 1961. Together these four districts increased their population from 1689571 in 1951 to 1775752 in 1961 with an intercensal growth rate of 5.10% increase. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 9.95% to 8.88% during the period in question (1951-61). [Table 5]

RURAL POPULATION CHANGE IN PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS, 1961-72

In Between 1961 to 1972, the growth rate of rural population in the districts of Punjab has been categorized as under:

Category A

This category consists of Layyah (82.84%), Gujranwala (57.32%), Multan (55.10%), T.T. Singh (53.06%) and Lodhrahm (52.86%). This category is showing an increase of 2497870 in 1951 to 3938479 in 1961 with an intercensal increase of 57.67%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population climbed from 12.49% to 13.85% during the period 1961 to 1972. [Table 6]

Category B

This category comprises of Narowal (50.91%), Rajanpur (50.02%), Bhakkar (49.62%), Sheikhpura (49.50%) and Faisalabad (49.34%).

TABLE-6

Rural Population Change in Punjab by Categories, 1961-72

Category	Population 1961		Population 1972		Change (1961-1972)	
	Number	% of Punjab	Number	% of Punjab	Number	%
A	2497870	12.49	3938479	13.85	1440609	57.67
B	3525367	17.63	5277136	18.56	1751769	49.69
C	2644690	13.23	3844031	13.52	1199341	45.34
D	3075094	15.38	4383869	15.42	1308775	42.56
E	2594861	12.98	3575394	12.57	980533	37.78
F	3245250	16.23	4357339	12.32	1112089	34.26
G	2404920	12.03	3048480	10.72	643560	26.76
Punjab	19988052	99.97	28424728	99.96	8436676	42.20

Source : Computed from DCR's of Punjab-1961-72 and Table 3 & 4.

Together these districts show an increase of 3525367 in 1961 to 5277136 in 1972 with an intercensal increase of 49.69%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population climbed from 17.63% to 18.56% during the period 1961 to 1972. [Table 6]

Category C

This category comprises of Hafizabad (49.02%), Muzaffargarh (48.22%), D.G. Khan (22.56%), Vehari (43.76%) and Rawalpindi (43.29%). This category is showing an increase of 3844031 in 1972 from 2644690 in 1961 with an intercensal increase of 45.34%. Their

total share in Punjab's population has remained nearly constant from 13.23% to 13.52% during the period in question (1961-72). [Table 6]

Category D

Districts of Sialkot (43.16%), Mandi Bhauddin (43.01%), Khushab (42.80%), Jhang (42.25%), and Bahawalpur (41.69%) are included in this category. It shows an increase of 4383869 in 1972 from 3075094 in 1961 the intercensal increase is 42.56%. Their total share in Punjab's population slightly increased from 15.38% to 15.42% during the period of 1961 to 1972. [Table 6].

Category E

This category consists of Jhelum (38.65%), Attock (38.26%), Gujrat (37.86%), Pakpattan (36.61%) and Kasur (36.52%). The total population of these five districts has increased from 2594861 in 1961 to 3575394 in 1972 with an increase of 37.78%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population increased from 12.98% to 12.57% during the period of 1961 to 1972. [Table 6]

Category F

Districts of Chakwal (36.37%), Kahnawal (35.75%), Mianwali (35.15%), Sargodha (33.53%) and Rahim Yar Khan (32.48%) fall in this category. There is an increase of 4357339 in 1972 for these five districts. The intercensal growth rate in between 1961 to 1972 is 34.26%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 16.23% to 15.32% during the period in question (1961-72). [Table 6]

Category G

This category consists of Okara (29.39%), Bahawalnagar (26.69%), Lahore (25.92%) and Sahiwal (24.24%). These four districts have an intercensal growth rate of 26.76% from 1961 to 1972. Whereas the total population of these four districts has reached to 3048480 in 1972. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 12.03% to 10.72% during the period in question (1961-72). [Table 6].

RURAL POPULATION CHANGE IN PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS, 1972-81

In Between 1972 to 1981 the growth rate of rural population in districts of Punjab can be categorized as under

Category A

This category consists of Lahore (43.14%), Rajanpur (41.11%), D.G. Khan (40.07%), Mianwali (36.25%) and Muzaffargarh (35.32%). The population of these districts has increased from 2795622 in 1972 to 3868988 in 1981 with an intercensal increase of 38.39%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population climbed from 9.83% to 11.29% during the period 1972-81. [Table 7]

Category B

Here we have districts of Sahiwal (34.37%), Pakpattan (33.83%), Layyah (33.12%), Bahawalpur (32.75%) and Lodhrah (30.52%). The population has increased from 3159592 in 1972 to 4203739 in 1981 with an intercensal increase of 33.04%. Their total share in Punjab's population increased from 11.11% to 12.27% during the period in question (1972-81). [Table 7]

Category C

Bhakkar (29.37%), Rahim Yar Khan (29.01%), Okara (28.35%), Multan (25.98%) and Vehari (24.72%) are included in this category. The intercensal increase is 27.38% while population has increased from 4431414 in 1972 to 5644906 in 1981. The share of this category in Punjab's total population climbed from 15.58% to 16.48% during the period from 1972-81. [Table 7]

Category D

The fourth category consists of Kahnewal (24.49%), Kasur (24.14%), Bahawalnagar (24.10%), Sheikhpura (22.56%), and Jhang

(20.27%) of rural population growth from 1972 to 1981. The total population of these five districts has increased from 5469849 in 1972 to 6721954 in 1981 with an intercensal increase of 11.78%. Their total share in Punjab's population was 19.24% to 19.63% during the period under question (1972-81). [Table 7]

Category E

Fifth category comprises of Khushab (18.52%), Sargodha (18.46%), Hafizabad (16.75%), Mandi Bhauddin (16.20%), and Attock (15.78%). The population has increased from 3282071 in 1972 to 3849861 in 1981 with an intercensal increase of 17.29%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population showed slight decline from 11.54% to 11.24% during the period 1972 to 1981. [Table 7]

Category F

Districts of Rawalpindi (13.69%), Sialkot (11.45%), Chakwal (11.43%), Gujrat (9.38%) and Gujranwala (7.67%) fall in this category. Its population has reached to 5377384 in 1981 from 4860511 in 1972 the intercensal increase is 10.63%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 17.09% to 15.70% during the period under question (1972-81). [Table 7]

TABLE -7

Rural Population Change in Punjab by Categories, 1972-81

Category	Population 1972		Population 1981		Change (1972-1981)	
	Number	% of Punjab	Number	% of Punjab	Number	%
A	2795622	9.83	3868988	11.29	1073366	38.39
B	3159592	11.11	4203739	12.27	1044147	33.04
C	4431414	15.58	5644906	16.48	1213492	27.38
D	5469849	19.24	6721954	19.63	1252105	11.78
E	3282071	11.54	3849861	11.24	567790	17.29
F	4860511	17.09	5377384	15.70	516873	10.63
G	4425669	15.56	4573963	13.35	148294	3.35
Punjab	28424728	99.95	34240795	99.96	5816067	20.46

Source : Computed from DCR's of Punjab-1972-61 and Table 3&4.

Category G

This last category has four districts, which are Jhelum (6.53%), Narowal (6.33%), Faisalabad (3.01%) and T.T. Singh (0.17%). The population of these four districts was 4425669 in 1972 and in 1981; it reached to 4573963 with comparatively a slow growth rate of 3.35%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population decreased from 15.56% to 13.35% during the period 1972 to 1981. [Table 7]

RURAL POPULATION CHANGE IN PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS, 1981-98:

From 1981 to 1998 the growth rate of rural population in districts of Punjab can be categorized as under

Category A

Lahore (99.41%), D.G. Khan (72.11%), Muzaffargarh (71.01%), Rahim Yar Khan (63.77%), and Rajanpur (63.50%) are included in this category. This category has nearly the double growth rate from 1981 to 1998, as it is 71.26%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population climbed from 14.13% to 16.37% during the period 1981 to 1998. [Table 8]

Category B

This category contains Layyah (61.78%), Bahawalpur (57.36%), Bhakkar (55.18%), Multan (53.68%) and Kasur (53.24%). Together these districts show an increase of 7262904 in 1998 from 4664968 in 1981 with an intercensal increase in rural growth of 55.69%. Their total share in Punjab's population increased from 13.62% to 14.35% during the period in question (1981-98). [Table 8]

Category C

Here we have Vehari (52.94%), Sialkot (51.43%), Pakpattan (51.12%), Lodhrain (50.36%) and Kahnawal (49.51%) in this category. It shows an increase of 7574550 in 1998 from 5011053 in 1981, with an average intercensal growth rate of 51.15%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population showed slight increase from 14.63% to 14.96% during the period 1981 to 1998. [Table 8]

Category D

Fourth category consists of Bahawalnagar (47.82%), Mianwali (46.24%), Sahiwal (42.66%), Gujranwala (42.45%) and Rawalpindi

(42.38%) these five districts show an increase of 5068460 in 1981 to 7304000 in 1998 with an intercensal increase of 44.10%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 14.80% to 14.43% during the period in question (1981-98). [Table 8]

Category E

District of Jhang (42.17%), Sheikhpura (41.67%), Okara (41.49%), Gujrat (40.70%) and Hafizabad (39.29%) fall in this category. Together these five districts increased their population from 5958111 in 1981 to 8426053 in 1998 with an intercensal growth rate of 41.42%. The share of this category in Punjab's total population showed decline from 17.40% to 16.65% during the period 1981 to 1998. [Table 8]

Category F

This category consists of T.T.Singh (38.70%), Jhelum (37.98%), Khushab (36.53%), Sargodha (36.01%) and Narowal (35.73%). Collectively these districts show an increase of 5697209 in 1998 with respect to 4162557 in 1981 with an Intercensal increase of 8.41%. Their total share in Punjab's population decreased from 12.15% to 11.25% during the period of 1981 to 1998. [Table 8]

Category G

This last category consists of four districts, which are Attock (34.69%), Faisalabad (34.35%), Chakwal (33.89%) and Mandi Bhauddin

TABLE-8

Rural Population Change in Punjab by Categories, 1981-98.

Category	Population 1981		Population 1998		Change (1981-1998)	
	Number	% of Punjab	Number	% of Punjab	Number	%
A	4838296	14.13	8286428	16.76	3448132	71.26
B	4664968	13.62	7262904	14.69	2597936	55.69
C	5011053	14.63	7574550	15.32	2563497	51.15
D	5068460	14.80	7304000	14.78	2235540	44.10
E	5958111	17.40	8426053	17.05	2467942	41.42
F	4162557	12.15	5697209	11.52	1534652	8.41
G	4537350	13.25	6051121	12.24	1513771	14.54
Punjab	34240795	99.98	50602265	99.96	16361470	47.78

Source : Computed from DCR's of Punjab-1981-98 and Table 3&4.

(28.57%). It shows an increase in rural population of 4537350 in 1981 to 6051121 in 1998. The share of this category in Punjab's total population decreased from 13.25% to 11.95% during the period of 1981 to 1998. [Table 8]

CONCLUSION

A major change during 20th century has been the growth and concentration of population in urban areas. The pace of growth in urban areas shows that approximately, three fifth of the world population will be living in urban areas by 2030. According to the 'world population data sheet 2006' most of the population in developed regions of the world is living in urban areas whereas for less developed regions the situation is vice versa. Rural population in developed regions of the world is declining gradually and most of the rural population lies in less developed areas. Pakistan, being a less developed country, has most of its population in rural areas. In 1901, nearly 90% of the total population was rural. In 1951, it decreased to 82% and until now, it is 66% of the total population. Over the time, there have been different patterns of change in growth, which can be examined through the comparison with its urban counterpart. The data gathered from previous censuses indicates a decline in rural population. Urban population is continuously increasing from 17.3% in 1951 to 31.2% in 1998. This depicts the gradual decline of rural population. The average annual growth rate in rural areas accelerated during 1951 to 1972 then it slightly declined in 1981-1998. The increase in rural growth rate in 1972 can be viewed in context of overall population growth rate. However, there is possibility that the effect of political factors, coverage and content questions may have affected the 1972 census results.

At district level, there have been changes in boundaries of administrative units and the data of all the censuses has been adjusted according to the administrative boundaries as on 1st march, 1998. Socio-economic conditions also play an important role in determining the rural population growth of different districts of Punjab. The district level change in the growth of rural population in Punjab has been discussed through dividing every intercensal period into seven categories.

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Muhammad Ali Jinnah : Event Making Personality of the 20th Century

ABDUL HAMID & ABDUL MAJID

Abstract

The achievement of Pakistan is undeniably the result of the Quaid-e-Azam's most capable leadership. It was by the arrogant attitude of the congress that the Ambassador of "Hindu Muslim Unity" became the staunch believer in the demand for Pakistan. The concept of power for the sake of power had no appeal to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was the only Muslim who had the political vision. He was the only person who could expose congress designs with an ability that was irrefutable. Muhammad Ali Jinnah had exposed the hypocritical utterance of the congress and then with a martinet's will and ingenious skill smashed them to the ground. He dominant the entire Indian political scene with single "loftiness" and shone like a pyramid of light guiding the Muslims to the most cherished goal of Pakistan.

Story of Pakistan is a story of relentless struggle of the Muslims of Indian subcontinent which culminated in the achievement of an independent sovereign state. The parallels of such remarkable and fruitful struggle are rare in the history of the world. The magnificent and the inspiring struggle of the Muslims for independence might will have come to nothing, had they been led by the people of lesser vision. Every Muslim worked for the establishment of Pakistan, the names of the leaders who led them through critical times with ability and devotion will live forever. Oblivious of their personal gains, comforts and convinced to the authenticity of their claim for the separate homeland, they led eighty

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(80) million Muslims to the cherished goal of Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was one of those leaders who devoted his life for the freedom of Muslims of Indian sub-continent.

Aga Khan wrote about the Jinnah that :

“Of all the statesmen that I have known in my life, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill, Curzon, Mussolini, Mohatma Gandhi, Jinnah is the most remarkable.”¹

He further added that :

“None of these men in my view outshone him in strength of character and in that almost uncanny combination of prescience and resolution which is state craft”.

This remark from a great man of the status of the Aga Khan in itself speaks for the political genius and integrity of the character of the Quaid-i-Azam.

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born on 25th December 1876. His father Jinnah Poonja was a hide merchant. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the eldest son. This name was suggested by his maternal uncle Mr. Qasim Musa, and was accepted by all family member. Perhaps it was the first Islamic name in the Poonja's family. Shirian Bai the mother of Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a very wise and religious lady.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the only one who by the sheer force of determination and singleness of purpose, made a name for himself in the history of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. At the age of six in the year 1881, Jinnah was sent to a school in Karachi. Five year later in 1886 his father sent him to Bombay to study at the Gokhle Das Tej Primary school for one year. He returned from Bombay in 1887 and was admitted in the Sind Madrassah High School, Karachi, where he studies for four years. In 1891, he was sent to the Christian Missionary Society High School at

Karachi. At the time Muhammad Ali Jinnah was fifteen years old and in accordance with the custom of the time, he was married to Amai Bai. But the companionship with the wife was not to last long. When in 1892, Muhammad Ali Jinnah sailed for London to study law, his younger wife died during his absence.

Even in his early boyhood Jinnah never wasted his time. All the time he shouldered his duties with a very keen sense of responsibility. Unlike the children of his age, he was a hard working boy and took his studies very seriously. As early as 1884 when he was only eight (8) years old, "Muhammad Ali Jinnah" his sister said " was a good boy, a clever boy. We lived, eight of us in two rooms as the first floor of the house on Newnham Road Karachi. A night when children were sleeping he would stand a sheet of card board against the oil lamp to shield the eyes of the children from light. Then he would read and read. One night I went to him and said, you will make yourself ill from so much study, and he answered, Bai you know, I can not achieve anything in life unless I work hard."²

Jinnah 's sober temperament and keen sense of responsibility towards his study were greatly appreciated by an Englishmen Frederick Leigh Croft, who was an exchange broker and a friend of Jinnah's father. Frederick Leigh Craft was so impressed by the sobriety and intelligence of Jinnah, that he persuaded his father, Jinnah Poonja to send him to London for study in the legal profession. Consequently at the end of his school education in 1892, Jinnah was sent to London.

After he came to London he joined the Lincoln's Inn to pursue his legal studies. The reason why he joined the Lincoln Inn was given by him later in his life, in the year 1947, when in an address to the Bar Association Karachi he said,

"I joined Lincoln's Inn because there on the main entrance, the name of the Prophet was included in the list of the great lawgivers of the world".³

After completing courses at the Lincoln's Inn Jinnah returned to India in 1896. Great changes had been taken place in his family. During his absence abroad his wife and his mother, both had died and his father was facing a financial crises in his business. For one year during 1896-7, Jinnah tried hard to establish his practice at Karachi, as a barrister, but he could not succeed. So in 1897, he left Karachi for Bombay but success was not to come all of a sudden.

The turn of century was, however lucky for Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The then Acting Advocate General of Bombay Jhon Malesworth Macpherson, in recognition of Jinnah's ability and integrity, invited him to work in his chambers. At about the same time, there was a temporary vacancy of the post of a Presidency Magistrate, in Bombay. Mr. Molesworth Macpherson recommended Jinnah for the post, and within a few weeks Jinnah became the presidency Magistrate.⁴

Although the post was to last for a few months, yet it helped Jinnah in the sense that he became distinguished in the Bar and from then on his practice increased day by day and the financial crises was gone for ever. And Jinnah had time to work without financial botherations. Three year later in 1903 Jinnah was offered an assignment to work for the corporation of Bombay on the salary of Rs.1000 per month. The way Jinnah get this job is extremely unusual, as is narrated by an advocate who knew Jinnah at that time. In his interview with Jinnah's famous biographer, Hector Bolitho, the advocate said,

In 1903 the president of the Municipal Corporation Bombay was a Scotsman, James MacDonald. He was a very important man, manager of all the affairs of the Bombay Corporation. There was a big case being tried at the High court and the place was so full that the doors had to be closed. Inside the court there was an enclosure reserved for the lawyers. When Jinnah arrived, he was quite unknown there. There was a nowhere for him to sit. He saw that James MacDonald was occupying one of the chairs reserved for the Lawyers and he asked him to move. Naturally he refused. So Jinnah went to the clerk of the court and demanded the

MacDonald be removed. The clerk was reluctant unless Jinnah threatened him to appeal to the Judge. The wretched clerk had to go and asked MacDonald to yield up his place to Jinnah. Instead of being furious, he gave up his chair and asked Jinnah's name, and soon after appointed him to act for the corporation for a fee rupees one thousand per month.³

This incident amply illustrates Jinnah's faith in the constitutional approach. It was this faith in his conviction that persisted throughout his life, and ultimately manifested itself in the creation of Pakistan.

Jinnah always said what he firmly believed. There is not a single instance in his life where we might be able to discern between the dichotomy of his speech and action a sterling quality, rare in almost all the great leaders of Indian politics. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, on whom the fortune smiled after the year 1900 had acquired a great deal of popularity and fame as an advocate of remarkable caliber. He had started participating in the political activities of the country from the platform of the Congress in the year 1906. In 1909, when the government introduced the Minto Morley reforms, he stood for the membership of the Imperial Legislation Council, and was elected by the Muslims of Bombay for this high position. At that time Muhammad Ali Jinnah's was only thirty three.

Jinnah's successful election to the Imperial Legislative Council was the first significant step in his epoch making political career. Whenever he felt that the government was being unjust to the people, he criticized it sharply, but he also praised it when he found that it had taken a good measure for the public benefits. Jinnah was never dazzled by the catchwords of the lesser politicians, who used to build their public image by criticizing the government on any issue they could lay their hands on. Jinnah views in 1909 never changed even after the establishment of Pakistan.

Mrs. Sarojini Naidu had said :

“Jinnah was pre-eminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate”.⁶

His stand was always based on reason, rather on cold logic; emotions had no place in influencing his decisions. He did not show any sign of prejudices even while dealing with delicate religious issues. This would be illustrated by Jinnah’s successful advocacy on the “Waqf” which is a kind of trust in the Islamic law.

Bill was ultimately passed by the Council and received the assent of the Viceroy. In getting the bill passed, Jinnah had the distinction to be the first private member on whom motion a bill became a law.

Jinnah’s success at the Imperial Legislative Council imparted great confidence to him. At that time he was of opinion that the Muslim as well as the Hindus should try to understand each other, so that they could work in unison for the independence of the subcontinent. The zeal with which he pursued this goal of Hindu-Muslim cooperation earned him the title of the “Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity”.

With the manifest aim of bringing the Hindu and the Muslim closer, Jinnah became the member of the All India Muslim League in 1913. at that time he was also the member of the Congress and the imperial Legislative Council and was thus in position from where he could be instrumental in harmonizing the political activities of the Congress and the Muslim League.

Thus Gokhale tributed to Jinnah as :

“He has true stuff in him and that freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of the Hindu Muslim unity”.⁷

The Congress was due to hold its annual session in December 1915, and Jinnah at that time requested Muslim League prominent leaders to hold the annual session of Muslim League at the same time and place. He had in mind the utility of the annual sessions of the two parties being held at the same time and place.

His effort bore fruit and in April 1916, due to his untiring efforts, a joint committee of the Congress and league was formed to discuss as to what demands should be made to the Government for the improvement of the Indians in social and political spheres. This was a major step in bringing the two parties together at a common platform.

In December 1916, his efforts were rewarded and both the League and the Congress met at Lucknow. Thus historic Lucknow Pact (1916) was signed by the two parties. The chief architect of this pact was Muhammad Ali Jinnah. By his sincere conciliatory efforts, Congress and Muslim League started to coordinate their activities.

The attitude of Congress was accommodating and it accepted the principle of separate electorate which was one of the chief demands of the Muslim league. Congress also agreed to the Muslim demand of "Weightage" where they were in minority it was also agreed upon by both the parties that one third ($1/3$) the seats in the Council would be reserved for the Muslims. No bill would become law unless the three fourth ($3/4$) of the representatives of the community affected would vote in favour it.

In their struggle for independence this was the first and last time that Congress- League harmony had been achieved. The Hindus and Muslims were never again to arrive at a workable compromise. Instead the event followed the Lucknow Pact only made them move in the opposite direction, once again creating a gulf of differences, which were never been bridged again.

Montagu Chelmsfor Report was published in 1918. The Congress-League scheme put forth in the Lucknow Pact 1916, was utterly

discarded and instead an ingenious device of "diarchy" was introduced. It divided the important subjects into two "transferred" and "reserved". Governor was empowered to an act "essential" bill without referring it to the Legislative Council. At the end of a ten years period, a commission was to report on the workability of this system and recommend necessary changes towards the goal of responsible government. After a few changes these proposals became the basis of the government India Act 1919. The principle of separate electorate was accepted and all the minorities had the right to adopt it.

A few month later, in March 1919, the Rowlatt Act was passed by the government. The Act empowered the government to authorize arrest without trial. The Act also included a clause by virtue of which the government could even conduct trial in secrecy without any defence whatsoever.

When the bill was first introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah vehemently opposed it saying that it had "no precedent or parallel... in any other civilized country". The Bill was however passed. Jinnah was extremely oppose to it. As a mark of protest and deep resentment against the passing of the bill he resigned from the Legislative Council. In his letter of resignation addressed to Lord Chelmsford the Viceroy, Jinnah wrote on 28 March 1919:

"The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional right of the people have been violated at the time when there is no real danger to the state by an over fretful and incompetent bureaucracy... for I feel that under the prevalent conditions I can be of no use to my people in the council... I still hope that the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu Chelmsford advise His Majesty to signify his disallowance to this black Act".⁸

The words and tone of this letter clearly indicate the constitutional temperament of Quaid-i-Azam and also his courage to write what ever he thought fit. It would be extremely rare to find another Indian at that time writing to the Viceroy in such an outspoken manner.

There was a protest all over India at the introduction of the Rowlett Act, which Jinnah called the Black Act. Jinnah had said :

“It is my duty to tell you that if these measures are passed you will create in this country from one end to the other a discontentment and agitation, the like of which you have not witnessed. And it will effect the good relation of the people and government.

In the reaction of this Black Act people demonstrated all over the country. Jallianwala Bagh incident occurred. General Reginald E.H Dyer ordered fire and in ten minutes of continued firing three hundred and seventy Nine people were killed. According to an other reports “that 1516caualities were made for 1650 bullets fired. This terrible massacre at Jallianwala Bagh created a deep hatred for the government all over India.

In 1916, Dr. Annie bezant had started the movement of the “Home Rule League” Jinnah became the member of this movement and later the President of the Bombay branch in 1920, Dr. Besant resigned from the league and Gandhi was elected in her place. The first clever move that Gandhi initiated was the Hindi translation of “Home Rule League” into and adopted of “Swaraj Sabha” thereby enlarging its appeal to the common India.

Gandhi also changed the aims of the Home Rule League. As long as Dr. Besnat was the President the slogan of the Home Rule League was

“Self government within the British Empire” where as Gandhi sought complete independence aiming to severity with the Britain. When Jinnah raised question about these changes, Gandhi replied coldly that any member who did not feel like abiding by the altered constitution” was free to resign from the membership of the league-consequently Jinnah and Nineteen other members resigned.⁹

Jinnah’s faith in his ability and constitutional propriety was such that he would not care for any other consideration, Who so ever violated the

basic principles of any case evoked his anger and he would not care whether his views were addressed to the Viceroy or to Gandhi. This force of conviction, this inexhaustible faith in his ability and this never failing courage were the secrets of his magnificent political career.

Among Jinnah's friends was Sir Dinshaw Petit a distinguished parsee gentleman of Bombay. Jinnah used to meet his friend off and on, and was intimately known to the family. There he came across Sir Dinshaw only daughter, Rutenbai. Rutenbai was known for her charm, intelligence and beauty all over Bombay and Jinnah was also captured by her and propose to her. At first Sir Dinshaw did not approve of his only daughter being married to a Muslim, but later on he gave in. Rutenbai was converted to Islam and was married to Jinnah on 19 April 1918.

By this time the W.W.I was almost over and the treaty of "SEVRES" was being proposed which included a provision for the harsh treatment to Turkey, endanger the status of the Caliph. Against this provision there were protests all over India by the Muslim led by Maulana Muhammad Ali. At first this movement was only confined to the Muslim circles, but afterwards its appeal also spread to the Congress. Gandhi was a shrewd leader. He knew that the Muslim masses were unified against the British Government, on this question if he could persuade the Congress to align itself with the Khilafat Movement, the joint force of the Hindu and the Muslim would be sufficient to extricate any amount of concessions not only on the caliphate question, but also on a number of issues regarding the Dominion Status. Consequently on his persuasion, the Congress took up the cause of caliphate.

The only person of eminence who stood apart watching with cool detachment the programmes of the non-violent and non-cooperation movement was Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He saw through the designs of the Congress.

A delegate from the British Labour Party Colonel Wedgewood

remarked that :

“There was in India at least one man who had the strength of character to stand by his conviction in the face of a huge opposition and no support whatsoever”.¹⁰

Despite his discontentment with the prevailing politics in the early twenties, Jinnah's faith in Hindu-Muslim unity never weakened. He wanted the Hindu and the Muslims to put up a united front before the Government to have themselves properly heard. He knew that the force of Hindu Muslim unity would be irresistible, but at the same time he did not approve of resorting to unconstitutional methods like the non-cooperation movement.

In 1924 addressing a meeting of the Muslim League he said :

“India due to the fact that the people of India, particularly Hindu Muslim are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other. He said, India will get dominion responsible Government the day the Hindu and Muslims are United”.¹¹

On different occasion Jinnah said that :

Muslims were justified in fearing the dominance of the Hindus, because Hindus were in control of business and industry, and were socially more advanced and therefore “unless the Muslims were guaranteed separate electorates with a fixed number of seats in the legislative council, Muslims would be in constant fear of being dominated and out voted in every province where they were in minority”.

But this sincere opinion was not taken seriously by the Congress which had by now grown far more organized and powerful than the Muslim League.

In Nineteen Twenties, things were changing very rapidly. Quaid-i-Azam was against the emotional politics. He did not support the movement like, non-cooperation and non violent Gandhi had received popularity in the Khalafat movement. He had his own hidden objectives by participating this movement. He wanted to exploit the Muslim against the British Government. This had been proved that Gandhi always worked for the Hindu cause. He wanted to rule the country by its Hindu majority as they were dominant in Education, Trade and Industries.

Gandhi's treacherous role in the Khalifat Movement disheartened the Quaid. Now Quaid-I-Azam started to change his attitude about the Hindu Muslim Unity. In 1921 he resigned from the Congress membership. Honey moon period of the Hindu Muslim cooperation had been ended. Several riots occurred in the country that proved the truth of Congress favouritism towards Hindu. Congress only advocating the Hindu's rights and interests. This made the Quaid much conscious.

In 1927 the British set a commission under the chairmanship of Lord Simon to recommend constitutional reforms for India. As there was not a single Indian included in the commission both Congress and Muslim League (Jinnah Section) refused to cooperate with it. Instead the Congress appointed the committee under the Motilal Nehru to draft a constitution for India. The committee presented its report in 1928, which is known as Nehru Report. The Nehru Report belied all the hopes of the Muslims because it did not even grant separate electorate to the Muslim also weightage in the Muslim minority areas was denied. This was a clear contradiction and contravention of the Lucknow Pact of 1916 where the Congress had accepted both these demands of the Muslim League.

Obviously this was a gross injustice. All the Muslim parties rejected it out of hand, as it was obvious that the Congress was working for the specific interests of the Hindus at the cost of the Muslims. Muslims

fear were farther justified by the Report's recommendation of a unitary, not a federate basis for constitution. This meant that the Muslims could not hope to form autonomous government in the provinces where they were in an absolute majority.

During the last week of December 1928, the Congress convened an all parties Conference to discuss the Nehru Report. The Muslims who attend the conference severely criticized the report. Jinnah was also one of those. After analyzing the report in a skilful logical method, Jinnah proposed three amendments to the safeguard the interests of the Muslims. Amendments were.

1. Muslims should have one third representation in the central legislative council.
2. In the Punjab and Bengal, Muslims should continue to be represented on the basis of their population for the period of ten years.
3. Residuary powers should not rest with the Centre, but should vest to the provinces.

These were the limited demands and safeguard the Muslims interests in the subcontinent, but the Congress, which by now had grown militant under the influence of the Hind Mahasabha, refused to listen to Jinnah who said, "I am not speaking as a Muslim, but as a Indian. It is my desire to see that we get seven crores of Musalman to march alongwith us in the struggle for freedom".¹²

Congress did not appreciated the Jinnah's demands and lost a vital chance of Hindu Muslim unity for god. Obviously Jinnah was disappointed by this Congress attitude. It was a dismal time for him. Unfortunately his second wife, Rutenbai died after serious illness and added to the sorrow in Jinnah's life.

After receiving a rebuff from the Congress, he thought of another measure that could guarantee the safety of the Muslims of India. Presided over the session of Muslim League in 31 December 1928, he put forward fourteen points which were to be kept in view whenever constitutional reform were to be introduced in India, and also affirmed that no scheme of any constitution would be acceptable to the Indian Muslims, until the fourteen points were incorporated in it.

In early October 1929, the British government announced that Britain wanted that India would achieve Dominion status, and actually it was towards the attainment of the Dominion status that future constitutional progress would be directed. Sir John Simon also supported this idea. Hence the British government organized three session of the conference between 1930-32 popularly known as the Round Table Conference.

The leaders of the Indian political parties were chosen by the Viceroy, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah was one of them. The conference failed to bring about any rapprochement between the leader of the Congress and the League. Muslims demand for separate electorate was rejected by the Congress and other safeguard demanded by them were ignored.

Gandhi tried to give an altogether different twist to the situation. He said that the cause of the Hindu Muslim conflict was the presence of the British. This was a simple fabrication aiming to divert the attention of the conference from the basic issue of constitutional safeguards for he Muslims to irrelevant detail.

Since no settlement was forth coming from amongst the delegates, the British Government took the initiative and passed the government of India Act 1935, although both the Congress and the Muslim League did not approve of it.

The non accommodating attitude of the Congress was very disheartening to Jinnah. Who had been up till now hailed as the apostle of the Hindu Muslim Unity. Jinnah decided to settle down in London after

the second Round Table Conference was held in September 1932. Jinnah said in 1938 that :

“I received shock of my life at the meeting of the Round Table Conferences. In the face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu Attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor could I make the Muslim realize the precarious position. I felt so disappointed and depressed that I decided to settle down in London”.¹³

In London, Jinnah purchased a huge bungalow and started his career by practicing before the Privy Council. There were the only days in the life of Jinnah when he seemed to have led a real peaceful life, away from the fret and fury of the Indian politics.

Liaquat Ali Khan and his wife came to England in 1933 on the honeymoon. He requested Jinnah to return to the subcontinent and lead the Muslim League. Liaquat's efforts were successful and Jinnah once again returned to India in 1934. When Jinnah came to India the Congress had firmly established itself even in some of the Muslim majority areas (NWFP).

Jinnah was, therefore faced with a prodigious task to revive the Muslim League and establish it on all India basis. He started earnestly to prepare the league for the coming election to be held in 1937. Congress won a big victory in the elections and also won a few Muslim seats from the Muslim majority area. Although League achievement of 102 out of 482 Muslim seats was not height commendable. Congress won twenty six (26) Muslim seats, of which fifteen (15) were from the (NWFP) and merely eleven in the rest of the country. By virtue of this victory in the election Congress was in position to form ministries in the seven out of eleven provinces. In 1937 Jawarhalal Nehru stated that :

“There are only two forces in India today British Imperialism and Indian nationalism as represented by the Congress”.

Jinnah refused to accept this and sharply reminded him that :

"There was another party, Muslim League which alone had the right to represent the Muslims of India".¹⁴

In his speech at Lucknow on 15 October 1937, Jinnah said that :

"The majority community have clearly shown that "Hindustan is for the Hindus".

From then on Jinnah has no confusion about the Hindu tactics. He was finally convinced that the Hindu majority wanted to coerce and dominate the Muslims, and had no desire to give them a fair treatment. At this the Iqbal's words which the poet had uttered at the historic annual session of the All India Muslim League at Allahabad :

"I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamate into a single state. Self government within or without the British Empire and the formation of consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North west of India", got his attention."

Jinnah was also influenced by the letter of Iqbal to him in 1937 June 21 in which he wrote :

"Why should not the Muslim of North west India and Bengal be considered as nation entitled to self determination just as other nations in India and out side India are".¹⁵

These words gave new meaning to Jinnah. He seems to have been convinced that the Muslims of India could never live with Hindus. With this conviction he, in his presidential address at the annual session of the Sind Muslim League in 1938, recommended to the All India Muslim League.

"To devise a scheme of constitution under which the Muslim majority provinces might attain full independence in the freedom of their own".

Meanwhile the anti-Muslim activities of the Congress ministries continued to work against the Muslim interests "Bande Matram" a song in anti-Muslim tone was raised to the status of the national anthem. Hindi language was being developed at the expense of Urdu, banned cow slaughtering, Hindu were being preferred in service.

Congress leader posed complete ignorance of the Muslims feelings. The Congress authoritarian attitude during these years of 1937-39 become obvious from the following lines written to Jinnah on April 6, 1938.

Obviously the Muslim league is an important communal organization and deal with it as such. But we have to deal with all organization and deal with it as such. But we have to deal with all organization and individual that come within our ken".

Naturally Jinnah was annoyed at the tone of this letter and he replied.

"Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and military spirit as if the Congress is the sovereign power".¹⁶

On 15 November 1939, Congress High Command" ordered its Ministries in the seven provinces to resign. Four days later they tendered their resignation, the Congress leader took the stand on non-cooperation with the Britain in its war unless India was declared independent".

Muslims were very happy to get rid of the Congress rule. The Quaid-I-Azam asked his supporter all over India to observe the day of Deliverance and thank giving on 22 December 1939. day was observed with great enthusiasm not only by the Muslims all over India, but also by thousands of Hindus parsees, Christians and untouchables.

During this time Jinnah was thinking about the separate home land for the Muslims. More than ever he became convinced that the Hindu would not tolerate the Muslims when the British left. The Congress reign had amply demonstrated this, Jinnah wrote an article published in the British "Time and Tide" on 9 March 1940 saying that :

The British people being Christian sometime forget the religious wars of their own history and today consider religion as a private and personal matter between man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam. Both these religions have definite social codes and aspects of their social life".

A fortnight after the publication of this article, the Muslim League passed the historic Lahore Resolution Addressing a mammoth public meeting on 23 March 1940, the Quaid-e-Azam said :

"We have our past experience of the last two and half years... we have learnt many lessons. We are now apprehensive and can trust nobody. It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Muslims are a minority. He said, Muslims are a nation by any definition of a nation. Hindus and Muslims belong to two religions, philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry, nor inter-dine and indeed belong to different civilizations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts of life are different. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other and likewise their victories and defeats overlap. He also added that :

"To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical majority other as a minority must lead to growing discontent. Muslims are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homeland their territory and their state".¹⁷

It was on this historic session of the Muslim League that Sher-i-Bengal A.K. Fazal Haq, the Chief Minister of Bengal, moved the

resolution which was ultimately to become the target of achievement during a hectic political struggle in the sub continent.

The Muslims of the subcontinent responded very well to the Lahore Resolution. For first time after the advent of the British Raj they visualized a concrete aim, and united themselves in their bid to achieve it. Fortunately for them they were being led by a sincere, selfless and brilliantly capable leader. It was after the Lahore Resolution was passed that the title of "Quaid-I-Azam" "The great leader" was given to Muhammad Ali Jinnah by his grateful coreligionists.

On 8 August 1940, Viceroy of India Lord Linlithgow made an offer, popularly known as August offer. Although Muslim League did not accept the August offer for it would not accept to have only two representatives at the Viceroy's Executive Council. It was accepted by the Muslim after some assurance from the Government.

Two year after the Lahore Resolution was passed. Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on 23 March 1942 to discuss with Indian leaders the constitutional problems of India. Cripps put forward the proposal that at the end of the war, a constitution making body would be set up which will achieve Dominion status for India.

The Congress rejected the Cripps proposal, Gandhi said that the proposal amounted to a "post dated cheque on a failing bank". Muslim League also rejected the Cripps offer, because it did not promise the creation of Pakistan.

Jinnah's rising popularity among the Muslims made the Congress leaders uneasy. They therefore acted in all possible haste to coerce the British to grant independence to India. So that after the British are gone they may be able to dictate their terms to Jinnah and Muslim League. On 8 August 1942, the Congress passed a "Quit India" Resolution demanding the British to withdraw.

The Muslim League advised the Muslims to stay away from the "Quit India" movement, because the Congress bring about the establishment of the Hindu Raj, and to deal a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan.

Jinnah visualized the movement to be a desperate mentality" and advised the Muslims not to participate in this most dangerous mass movement.

As soon as the "Quit India" movement was launched, the government quickly acted and arrested all the notable Congress leaders including Gandhi. This gave Jinnah ample time to reorganized the Muslim League and intend its appeal to the Muslims all over the country. Jinnah worked day and night. Due to his untiring efforts, the demand for Pakistan became the only demand for the Muslim of the subcontinent.

The demand for Pakistan not only meant freedom from the oppressive Hindus but it presented the concept of a separate and completely independent Islamic state, where in the Muslims were absolutely free to live according to the dictate of their religion. By the time Gandhi was released in May 1944, the Muslim League had disciplined the Muslims in their demand for Pakistan.

Gandhi was too shrew to ignore this. He wrote to Jinnah desiring to see him. The meeting between Jinnah and Gandhi started on 9 September 1944 and continued for three weeks. Quaid-e-Azam explained to Gandhi that:

"We maintain that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million. We are nation with our own distinct culture and civilization, language and literature art and architecture, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambitions- in short we have our own distinctive out look on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation."¹⁸

Near the end of their talk Gandhi put forward the C.R. Formula" according to Gandhi, the separate state" of the Muslim so carved out would be more or less a federating unit where "Foreign affairs, defence, internal communication custom, commerce and the like, must continue to be the matter of common interests between the contracting parties. Jinnah replied this as :

"According to Lahore Resolution as I have already explained it to you, all these matters which are the lifeblood of my state can not be delegated to any central authority".¹⁹

He also discarded the idea of Gandhi that Muslim should wait until the British leave the subcontinent. Naturally with such conflicting views the leaders could not reach at a common conclusion and talk broke down without any result.

A few days later, in an interview to the representative of London "News Chronicle" published on 4 October 1944 Jinnah said :

There is only one practical realistic way of resolving Hindu-Muslim differences. This is to divide India into two sovereign parts of Pakistan and Hindustan and for each of us to trust the other to give equitable treatment to Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in India .. The fact is that the... Hindus will not reconcile themselves to our complete independence".

At the end of the war in Europe, Lord Wavel, the Viceroy, put forward a plan in May 1945, according to which all the executive members of the Viceroy's Council would be Indian except the Commander in Chief, who would be an Englishman. The executive Council thus constituted was to work in the capacity of an "Interim Government" until war in Japan ended. He said that there would be a parity between the caste Hindus and Muslims members of the Executive Council.

Jinnah agreed, but he said that the Muslim League alone shall have the right to nominate the Muslim member since it was completely

representative of the Muslim interests in the subcontinent. The Congress refused to accept this stand point, this conflict between the League and the Congress ended in a dead lock, and negotiation on the Wavell plan broke down.

Had Jinnah yielded to the Congress demand of nominating the Muslim Members of Viceroy's Council, this would have led to a conclusion that Muslim League was not completely representative of the Indian Muslims. Jinnah's mind was a computer's mind. He had the foresight to see the complication arising out of the acceptance of the Wavell's plan, and therefore he decided not to accept it.

The elections were held in 1946. Jinnah's eleven years of hard work and intensive efforts bore the fruit in the form of thumping victory for the Muslim League. The Muslim League capture all the (30) thirty (Muslim) seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. In Bengal it won 113 out of 119. Muslim seat whereas in the Punjab it gained 73 out of the 86 seats reserved for the Muslims. In all Muslim League got 425 out of 492 Muslim seats in the provincial legislature.

These elections were fought on the demand of Pakistan. Muslim League vindicated its dual claim of sole representative of the Indian Muslim. It was by virtue of the charismatic personality of Jinnah, that Muslim League stood victorious, which gain only 102 seat out of 482 Muslim seats in 1937 election, became the undisputed representative party of the Muslims of the subcontinent.

In 1946, the British Government announced the appointment of a "Cabinet Mission" to evolve in consultation with the Indian leaders a plan for the transfer of power". The commission arrived in India on 24 March 1946, and soon got busy in consulting the leaders of Congress and Muslim League. Commission presented its own plan published on 16 May 1946.

After the acceptance of the Plan by both the parties, the Viceroy started negotiations with the leaders of the Congress and Muslim

League in order to form the Interim Government. The Viceroy had told Jinnah that all there would be twelve portfolios in the Interim Government and would be distributed as follows.

- Five for Congress
- Five for Muslim League
- One for Sikhs
- One for Christians or Anglo Indian

But when it came to negotiation with the Congress, the Viceroy's plan was refused by Nehru.

In order to pacify the Congress, Viceroy offered them six seats including one for a scheduled caste member, making the total number of portfolios thirteen. Jinnah naturally did not appreciate this change. He said that I do not see how this can be called parity. But Congress refused to accept even this agreement. Viceroy came forward with yet another arrangement. He increased the portfolios to fourteen but even this new arrangement was not acceptable to the Congress. League was now depending upon the assurance given by the Viceroy in his statement of 16 June 1946.

Jinnah rightly anticipated that in the event of the Congress refusing to join, the Muslim League will be asked to form the Government. But the Viceroy did not take this decision. Instead he appointed a "Caretaker Government" consisting of the permanent government officials. Jinnah was enraged and said bitterly.

I maintain that the cabinet Mission and the Viceroy have gone back on their word within ten days of the publication of their proposals, is not implementing the statement of 16 June 1946.

During this period the Congress leaders (Gandhi and Nehru) were feeling very unpleasant about the grouping arrangement of the Cabinet Mission plan. Jawaharlal Nehru who became the President of All India

Congress in July 1946, addressing the press conference on 10 July 1946 he said in replied to the question, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad mention in his book "India wins freedom".

"Jawaharlal said that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and regarded itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission plan as it thought best. To this Abdul Kalam Azad added. It was not correct to say that the Congress was free to modify the plan as it pleased".

Jinnah was greatly perturbed over this statement, which was clearly indicative of the militant Congress designs. And Muslim interests would be clearly jeopardized. He immediately issued a statement in response to the Nehru's statement on 27 July 1946. Attacking the Congress for shifting its stand Quaid advised the council of Muslim League to withdraw its acceptance from the Cabinet Mission plan. He further added,

"We are alone to be guided by reason, justice, honesty and fairplay, when on the other hand there are perfidious dealing by the Congress. An other resolution was passed which urged the Muslim to "Resort to Direct Action on achieve Pakistan" in order to get rid of the present British slavery and to the contemplated future caste Hindustan." Quaid-e-Azam for the first and the last time in his long political career resorted to the "Direct Action", as he became convinced that all reasons had been exhausted and that it was useless to discuss the future of the Indian Muslims through constitutional means. He had before him the bitter experience of the Congress reaction on the Cabinet Mission Plan.²⁰

All India Congress was disturbed at this bold stand taken by the Quaid-e-Azam, and passed the resolution on 10 August 1946, saying that they were ready to accept the cabinet mission plan but now it was too late. Their inner feeling on the plan had been exposed. Quaid-e-Azam refused to accept this assurance saying that :

"It is only a repetition of the Congress stand taken by them from very beginning only put in the different phraseology".

The Viceroy invited Nehru to form the interim government even if the Muslim League did not join. He was even allowed to nominate five Muslims to the seats reserved for the Muslim. Viceroy appealed the Muslim to co-operate with. Jinnah was enraged at this demand for co-operation, when the government had chosen to disregard the Muslims' sentiments entirely.

In his speech on 29 August 1946 Jinnah said, "The Viceroy has committed a double betrayal in going back on his solemn word and in ignoring and bypassing the Muslim League... Viceroy's action to day is nothing but a wicked breach of the declaration of August 1940 (August offer) made by the British Government, to which the labour party was committed.

However, it was not advisable for the Muslim League to continue to remain outside the interim government as it would have been prejudicial to the Muslim interests. Following the negotiation between the Viceroy and Jinnah Muslim League took office in the interim government, on 25 October 1946.

The 16th of August was to be the "Direct Action Day" for Muslim League. Muslims obeyed their leader and the day passed peacefully except in Calcutta, where the Hindu-Muslim riots of the worst nature took place resulting in 20,000 casualties. Muslim losses were greater. The government summoned the Constituent Assembly to start functioning from 9 December, 1946 but the Muslim League refused to participate in the Assembly on the plea that the Congress acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan was not genuine.

On 20 February 1947 the British Prime Minister, Lord Attlee, declared the "definite intention" of the British government to take necessary steps to effect the transfer of power to responsible Indian hands by the date not later than June 1948.

In order to effect "the transfer of power" Lord Mountbatten was appointed the Viceroy of India. He arrived in India on 22 March 1947. At

at that time there was great unrest in the country. There were number of riots between Hindu Muslim groups, where Muslim demanding that Pakistan was the only solution for the Muslim India. Viceroy held numerous meeting with the Quaid-e-Azam and the Congress leaders and chalk out the plan for Indian independence and sent it to London through the Chief of Viceroy's staff, Lord Ismay, for final approval on 2 May 1947. plan was approved by the British government. He send the copy of the plan to Jinnah and Gandhi.

Nehru refused to accept the plan as certain conditions were not to his liking. Mountbatten arrived in England on 19 May 1947 to decide the future of India. He got the approved plan by the British Government and returned to India fortnight later. The plan was made public on 3 June 1947. The Quaid-e-Azam in his broad cast on the All India Radio told the Muslim of India triumphantly that Pakistan would come into being. At the end of his speech he became emotional perhaps for the first time in his life. He raised his tone, and in a voice charged with enthusiasm said,

“Pakistan Zindabad”.

The borders for the new states were to be demarcated by a Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a choice to which both parties agreed. Although later on the Quaid was shocked by the bias of the Radcliffe Award.

Jinnah commented on this injustice of the Boundary Commission as: “The division of India is now finally and irrevocably effected. No doubt we feel that the carving of this great independent Muslim state had suffered injustices. The latest blow that we received was the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award..... As honorable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune, but we must bear up this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope”.²¹

CONCLUSION

The achievement of Pakistan was undeniably the result of the Quaid-e-Azam's most capable leadership. The way he grappled with the British and the Hindu forces, particularly after the Cabinet Mission Plan was made public, was most admirable. His approach towards the problem was always rational and practical, Jinnah followed the principle.

"Think a hundred times before you take a decision, but once a decision has been taken, stand by it as one man"

He was the only one who never made a secret of his intentions and not for once resorted to underhand means. Confident of himself he took bold and emphatic steps in the independence movement. All through his life he sought to serve the Muslims to the best of his ability. In the beginning of his political career he followed the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity, he did so because he realized that it would be best in the interest of the Muslims to work in co-operation with the Hindus.

His later experience, particularly after the publication of the Nehru Report and Round Table Conferences, about Hindu mentality, led him to revise his views.

In the Hindu activities of the Congress he saw that they were working in the establishment of the Hindu Raj. This realization was further confirmed in 1937 when Congress ministries came to power and started prejudiced to Muslim interests. The grievances of the Muslims were confirmed by the publication of the Shareef Report and the Pirpur Report.

It was by the arrogant attitude of the Congress that the Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity" became the staunch believer in the demand for Pakistan. The concept of power for the sake of power had no appeal to Jinnah.

Famous historian Sidney Hook in his book, "The Hero in History" drew a distinction among historical figures. He divided them into two

categories 'event making' and 'eventful', to the first category belonged leaders who were exceptionally adept in driving events. Pakistan's Muhammad Ali Jinnah falls in the first category of event making class.

Jinnah, compared to the Congress leaders, was stately, truthful and highly dignified. All his life he never exploited the masses to court popularity. He did what his conscience told him. After analyzing the situation would put behind his convictions the weight of argument which no advisory could counter. He was the only Muslim who had the political vision. He was the only person who could expose Congress designs with an ability that was irrefutable. It was because of these sterling qualities that he succeeded in creating the largest Muslim State in the world. One by one he exposed the hypocritical utterances of the Congress and then with a martinet's will and ingenious skill smashed them to the ground. He dominant the entire Indian political scene with single "loftiness" and shone like a pyramid of light guiding the Muslims to the most cherished goal of Pakistan. The Jinnah had an unflinching faith in the earnest human efforts.

The Quaid-e-Azam had been suffering from bronchitis since quite a few year ago, but in his efforts for Pakistan, he never found time to take complete rest. After the establishment of Pakistan although he was happy, but he was saddened by brutal Muslim massacres, and the problems o Kashmir and fell ill seriously in July 1948. he died on 11 September 1948, but his name will continue to live and his remarkable personality will continue to inspire the people of Pakistan for ever.

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Pakistan Republican Party

JAVED HAIDER SYED

Abstract

The paper relates to the history of Pakistan's politics in general and to the Pakistan Republican Party in particular. The stretch of the period, therefore, is from 1956 to 1958. Indeed it is the most critical period of Pakistan's political history in which the Pakistan Republican Party had played the central role. It had moulded the destiny of the country to a miserable path which is elucidated in the pages to follow. As characterized by the period, the political parties that emerged were all infected with fatal diseases like immorality, corruption and selfishness. The party came into office even before coming into existence and its leader was appointed chief minister of the province yet to created.

The Marxian dialectical theory's thesis was manifested in Pakistan from 1947 to 1958. It was apparently a feudalistic society, where the feudal lord was at the helm of the affairs. Not only that he controlled the social, economical and political affairs but also, he indelible stamped his personality on the process of history. The acrobacy in the gymnasium of the country's politics was coached by the incredible vested interests. Since the government at this crucial period was run by the Pakistan Republican Party, therefore the entire responsibility administration rests upon it. The involvement of so towering personalities in so abominable crime is a reflection of the political system which was patronized and practiced by the Pakistan Republican Party.

The present work relates to the history of Pakistan's politics in general and to the Pakistan Republican Party in particular. The party came into office even before coming into existence and its leader was

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appointed chief minister of the province yet to be created. The stretch of the period, therefore, is from 1956 to 1958. Indeed it is the most critical period of Pakistan's political history in which the Pakistan Republican Party had played the central role. It had moulded the destiny of the country to a miserable path which is elucidated in the pages to follow.

The political kaleidoscope of the period was consisted of the elements namely the feudal lords, the beaurocrats and the defense-personal. One way or the other, these three elements remained in the forefront of the politics during the period under review. Nevertheless the politicians either deliberately or out of compulsion bowed to the pre-conceived ideas of these three ruling powers. Pakistan at this stage was being ruled less by democratic institutions and more by the will of the rulers who always liked to maintain their "all-mightiness".

The early 1950s especially after the death of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan at Rawalpindi on October 16, 1951, brought a period of uncertainty and political manipulation of the highest order which eventually led to the establishment of a military regime in October 1958. After the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, Malik Ghulam Muhammad became the third Governor-General of Pakistan. Nazimuddin was dismissed from premiership on April 16, 1953.¹ Muhammad Ali Bogra was then appointed the Prime Minister. Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly passed new laws curtailing the powers of the Governor-General who revengefully dissolved the assembly. Sindh High Court ruled out the dissolution but the Federal Court, however, overturned the Sindh High Court Ruling and a new assembly was elected on May 28, 1955.

In August 1955, Ghulam Muhammad fell ill and had to resign in September. Iskandar Mirza became the acting Governor-General. He dismissed Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister and made him the ambassador to the United States of America. After the dismissal of Mohammad Ali Bogra, Ch. Muhammad Ali took the office of the Prime Minister on 11 August 1955. He had a coalition cabinet of Muslim League and the United Front. He had the honour and privilege to be the

first Prime Minister of Pakistan who framed the first ever Constitution of Pakistan in 1956. The framing of the new constitution also brought with it many problems and the question of forming the One-Unit into the limelight. The Prime Minister was very weak and a puppet in the hands of the President. President Iskandar Mirza along with the help of Ch. Muhammad Ali and Governor Mushtaq Gurmani made Dr. Khan Sahib the Chief Minister of West Pakistan just before the One-Unit scheme was actually put into operation on October 5, 1955.²

As far as the history of the creation of One-Unit is concerned S. Chandra Chatopadhia, a Congress member of Parliament from East Pakistan floated the idea in 1949.³ Later on the idea was adopted by Ghulam Muhammad⁴ but he could not give it the proper shape as it was strongly criticized by all the provinces, which eventually led to an unqualified dismissal of the Chief Ministers of N.W.F.P., Sindh and the Punjab.⁵ Abdul Ghaffar Khan was the greatest opponent of the proposal of One-Unit and to slow down his campaign, his brother Dr. Khan Sahib was used as bait.⁶

Under the direction of the Prime Minister, Mumtaz Daultana drafted the technicalities involved in creating the One-Unit,⁷ which made Dr. Khan Sahib as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan along with Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani as the Governor. Dr. Khan Sahib immediately after holding the office started popularizing the idea of creating One-Unit. He wanted to create a group of politicians who could be used as backing to his own office and the office of the Governor General.

He was quite successful in gaining the support of about 72 political leaders in a short time.⁸ As a reasonable number of signatories were brought to the platform, Dr. Khan Sahib formed the 'One-Unit Party' which raised the eyebrows of Mumtaz Daultana and Sardar Bahadur Khan who later approached Ch. Muhammad Ali in Karachi and abreast him with the latest developments. In response to the protest by the Muslim Leaguers on the formation of One-Unit Party, Dr. Khan Sahib gave some interesting statement. He said that "One-Unit Party's main

objective was to mobilize public opinion to counter propaganda against One-Unit and it has nothing to do with the ministry-making nor would it act as a rival party to the Muslim League.⁹

By April 1956, the Leaguers enmity against Dr. Khan Sahib was mounting partially because of his past alliance with the Indian National Congress and partially because of the undaunted support availed by him from Iskandar Mirza.¹⁰ A meeting of the Muslim League Party was held on April 1, 1956. The Pro. Dr. Khan Leaguers (led by Daultana), tried to convince their party that Dr. Khan would not try to organize a party of his own and he would select ministers by consulting the leaders of the Muslim League.¹¹ Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar did not take part in the discussions. The Muslim League party passed a resolution, condemning the appointment of Dr. Khan Sahib and resolving to establish a Muslim Leaguer in his place. Muslim League was the majority party in the parliament and Dr. Khan Sahib had to have assistance from the Muslim League to stay in the office.¹²

Meanwhile Sardar Nishtar became the president of the Muslim League who immediately started to reorganize the party. A Working Committee was formed to organize the West Pakistan Muslim League. The amendments to the constitution of the League gave the President the powers to nominate 12 of the 22 members, to dismiss any member, to reshuffle and reconstitute the party etc., thus vesting concentrated powers in the President.¹³ The Muslim League captured 245 seats in the provincial assembly as against the total of 310 seats. This majority lead by the Muslim League became the real obstacle for Dr. Khan Sahib but he was rescued by the statement issued by Ch. Mohammad Ali favouring his (Dr. Khan's) retention as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan in order to appease the former provinces of West Pakistan,¹⁴ whereas, based on their claim of being the majority party, the League demanded the appointment of Sardar Bahadur Khan as Chief Minister of West Pakistan instead of Dr. Khan Sahib.¹⁵

The cabinet of Dr. Khan Sahib had many prominent Muslim Leaguers like Khan Sardar Bahadur Khan, Mumtaz Daultana, etc., whose loyalties towards their party were doubtful. On April 23, 1956 the

Working Committee of the Pakistan Muslim League offered the alternative to the members of Dr. Khan Sahib's cabinet, either to resign from the cabinet or to stand deprived of their membership from the League on account of clear violation of the mandate of the party.¹⁶ Dr. Khan Sahib reacted quickly by promising the Muslim Leaguers in his cabinet of ministerial appointments and also declaring the formation of the "Pakistan Republican Party", the same day.¹⁷ The Party attracted many prominent figures like Syed Hasan Mahmud, a former Chief Minister of Bahawalpur State. The Muslim Leaguers in Dr. Khan's cabinet like Mamdot, Malik Feroz Khan Noon and Sardar Abdur Rashid who were once faithful to the Muslim League were now propagating for the Republican Party. Under the patronage of the President Iskandar Mirza, soon the new party in the federal parliament swelled to the majority of 21 against the Muslim League's remnant of 15.¹⁸

Despite of the fact that the Pakistan Republican Party was largely composed of ex-Muslim Leaguers, it constituted a new factor in the politics of Pakistan. Groups and personal loyalties were unquestionably the dominating considerations in the selection of the Republican nominees.¹⁹ The largest single group was that of the landlord of the West Pakistan. In the last week of September 1956, the Republican Party held a convention at Lahore. The component parts of the convention were old Unionists, Congressites, renegades and big landlords who brought with them their tenants, servants and friends. Major parts of the Province (West Pakistan) were not represented at all. There was no delegate from the Tribal Areas, Baluchistan, Northern parts of the former Punjab and some parts of the former Sindh. About half a dozen National Assembly members attended the convention out of the total claim of thirty-one. Abdul Ali MP was the sole delegate from East Pakistan.²⁰ The convention did not succeed in establishing a firm foundation for future activity. It was due to this reason that in December of the same year, the General Secretary of the Party resigned from the office saying that "the party was insolvent, its leaders were too busy with ministerial posts to have time to spend on party affairs and the party had no fixed policy."²¹

At this juncture, the Governor Mushtaq Gurmani drafted the manifesto of the Pakistan Republican Party and the party was given a

formal character by adopting her constitution.²² According to its constitution the Republican Party would strive to educate and organize public opinion in support of its aims and objects. It would endeavor to implement its programme for the preservation of the sovereignty, independence, solidarity and integrity of the nation and the political economics and social progress of the people. The constitution outlined the party structure which was made up of ward and village committees, constituency committees, district councils, provincial conventions, the national convention, municipal and district board parties, the provincial assembly parliamentary parties and the national assembly parliamentary party. The National Convention was the supreme organ of the Republican Party. It was to guide the provincial organizations on all matters of national importance and formulate the national policy and programme of the party. It was to elect a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, General Secretary, two Joint Secretaries and Treasurer as well as twenty members of the National Council (the central organ of the party). Membership of the party was open to every citizen at the age of 18 subscribing to its aims and objects and paying the annual membership fee of Annas 4 (paisas 25) per annum. Default in the payment, deliberate absence from three consecutive meetings and defiance of discipline could render the member liable to expulsion. The membership also carried with it the obligation to devote at least 6 hours a month to party work assigned by the appropriate task committees. Furthermore the party was required to raise corps of volunteers in each unit and to set up centers for their training and organization in district offices.²³

But the practical application of this theoretical enunciation was, however, a different story. More than two years after the convention, its constitution was very much on the paper and the organizing committee whose life was to expire on September 30, 1957, still exercised all power and authority on the party's behalf. The enrolment date, which was to be closed on March 15, 1957, was extended from time to time despite of the General Secretary's bold assertion that "about 20 lakh persons had already demanded membership forms from the party's central office."²⁴

The manifesto of the Republican Party was very interesting in many ways. It refused to accept the Muslim League as a political party. It stated that the Muslim League was just a get together of certain

ambitious individuals who wanted to retain their power and it was due to this desire of remaining in power that the constitution-making was delayed, general elections were withheld, civil liberties and fundamental rights were curtailed, opposition parties were harassed and the freedom of political expression was restricted. The manifesto also explained that the Republican Party was so named as to signify its commitment to the preservation and protection of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the upholding of the sovereignty of the people and their right to rule themselves and the consolidation and enlargement of national freedom.²⁵

Since the party enjoyed undisputed patronage of the President, the Prime Minister and the Governor, the Muslim Leaguers who had not joined the party before, now began to shift their loyalties towards it. The Governor declined the Resolution of the Working Committee of the Pakistan Muslim League seeking the replacement of Dr. Khan Sahib by a Muslim Leaguer. The total strength of the House at that time was 300, out of which 204 MLA's belonged to the Muslim League, of whom 131 voted for the resolution. It was at this juncture that the elections for speaker of the house fell due. Sardar Bahadur Khan declared that 178 MLA's for the speaker's election will support the Muslim League, where as the Republican Party claimed the support of 171 MLA's on the same day. On May 20, 1956, the elections were conducted in a 'disorderly manner', under the chairmanship of Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qazalbash. The candidates²⁶ of both the parties polled equal number of votes i.e. 148 (4 seats vacant). The tie was now to be solved by polling the casting vote by the Chairman. The Muslim League considering him to be their sympathizer took it for granted that he must have voted for them but the Republican Party won the election by a lead of the sole casting vote.²⁷ Next day the leaders of the Muslim League challenged Assembly proceedings in High Court. Abdussattar Pirzada, a Muslim League leader changed his garb in few hours, in the morning he entered the courtroom as Muslim Leaguer but came out a Republican Minister.²⁸

The opportunists who had joined the Republican Party with their vested interests were not disappointed.²⁹ Dr. Khan Sahib expanded his

cabinet by creating a number of new ministries.³⁰ The conflict between the two rival parties started to affect the Central Assembly. The Muslim League started building up the pressure on Ch. Mohammad Ali to dismiss Gurmani from the Governorship or face expulsion from the party.³¹ This brought Ch. Mohammad Ali to a point of bifurcation. To avoid this confrontation he tried to deal the situation diplomatically. He released a statement saying, "it is the representation of the people in parliament who are primarily charged with the duty of managing the affairs of the country. If parliamentary leadership is continuously subjected to the caprice of personal and power politics by elements external to it, the conventional democratic concepts and constitutional practices will have lost all their reliance."³² Symptoms were already appearing for withdrawal of party backing from him. There were a number of Muslim Leaguers whose loyalties were doubtful. At least 21 of them were distinguishable who carried the label of Muslim League but had all their sympathies for the Republican Party and were the trusted friends of the President.³³ Two of the most prominent Muslim Leaguers i.e. Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar and Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi resigned from their ministerial positions as a mark of protest against the incapability of the Prime Minister. The incident was resultant of the fact that the Prime Minister deliberately absented himself from the meeting of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in August 1956.³⁴ Later, on August 7, 1956, Ch. Mohammad Ali convened the meeting of the Muslim League-United Front Coalition Party, which was boycotted by Muslim League members of parliament. It was perhaps on this occasion that the Muslim League decided to strip-off Ch. Mohammad Ali from all laurels. Under these unfavorable circumstances, Ch. Mohammad Ali was left with no alternative save resigning his position both from the party and from the office, which he did on September 8, 1956. Accounting for his resignation he lamented against those Muslim Leaguers who assured their full support and assistance for the cause of Dr. Khan Sahib's candidature, but backed out at the hour of trial. He also criticized Sardar Nishtar's attitude stating that it was he who had appointed him the President of the Muslim League.³⁵

AWAMI LEAGUE-REPUBLICAN PARTY COALITION (September 12, 1956 to October 11, 1957)

After the acceptance of Ch. Mohammad Ali's resignation, President Iskandar Mirza was left with no alternative but to invite Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (Chief of Awami League) to form new cabinet. On September 12, 1956, Suhrawardy announced his cabinet that emerged out of the coalition of his own party and the Republican Party. The Republican Party being in alliance with the President posed a permanent threat to Suhrawardy who, under the circumstance, became merely a nominee of the President.

The Awami League professed and propagated a programme, which was altogether different from that of the other parties, particularly in the fields of foreign policy and provincial autonomy. The 1956 Constitution was brought under fire and mercilessly criticized by Suhrawardy. He also brought in nominee ministers of the Republican Party, whose nomination was based on their loyalties to their own organization.³⁶ As a seasoned parliamentarian, Suhrawardy had exposed his inborn talents and was thus respected and highly regarded by the contemporary politicians and the people of the country. President Iskandar Mirza was feeling a threat in the person of Suhrawardy.³⁷

In the National Assembly Suhrawardy was maintaining a weaker position for he could muster only 13 votes, whereas the Republicans (who were supporting the President) were 21 in number. Alert as he was, Suhrawardy adopted various methods of popularizing himself, which were obviously gone unapproved by the President. His frequent appearances in the public, his attitude of extending patronage to all party members, his behavior of seeking advices and extending co-operation, were all gathered to create a niche for himself in public. He cleverly allocated the portfolios, which implied a larger intercourse with the public to the ministers of his own party, who were strictly instructed to gain popularity.

On the other hand, he allocated portfolios of lesser public involvement to the ministers belonging to the Republican Party. The

ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance were allocated to Feroz Khan Noon and Syed Amjad Ali respectively. Contrary to that the ministries of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Education were scored by the Awami League ministers, while he himself, being the Prime Minister, supervised the Foreign Affairs. Actually he wanted to convert his party into political power, which may infuse its influence on the majority of the Republican Party. Suhrawardy had a strong liking for the Muslim League in general and for Mumtaz Daultana in particular.³⁸

The question of electorates was also creating complication as the 1956 Constitution had already left this problem unsolved like many other critical issues. The next general elections were due and it had to become the fundamental question for the elections. Constitutionally the matter was to be decided by the parliament with due consultation of the provincial assemblies. On the other hand the political parties of the country, both at the center and the provinces, were active in exploiting the situation to their advantage. Each of them wanted to solve it according to their ideology or manifesto. The Muslim League stood for separate electorates, the reason being their adherence to the ideology of Pakistan.³⁹ The Republican Party was not sure of its stand on the issue. Dr. Khan Sahib came out with a statement that it was all up to the Constituent Assembly to decide the issue and that his opinion being merely personal, did not have to be reckoned with.⁴⁰ On August 1, 1956, the matter was brought before the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly when spontaneously the Republican Party decided to vote for the Separate Electorates. On August 4, the assembly decided to favor the Separate Electorates. The decision obviously reckoned full support from both the Republican Party and the Muslim League while the Sindh Awami Mahaz and the Hindu MLA's discarded the Resolution.⁴¹

In the eastern wing the situation was quite topsy-turvy. In the East Pakistan Assembly, the Hindu minority was extremely significant, almost decisive. Some of the political parties like the Awami League, Pakistan National Congress Party; the Ganatrantra Dal etc. supported Joint Electorates beyond any doubt. Only the Nizam-i-Islam Party and

the Khilafat-i-Rabbani Party supported the Separate Electorates. The Pakistan Scheduled Caste Federation decided to accept the formula of Joint Electorate with the provision that a certain number of seats be reserved for them, while the Krishak Saramik Party was still tumbling in darkness to reach to a decision. On October 1, 1956, the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly intimated its decision to the National Assembly and evidently it favoured the Joint Electorates.

West Pakistan Legislative Assembly was favouring the Separate Electorates where as its eastern counterpart voted the other way. The country seemed standing divided on this issue of vital significance. The position exhibited the division of the nation both on the political front and the national front. The magnitude of the issue was aggravated further because the Central Government was constituted of the coalition between the Republican and the Awami League. On October 9, the Prime Minister convened a meeting of coalition parties, which, adjourned sine die, without reaching any decision. Subsequently the center followed the policy of compromising and decided that both wings may adopt the formulae of electorates as per their recommendations.⁴² This led to drafting of a bill accordingly and its presentation to the National Assembly. Though the Muslim League and the United Front vehemently opposed it. The bill was later on passed by the Assembly with the support of the Awami League and the Republican Party.⁴³

Suhrawardy was in favour of Joint Electorates and consequently decided to launch a broad-based campaign in favour of it. As a result he dispatched prominent Awami Leaguers to important towns in West Pakistan to earn the favour.⁴⁴ Reacting to this campaign, the Muslim League also formed a front in favour of Separate Electorates.⁴⁵ Suhrawardy's misfortunes were multiplying, as the unappreciable trend of his government was found unappeasable, unacceptable, not alone by the public but also by his own party members.⁴⁶ This led to disintegration in his party. The provincial chief of East Pakistan Awami League, Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani ultimately resigned from his office on July 24, 1957.⁴⁷

At that time there were five political parties in West Pakistan which carried significant weightage, these included the Red Shirts of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, G.M. Syed's Sind Awami Mahaz, Khan Abdus Samad's Daroro Pashtoon, the Sind Hari Committee and Azad Pakistan Party of Mian Iftikharuddin, who taking advantage of the situation succeeded in uniting these parties to reincarnate as the Pakistan National Party on December 2, 1956 at the Barkat Ali Mohammedan Hall, Lahore. The differences that occurred in the Awami League convinced Mian Iftikharuddin to rush to Dacca and to negotiate with Maulana Bhashani to elevate the newly born Pakistan National Party to national level.⁴⁸ On January 25, 1957 a convention namely the All Pakistan Democratic Worker Convention was convened at Dacca which was attended by both the Pakistan National Party and the Bhashani Group of the Awami League, wherein they resolved to amalgamate and to resuscitate under the aegis of the National Awami Party which attracted a large number of Awami Leaguers, which consequently deprived Suhrawardy to be backed by any measurable political force.⁴⁹

On the other hand the West Pakistan Assembly was presenting a picture of highly disturbed and extremely disorganized institution. On January 28, 1957, a no-confidence motion was steered in the house against the ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib. G.M. Syed group had promised to support the motion put forward by the Muslim League. The provision, however, entailed that the Muslim League would abrogate the One-Unit and would strongly move a resolution to that effect in the same session of the National Assembly.⁵⁰ The motion was however opposed by the newly wed Muslim League and the Pakistan National Party. This led to voting: 114 votes went in favour as compared to 110 against it. Dr. Khan's ministry thus narrowly escaped its life on the strength of a mere 4 votes.⁵¹

The Muslim League was bent upon undoing the One-Unit. It resolutely decided it at Lahore on March 7. Qazi Isa, the General Secretary of the Muslim League communicated this decision to G.M. Syed.⁵² In the meantime the Provincial Budget was approved by the Assembly, which demonstrated the amount of confidence mustered by

Dr. Khan Sahib's government. On the very next day, Sardar Bahadur Khan, the leader of the provincial Muslim Leaguer, by virtue of a statement assured G.M. Syed of his party's total support against the One-Unit Resolution. Sardar Bahadur's attitude won over some thirty Republicans. It was indeed an alarming situation for Dr. Khan Sahib, whose chances of toppling down were nearly matured. The situation demanded a version through the imposition of Governor's Rule in West Pakistan on March 21, 1957,⁵³ which Iskandar Mirza unreluctantly authorized. Commenting on this occasion Gurmani narrated :

When it became clear to me during the Budget session of the West Pakistan Assembly (March 1957) that the Republican Government's majority in the House was doubtful, I recommended for the imposition of Governor's Rule in the Province because there was hardly any time to form an alternative government which would pass the budget within the stipulated time.⁵⁴

Initially this rule was clamped for a period of two months, expiring on May 20, 1957, which was an estimated period for the Republican Party to re-muster the lost members and to regain the strength. The Governor's Rule had to be extended up to 20 September 1957, as the Republican could not achieve their goal within stipulated period. Though the lost members were brought back to the Republican camp and the Governor Rule was lifted yet it weakened the very foundations of the Republican Party. On July 15, 1957, Dr. Khan Sahib, realizing the gravity of the situation, resigned from the leadership of the Republican Party and nominated Sardar Abdur Rashid as his successor.⁵⁵ Later, Dr. Khan was also pressurized by the events to resign from the office of the Chief Minister on July 17, 1957 and was succeeded by Sardar Abdur Rashid.⁵⁶

The crumbling Awami League of Suhrawardy provided an opportunity to the Krishak Sramik Party to build their edifices for which the remaining members of the Awami League were used as foundations to form the government in East Pakistan. The Krishak Sramik was now approached both by the President Iskandar Mirza and Dr. Khan Sahib.

They wanted to win over the Party to negate the efforts of Awami League to reorganize once again and they also wanted to create hurdles for H.S. Suhrawardy whose activities were no longer appreciated by the President. Both Dr. Khan and Mirza wanted to decide the matter of electorates in view of the forth-coming general elections.⁵⁷ They were approaching the new emerging Krishak Sramik Party so that they could have their votes in order to gain strength in the Centre. Sensing danger hidden in this potential alliance, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, as a countering measure, extended his much-needed friendship towards Suhrawardy so Gurmani turned against the Republican Party.

Since Iskandar Mirza was the Patron-in-Chief of the Republicans, he confronted Gurmani in return. The situation lent itself to an understanding between Gurmani and Suhrawardy. As these reports reached the President Iskandar Mirza, he got alerted and consequently started planning to get rid of Gurmani. On the other side the Republicans also started suspecting Gurmani's activities and they thought it to be essential for their safety that the Governor should go and he was later made to go. And that also could be easily done by simple trick of threat to withdraw support from Suhrawardy's government.⁵⁸ Gurmani was now replaced by Akhtar Hussain who was then Secretary of Defense.

The net result of these political consequences manifested in the form of an agreement reached between the Muslim League on one side and the Pakistan National Party (Now National Awami Party) on the other side which primarily demanded the undoing of One-Unit. Finally the agreement was drafted on September 13, 1957 between the National Awami Party and the Republican Party.⁵⁹ By virtue of this agreement it was enjoined upon the Republican Party to lend unqualified support to move a resolution in the provincial assembly of West Pakistan seeking replacement of One-Unit by a zonal federation of autonomous province on linguistic and cultural basis. Reciprocally, the National Awami Party was placed under obligation to support the Republicans in all matters pertaining to their confidence.⁶⁰

On September 17, 1957, the Republican Party introduced a resolution in West Pakistan Legislative Assembly whereby it recommended to the National Assembly that the West Pakistan should be reconstituted as a sub-federation with four or more autonomous units. This resolution, nevertheless, offended President Iskandar Mirza and did cause "a lot of discontentment amongst the private and public sectors". Iskandar Mirza stated :

I have consulted the Prime Minister Suhrawardy and we have agreed not to make any change in the constitution at present. The only thing, which is essential for the political integration of Pakistan, is that the general elections should be held at earliest possible and these elections must be conducted under the present Constitution.⁶¹

The Prime Minister as a rejoinder gave an elucidation and elaboration over a confession that undoing One-Unit was not so easy matter as to demand it. He further maintained, "The future of Pakistan must be decided by the chosen representatives of the people, not to be at the mercy of political maneuverings and political ambitions and unholy alliances."⁶² The Prime Minister's speech was challenged by Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, a Republican minister, which amounted to an open revolt towards the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister. Even then the two did not give a serious consideration to this contradictory statement perhaps it was preconceived and perhaps it afforded solid grounds for the removal of Suhrawardy who had started nurturing goodwill relations with the Muslim League. The moment Daultana came to know about the conflict between the Republican Party and Suhrawardy, he immediately dispatched a confidential letter to Suhrawardy, assuring an unshakable support to him by the Muslim League in the National Assembly and at the same time condemned the unpleasant attitude of the Republicans.⁶³ This letter strengthened Suhrawardy and naturally thus he supported the One-Unit.⁶⁴

These events led the Republicans to approach Iskandar Mirza and to seek his permission to withdraw their support from Suhrawardy. After knowing the true intentions of the President, Suhrawardy sought under

provision of the Constitution to call a National Assembly session and to test him on the criterion of vote of no confidence.⁶⁵ The President however, did not agree to the proposal contrary to that it aroused suspicion of the President, who, later on, communicated his decision to relieve Suhrawardy of the office of Premier-ship through a prominent Republican, Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qazalbash.⁶⁶ The President's communication in question offered alternative of quitting the Premier-ship at his own or to stand dismissed. Suhrawardy opted to leave his office on October 11, 1957 after having remained there for thirteen months of upheavals and political dramas.

THE PREMIER-SHIP OF I. I. CHUNDRIGAR (October 18 TO December 11, 1957)

The departure of H.S. Suhrawardy paved a way not only to make I.I.Chundrigar walk into Prime Minister's office but also for Iskandar Mirza to work on his political strategy which involved winning over the Krishak Sramik, the Muslim League and the Nizam-i-Islam parties. Mirza factually thrust his views on Chundrigar to accept Premier-ship,⁶⁷ basically with a view to clinch to his own Presidential chair more securely. Chundrigar could not stay adamant to the offer and agreed to form the ministry and to take the path on October 18, 1957.⁶⁸

The constituents of the coalition consisted of 45 members including 4 independents and one belonging to the group of Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhry.⁶⁹ The problems leading to Suhrawardy's departure, once again erupted top to be faced by this newly formed coalition. During Suhrawardy's government, the National Assembly recommended the Joint Electorates system at Dacca session. The Muslim League wanted the repudiation of that recommendation and incorporation of Separate Electorates. They entered the coalition on condition that the latter would help in securing the repeal of Joint Electorates.⁷⁰ The Muslim League had asked the Republicans that the question of Electorates would be reopened and the reconstitution of the province of West Pakistan would also be reconsidered after the general elections.⁷¹ The Republicans though agreed but only to please the President and later they made it

clear that they would not compromise on their principles⁷² and that "their Organizing Committee (which was yet in the process of being organized) had not given its approval to the agreement to vote for Separate Electorates".⁷³

There already existed a gulf of differences between the Krishak Sramik Party and the Muslim League. I.I.Chundrigar stated once that he had accepted the office because the Republican Party had assured of its support in favour of Separate Electorates.⁷⁴ Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhry, the leader of the Krishak Sramik Party, however released a contradictory statement, which stated that the Republican's support to Joint Electorates was assured to him.⁷⁵ The Muslim League supported the foretasted view whereas the Republican Party chose to stay silent and let the challengers fight between themselves.

There was a genuine apprehension among the Republicans that the new partnership with the League would ultimately result in the loss of parliamentary support. They further apprehended that their loss would be the League's gain. The issue of the Electorates was maximized by the Muslim League to such an extent that it appeared to be the only and last problem to be faced by the country. The Prime Minister in his speech remarked, "His Party had entered the government to save the ideology of Pakistan, which was menaced by Joint Electorates."⁷⁶ The Prime minister on assuming the office ordered drafting of an Amendment Bill to replace Joint Electorates with the Separate Electorates. On November 2, the Amendment bill was brought before the cabinet. The Republicans escaped from discussion by declaring that they have yet to reach a decision on the matter.

From the very beginning cracks started appearing in the coalition and the Republicans who always declined support to Separate Electorates yet intended to prolong discussions in order to gain time to earn better associates and now proposed to dispatch its "Fact Finding Committee" to East Pakistan.⁷⁷ The committee recommended that Dr. Khan Sahib, after consulting the President and the Prime Minister, should make the

decision. Thus the question was initially delayed and by the time National Assembly was to take up the bill, they had already decided against the re opening of the issue.⁷⁸

On seeing the difference among the different parties of the coalition, certain other political parties stepped forward to exploit the situation. The Awami League which was a supporter of Joint Electorates developed genuine grievances against the Muslim League leaders like Daultana.⁷⁹ Suhrawardy decided to pay Daultana in the same coins. He assured the Republicans that in case they wanted to bid farewell to the Muslim League, his party would not let them down. In fact this was the task, which Republicans 'Fact Finding Committee' did and after being sure of the fact that the Awami League was going to assist them they openly stated before the Prime Minister that they did not support the Muslim League in its demand for Separate Electorates. Evidently, they wanted to break up their Coalition with the Muslim League at the Centre, the constituent of which, they must have soon realized, was inimical to their own interest.

On seeing the conditions against him, I.I.Chundrigar tendered his resignation on December 11, 1957. Iskandar Mirza however sent Noon to persuade Chundrigar to carry on. Noon stated in his book that "I tried my best to persuade Mr. Chundrigar to carry on. He had accepted the Prime Ministership without stipulating any condition whatsoever about the Separate Electorates, but he disagreed."⁸⁰

THE PREMIER-SHIP OF MALIK FERUZ KHAN NOON (December 16, 1957 To October 7, 1958)

Feroz Khan Noon headed the new ministry which was set up on December 16, 1957. The coalition parties were, the Republican Party, the National Awami Party, the Awami League, the Pakistan National Congress Party, Pakistan Scheduled Caste Federation, Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhry's Group and some independents.⁸¹

It is interesting to note that although the Awami League had supported the Republicans and provided them with majority in the House, refused to participate in the government. All the ministers were Republicans with exception of one that was from Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhry Group. Suhrawardy had also dictated this term to Noon that, he, while forming ministry would not allow the Krishak Sramik Party to enter into the government. Suhrawardy while sitting on the benches of the opposition could get his wishes fulfilled and the Prime Minister was not in a position to disobey him.⁸² The criticism of mal-administration, corruption etc., would be faced by the Republican alone where as the political exploitation would be to the advantages of the Awami League.

In order to see these extents of influence, which the Awami League had exerted upon Republicans a few examples would be interesting to note. One was the policy of "Operation Close Door" undertaken by the Army to prevent smuggling of essential commodities from East Pakistan. This operation had been started during the ministry of I.I.Chundrigar and when this action was started it was defended by Feroz Khan Noon. But Awami League soon ran into difficulties when it agreed with the Central Government to let the army seal the border districts to stop smuggling. It was well known that food, imported goods, and capital worth 800 million rupees were being drained away from East Pakistan's economy. A number of Hindu members of the assembly reacted sharply against this policy as it meant that a number of Hindu families, who were engaged in sending their capital and valuables out of Pakistan, would be adversely affected. They threatened the Awami League with withdrawal of their support if the anti-smuggling drive by the army were not relaxed or abandoned altogether. Later on due to the pressure of the Awami League, the Republican Prime Minister had to repeal it.⁸³

Atta-ur-Rehman Khan of the Awami League headed the provincial ministry in East Pakistan. The East Pakistan Governor, A.K.Fazal-ul-Haq on finding that the ministry of Atta-ur-Rehman had lost confidence of the House, dismissed him on March 31, 1958 and asked the opposition leader Abu Hussain Sarkar to form the new Cabinet.⁸⁴ It was a day of rejoicing for Sarkar who was sworn in as the new Chief Minister but it

was a day for sorrow for Fazal-ul-Haq, who was removed by the President. Hamid Ali was appointed as the new Governor on April 1, 1958 and he immediately sacked the ministry of Abu Hussain Sarkar the very next day and recalled Atta-ur-Rehman to form a new Cabinet. Noon gave a long statement in defense of the action of the President Iskandar Mirza declaring that, "Fazal-ul-Haq acted in disregard of the Constitution and had not accepted Chief Minister Atta-ur-Rehman Khan's advice to prorogue the Provincial Assembly, which was his constitutional duty". Noon further asserted that, "the Awami League ministry should not have been dismissed because it had majority of 19 votes in the house,"⁸⁵ on the other hand, Abu Hussain Sarkar tried to refute Noon's allegations, saying that the Constitution did not require the Governor to consult the Central Government before dismissing a provincial ministry so long as he was satisfied that it had lost majority support in the Legislative Assembly.⁸⁶

In the meantime the National Awami Party, which was supporting the ministry of Awami League in East Pakistan, was getting closer to the Krishak Sramik Party and in the middle of June 1958, the agreement between the Krishak Sramik Party and National Awami Party took place. Central Parliamentary Board of National Awami Party at once sent instructions to the East Pakistan National Awami Party to withdraw support from the Awami League ministry stating that the Krishak Sramik Party has accepted the programme of the National Awami Party. The programme, which was accepted by the Krishak Sramik Party, included the undoing of One-Unit, independent foreign policy, regional autonomy, early elections on the basis of Joint Electorates and implementation of the 21-point program of the United Front.⁸⁷ It was due to the fact that some Hindu members had withdrawn their support and the Awami League was defeated on June 18, 1958.⁸⁸ After a couple of days, Abu Hussain Sarkar was again sworn in as the new Chief Minister. In the meantime the brains of the Awami League remained at work and after a few days the political situation was again reverted when the National Awami Party changed its mind and decided to back up a coalition ministry to be headed by Atta-ur-Rehman because the latter had also

agreed to the five point programme of the National Awami Party. The result of this was that on June 23, 1958, the ministry of Abu Hussain Sarkar was defeated and a few days after that, the President, Iskandar Mirza suspended the Parliamentary Government in East Pakistan and Governor Rule was imposed.

This 'Musical Chair' game finally resulted in the premises of the East Pakistan Assembly," beating up the Speaker, killing the Deputy Speaker and desecrating the National Flag."⁸⁹ Again on August 25, the parliamentary government was restored and Atta-ur-Rehman once again appeared as the leader of the house. The Central Government had to put the Awami League in power again in East Pakistan, otherwise Suhrawardy would have made good his threat to withdraw the Awami League's support to the Republican government of Noon at the Centre.⁹⁰

In August 1958, the political events in Pakistan took a new turn. Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhry, the leader of the Krishak Saramik Party had been trying hard to join the cabinet of Feroz Khan Noon. And it was in August 1958 that the Prime Minister agreed to include him in his ministry.⁹¹ The Republican leaders thought that the representation of the East Pakistan was essential in their cabinet and the result was that the ministerial jobs soon got filled up with the rival party members.⁹² Noon on the other hand did not want to antagonize Suhrawardy so he offered two or three ministries to the Awami League also.⁹³ But just being sworn in as minister was not considered enough. The choice of portfolios was important. Ultimately when portfolios were announced, the Awami League ministers disputed their allocations and resigned en block.⁹⁴ It was in the midst of this chaos that the Army appeared on the scene.

It will be worthwhile to have a glimpse of the activities of the Muslim League at this juncture. The unfortunate demise of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar on February 14, 1958, motivated the Leaguers to dispatch a delegation to Miss Fatima Jinnah offering the President-ship of the Party, which she declined and the office was consequently bestowed upon Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan on March 29, 1958.⁹⁵ Replying to a welcome

address in Karachi on 14 April, Khan Qayyum vehemently condemned Iskandar Mirza's activities reasoning that being the constitutional head of the state he was not obliged to indulge in political affairs. This led to an organized campaign against the President and naturally the meetings of the Muslim League became a source of attraction for the public and press.

In the face of so hard an opposition, Iskandar Mirza was defended by his loyal and faithful lieutenant Dr. Khan Sahib, who was unfortunately murdered on May 9, 1958 and as a consequence of which, a meeting of the Republican Party was convened on May 30, 1958. The meeting unanimously elected Noon and Arbab Noor Mohammad Khan as the President and General Secretary of the party respectively.⁹⁶ The second and last National Convention of the Republican Party was held in Lahore on September 29-30, 1958.⁹⁷ The convention was attended by 2000 delegates of whom only a dozen participated from East Pakistan. So mismanaged and ill-organized was this convention that it was called a "rowdy" convention. The case of West Pakistan's unification was not even discussed and consequently all members were given a free choice to vote against or for it.⁹⁸ The Convention, nevertheless, succeeded to adopt a freshly formulated manifesto, which, however, was saved from the trial of standing the test of time, for while it was only a week old document, all political parties of the country were declared abolished on October 7, 1958.

Khan Qayyum receiving an impetus from the incident of Dr. Khan Sahib's murder accelerated anti-Mirza activities at a great velocity. To combat the mounting Muslim League propaganda, in September 1958, it was reported by the press that the Central Government is deciding to impose a total curb on organizations that maintain volunteers in uniforms.⁹⁹ The Muslim League National Guards being the only prevailing organization falling within the purview of the ordinance was to bear the brunt.¹⁰⁰ Khan Qayyum declared launching a movement of civil disobedience against any ordinance of that nature. The ordinance was promulgated on September 20, 1958.¹⁰¹ The natural repercussion manifested in initiating the civil disobedience movement. Khan Qayyum under-went a stormy tour of the country. In this course, a huge gathering was assembled in Karachi to receive Khan Qayyum but was dispersed

per force by the police. This incident led to the Muslim League's decision of celebrating a 'Protest Day'. Not being in a position to bear the consequences of the 'Protest Day' and before it was materialized; the country was placed under the clamps of the Martial Law. Iskandar Mirza clearly accepted his defeat on the political platform and was hence left with no alternative but to resort to the imposition of Martial Law on October 7, 1958 and thereby abrogate all political parties, democratic institutions and the constitution of the country.

Weeks before the imposition of Martial Law the Chief Minister of West Pakistan Muzaffar Qazalbash un-reluctantly admitted on the floor of the House that "now from top to bottom, there was hardly a person who was not corrupt".¹⁰² This situation was further confirmed in President's Proclamation of October 7, stating that, "For the last two years I have been watching, with deep anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of quorum and the prostitution of Islam for political ends".¹⁰³ But the President was held responsible for the worsening the political atmosphere in the country by many of his associates i.e., Ch. Muhammad Ali while answering the Shahabuddin Commission in June 1960 mentioned, "The President in all dishonesty wanted to discredit and destroy the parliamentary democracy with a well-measured evil designs of establishing life-long dictatorship convertible into hateful kingship."¹⁰⁴ Similar probabilities had been expressed by Noon, writing, "people expressed often the fear that Iskandar Mirza wanted to be a dictator especially after he visited Spain."¹⁰⁵

To put into nutshell the Republican Party was a spoiled child of Iskandar Mirza's blamable brain; it flourished in the same abode; it received guidance from the same sensorium. That was the brain who did not believe in democracy; that was the brain who integrated the nefarious plans of disintegration and who organized the shameless designs of disorganizing the country but not without gaining unconditional assistance from the extravagant and uncompromising sons, the King's Friends, so happily baptized as "The Pakistan Republican Party".

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33. Keith Callard, *Pakistan*: p.66.
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45. *Ibid.*, October 23, 1956.

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47. *The Pakistan Observer*, July 25, 1957.

48. Syed Noor Ahmad, *Martial Law*, p.481.

49. *Ibid.* p.482.

50. *Dawn*, January 29, 1957.

51. *Ibid.* March 9, 1957.

52. Secret and personal letter written to G.M. Syed by Sardar Bahadur Khan on March 20, 1957, shown by Nawab Muzaffar Qazalbash in an interview in 1974 at his Lahore residence.

53. Syed Noor Ahmad, *Martial law*, p.463.

54. Writer's interview with Mr. Gurmani. In 1974, at his Liberty, Lahore residence.

55. *Dawn*, July 16, 1957.

56. Syed Noor Ahmad has explained the incident as follows: "In early July 1957. Republican Party called up its members in Lahore and an important decision was made to restore the Republican Ministry (In fact the decision was made some time before but the details were worked out then). The decision was to make Dr. Khan to leave the office of the Chief Minister in favour of some one else and to continue as the patron and head of the Party". He further says that, after evaluating the services of Dr. Khan, Iskandar Mirza reached to the conclusion that though Dr. Khan was loyal to him but he was unsuitable to run the important administrative office of Chief Minister any more. So Mirza convinced Dr. Khan to leave the office (both Party's and that of Chief Minister's) for the Ex-Chief Minister of N.W.F.P. Abdur Rashid. For details, see Syed Noor Ahmad, *Martial law*, pp. 472-74.

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The US Policy Parameters Towards India and Pakistan in Retrospect : 1947-1989

MISS QAMAR FATIMA

Abstract

Traditionally, South Asia was considered peripheral to U.S interests, but the strategy to contain communism opened the venues of U.S involvement in the region. The Truman administration and then Eisenhower presidency sought to secure clients in the region. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan visited the U.S officially in 1949 and 1950 respectively. India, due to her potentialities of population size and geographical location of Indian Ocean drew attention of U.S administration as first choice to create military linkages in the region. However, India, under the foreign policy pursuits of Nehruvianism (the first Prime Minister's foreign policy guidelines) showed unwillingness to join the any military arrangement. Pakistan at that time, being a newly born nation, ravaged due to bloody and unjustified division of boundaries was looking for a patron to meet the security challenges of her environment. In this backdrop, Pakistan's attitude was more responsive towards U.S military arrangement. Pakistan and U.S signed a mutual defense Assistance Agreement in May 1954. She became "Most Allied Ally of U.S by signing SEATO, CENTO respectively.

U.S policy towards South Asia had not been smooth one. Similarly, Interests and objectives of U.S in South Asian region changed with changing trends of international politics and global scenario. Despite entry of Pakistan into U.S sponsored military Alliances, U.S continued with her efforts to bring India into her sphere of influence. Therefore, during Sino Indian conflict in 1962, America meaningfully helped India, because, at that time victory of china could diametrically go against interests of hers. Pakistan, abhorring this US-India Nexus, turned towards China led to further strains on Pakistan US relations that specifically marked the Kennedy era. U.S imposed an embargo during Pak-India war of 1965, on supply of Arms to both belligerents without considering Pakistan's long lasted alliance relationship.

The Nixon Presidency in 1972 sought to improve relations with China to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rifts in the Cold War. Pakistan played the role of intermediary in promoting rapprochement. This unleashed grave hostility and mistrust between Soviet Union and Pakistan, which subsequently took it toll, as it played a very negative role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971.

US policy in South Asia again took a new dimension. Democratic president Jimmy Carter showing hostile attitude to wards Pakistan on its development of nuclear programme imposed unprecedented heavy sanctions on Pakistan in 1979. However, the most defining event also took place in the same year, when an adjoining state of South Asia, Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet Union. Under the pressing circumstances, America once again badly needed Pakistani collaboration to abort Soviet designs in the region. Pakistan, with the status of frontline state instrumented supply of Arms and training to Mujahideen against invading super power in line with the U.S interests. Until the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan and United States had closest cooperation than ever before. Under Republican President Ronald Reagan, the large-scale aid was resumed from 1981 and Pakistan became the third highest recipient country of U.S aid, because of her frontline status in the last proxy conflict of Cold War period. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan crumbled the Washington-Islamabad axis and diluted the strategic importance of Pakistan. The bi-lateral differences as Pakistan's nuclear program re-emerged. During presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, U.S administration bestowed upon Pakistan the benefit of annual waiver from Symington and Glenn Amendments as per required by the Pressler amendment. With the end of the Cold War U.S. foreign policy underwent a paradigm shift for South Asia. George Bush Sr. refused to grant waiver to Pakistan due to her clandestine nuclear program. As a result, all aid was stopped and Pressler axe fell on supply of military equipments and F. 16 aircrafts to Pakistan.

PRE-INDEPENDENCE ERA

Stanley Wolporte wrote in his book "Roots of Confrontation in South Asia" that the United States had no South Asian policy prior to 1947. The statement, as seems, might have been formulated in the context of American lack of interest at that time in a distant colonized not so vital region both commercially and politically from the US viewpoint. The South Asian political and ideological realities remained unknown, for a long spell of history rather alien to US people and government as well. The reasons of this unknowing ignorance are of many.

First, the South Asian expatriates in the USA were small in number and their scattered presence produced no harmonizing feelings among them, all around pre-independence era. South Asian community people, during the period of 1940s, generally came from three categories, i.e. visitors, academics and farmers. The visitors largely came from both religious class and a few native officials, while academics mainly comprise students and faculty members. Farmers were the people whose majority came from Punjab. These expatriates tried to keep contact with India by founding organizations mostly in New York and Washington DC with the names like Hindustan Welfare Association, India League of America and so on. These organizations and individual efforts did their utmost to raise level of awareness in American public and officials about society, culture, and political affairs of Sub-continent. However, they had to face many obstacles such as geographical distance, limited bilateral channels in media and commerce. Secondly, the source of information about Sub-continent for American Media Men was mainly their British counterparts who used to show the picture of Sub-continent and disseminate information in the backdrop of British interests. Thirdly, In the 1940s, the contacts on official levels were limited to upper strata and ruling elites, while mainly conducted through consul offices at Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi, side by side the American Embassy in London and British Embassy in Washington were also involved in handling the Indian Affairs.²

The entrance of United States into World War II resulted in more visible involvement of Americans in South Asian affairs than ever before. Americans stood high rather idealized by Indians being a nation. They were optimistic as regards the emerging trends among Americans for investments outside America, however the expectations with American industrialists to use their capital for expansion of Indian industrial base did not come true, although people were taking India at that time as an ideal place for extensive investments as part of post war developments. The American trade with India passed through fluctuations with changing trends of world economy during interwar period. The following table shows the trends of fluctuations.³

US and India Exports –Imports : 1940-1945

Year	US exports to India	US Exports from India
1940	68,428	102,204
1941	98,162	131,510
1942	377,793	105,137
1943	553,865	125,784
1944	777,557	144,892
1945	491,257	173,157

Source : Foreign Commerce Weekly Washington October 11, 1949 p.32, cf. Srinivas.

After Second World War, the warmth between Indians and Americans began to resolve rapidly, particularly when Washington extended moral support to Dutch and French colonial rule in Indonesia and Indo China. This policy engendered suspicions about America and the political groups in India took this policy as a tendency towards imperialism, and they started seeing America the forthcoming new imperial power.

The American President Franklin De Roosevelt and his personal envoy to India, William Phillips, expressed displeasure over the idea of partitioning of British India into two independent nation states, but both major political groups in India, Muslim League and Congress, showed their resentment and chose to disregard the US advice in respect of keeping India undivided. In early 1947 when the political drama in India was gradually moving towards its climax, the major US foreign policy concerns had no place for South Asian affairs, because Soviet Union and the United States were entering into Cold War. Therefore, during the final stages of the British India and Hindu Muslim settlements, the US had no obvious policy or envisaged a part to play " but one, which seemed on the outside to imply that any settlements at all would be satisfactory to Washington if it avoided war".⁴

In February 1947 the Department of State welcomed the then expected federal solution for an undivided India and applauded Labor government for this solution, but when in June Labor government changed its mind and policy and made it public that the solution of Indian dilemma would only be partition, also bagged applause from State

Department. This shows the indifferent attitude of America towards Sub-continent leading many Indians to think in terms that the US primary interest was Anglo-American rather than India's welfare.⁵

On June 1947, the US hailed the agreement, the British had reached with the Congress and Muslim League (the two major political parties) and expressed the hope that this agreement would end civil disorder in India and would help avoid further bloodshed. The June statement of State Department also commented

"The future constitutional pattern is a matter to be determined by the Indian people themselves and whatever that pattern may be the US government looks forward to the continuance of the friendliest relations with Indians of all communities and creed."⁶

During the troubled period of partitioning, US diplomat Raymond Hare, selected to head up State Department South Asian affairs, spent two months in the Sub-continent to learn first hand about his new area of responsibility. He had extensive rounds of talks with all the top leaders of Sub-continent. He met Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah for an hour in New Delhi and enquired about the future foreign policy of Pakistan. Responding to Mr. Hare, he told that Pakistan policy would be oriented towards the Muslim countries of Middle East since they were weak. He also furthered that Muslim countries would stand together against possible Russian aggression and would look to US for assistance. He also added that he did not personally share the view that most of the Indian Muslims held i.e. United States was unfriendly to them, because, they had the impression that the US press and some American officials were against the emergence of Pakistan.⁷

Mr. Hare also had a meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru, the would-be Indian Prime Minister. He questioned about India's post-independence foreign policy parameters. The congress leader gave his version and said, "India stays out of entanglement in the current struggle in the belief that such was best for India and best for world peace.... there was a general fear of American economic penetration"but he thought," India would have to depend on the United States for certain types of support."⁸

Over all he emphasized India's desires of friendly relations with the United States.

At the time of partitioning in 1947, Washington paid little attention to the affairs of the Sub-continent because of its commitment in shaping the policy to counter the growing influence of Russia after World War II which later became the thriving force for next 44 years national security policy.

US CRUSADE OF ANTI COMMUNISM & SOUTH ASIA THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, MARCH 12, 1947

Truman envisaged his Doctrine in response to a particular set of immediate and pressing issues at global level. The immediate challenges were; the threat of soviet intervention in Greece and Turkey and, the eventual increase of Soviet influence throughout the Middle East. So, concluded by President Truman that U.S had been facing a grave challenge to its security and the failure to formulate an effective response, would leave Russia unchecked to wrest world power and deal world affairs in accordance with its desire and need of national interests. Truman while presenting his Doctrine argued that the challenge being the global in scope had to be met with global strategy.⁹

The purposes that had to be accomplished under this Doctrine were: to strengthen the security of Greece and Turkey by keeping them out of Soviet orbit; to redress the balance of power within a broader global perspective owing to serious imbalance created after the defeat of Germany and Japan and decline of British as great power in the wake of world.¹⁰

Soviet power was viewed by George F. Kannan as a "fluid stream that threatened to fill up every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power".¹¹

The policy of containment envisioned US as only counter veiling power to curb soviet expansionism. Another goal of this Doctrine was to

notify the world that United States was ready to accept the leadership position that its power and influence demanded. The United States of America considered Economic reconstruction of endangered nation a key to political stability and security under this doctrine.

Johan Spanier viewed Soviet Union expansionist moves after World War II as a tool to give Moscow the control of Heartland; the Eurasia. The containment policy and strategies corresponding to this policy primarily aimed to curtail Soviet expansionism towards Europe and Asia as well.¹²

South Asia was accorded, earlier, little attention by President Truman and foreign policy makers, though evidences had been found that U.S secretary of State George Marshal on many occasions put stressed on strategic importance of this part of world, specifically operational significance of Pakistan in terms of prospective Air strikes against Central Asian states of Soviet Union was highlighted. However, United States did not take any solid or meaningful interest until late 1949. Mr. Warren took his office as ambassador to Pakistan in 1950, which indicated marginal importance of South Asian, states in American strategist and diplomatic realms.¹³

When Washington decided to befriend south Asia to curtail Soviet expansionism, it was India not Pakistan which secured the position of first choice. Because of socialist tendency of Congress leadership, India was feared to be an easy prey to fall in Moscow's web. Despite knowing Pakistan's tendency towards U.S friendship, India with enormous resources and population was thought to be best choice to groom as the bulwark of communism.¹⁴

INDIA AND NEUTRALISM : A DIVERGENT ROAD MAP

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, in addition to his duties as prime minister, kept with him the additional charge of ministry of Foreign Affairs. He, in his frequent speeches broadly outlined the features of Indians foreign policy.

In one of his first speeches made after independence, he declared :

"India is a great country in its resources, great in manpower great

in its potential in every way I have little doubt that a free nation on every place will play a big part on the world stage".¹⁵

In June 1947, he briefed about the parameters of Indian's foreign policy to Mr. Grady who was the first ambassador to India of the United States of America. He highlighted the following points :

India desired to avoid involvement with either of the power but at the same time wished to have warm relations with United States.

India had concerns in respect of American power that might impinge on its sovereignty. He also articulated about India's desire and need of U.S capital to help country develop. India would probably follow the British social model.¹⁶

As a part of western world America was deemed by Asian and African nations as an extension of European imperialism. India showed much concern in this regard as compared to others. In October 1949, during his first visit to U.S.A, Mr. Nehru explicitly talked about this sensitivity. He said that the west has often despised the Asian African, and still in many places denies them not only equality of rights, but even humanity and kindness. He also had this version that a new era had dawned in which nations of Africa and Asia could not be bypassed or ignored at all. The decisions for these nations would not taken by western nations.

Four months after independence, in December 1949, State Department officials and Diplomats as Henry Grady Paul Ailling met in Washington and had a consensus that US should promote some sort of loose cooperation between the two nations.

Kashmir was the first and major cause of bi-lateral tension between the United States and independent India. Initially, the United States did not show any intention to meddle with Kashmir affairs. Its reluctance was apparent in its lukewarm reaction over Common wealth secretary's proposal to conduct plebiscite under the control of international agencies.

On the advice of Near East office Director Loy Henderson, soon to become Ambassador to India, USA chose to stay out of this dispute on the basis of his arguments that US should avoid global commitments. He further added that through its involvement, Soviet Union should not be given an opening to creep into the affairs of South Asia. US also had doubts about the UN capability to resolve the issue amicably, but preferred to Security Council resolutions, which dealt with setting up commission for India and Pakistan. Indians categorically rejected this support. Consequently, Mr. Nehru called in Loy Henderson and told him, he was "tired of receiving moral advice from the United States As far as Kashmir was concerned, he would not give an inch. He would hold his ground even if Kashmir, India and the whole world went into pieces".¹⁷

The United States officially looked at Kashmir as a dispute between two nations with whom US was having friendly relations. It did not see it as an issue involving US vital interests. George McGhee, assistant secretary of state of Near Eastern and South Asian affairs expressed that US main concern was about the probability of outbreak of full-scale war between the two nations. "we wanted to avert full-scale war between India and Pakistan. This was always a threat. Our effort failed because of Nehru."¹⁸

The establishment of communist regime in 1949 in China gave a new direction to East West conflict with grave repercussions for Asia. The obsession and fear of expansion of communism seized the minds of Americans so much, that they started thinking that India and Pakistan with vulnerable geo political environment would be next prey to this Soviet aggression. The geographical proximity of South Asia was the driving force behind this perspective.¹⁹

Nehru even before independence regarded good relations with China as a fundamental plank in Indian foreign policy; he viewed them as two nations emerging out from the yoke of imperialism to become pillars of new Asia. This version produced more friction between India US relations, but simultaneously Nehru took strict measures against those

communists who sought to improve their influence in southern India. On international scene, contrary to his domestic attitude, he neither was convinced of righteousness of western cause nor understood communist's doings wrongs. This unleashed confusion about India among Americans. Nehru, despite his liberal ideas seemed to fail make distinction between democracy and totalitarian regimes. He was found unprepared to support the forces and cause of free world, however, America continued with its efforts to promote better understanding with India and to accommodate India's role in Asian affairs.

In June 1950, North Korea forces invaded South Korea turning Cold War into blistering war. The initial reaction of India highly impressed the free world. However, when Truman linked this conflict with Formosa and Indo China, it took new dimension. Nehru thought that US engineered its policy to enlarge the war in the defense of western interests. In early July, India came up with a peace proposal, which, suggested that Soviet would agree to initiate talks on Korean issue and in return it would resume its seat in Security Council. China would occupy the UN seat of the Chinese nationalists.²⁰

However, Truman administration turned down this proposal flatly. To India, Korean crisis was a regrettable involvement of Asian nations into US-Soviet struggle. The UN-US led forces crossed the 38 parallel line, International boundary line and caused widespread resentment all around India.²¹

On October 13, 1949, Nehru while visiting USA addressed congress on personal invitation said " however, the voice of India and the United States appear to differ, however there is much in common between them. He further asserted: the objectives of Indian foreign policy are the preservation of world peace and enlargement of human freedom. Reaffirming his policy of neutrality, he censured the challenges to man's freedom. He concluded "we are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to a man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come, whether freedom is menaced or justice is threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral".²²

This speech was hailed by all sections of society in USA but USSR took the impression that Nehru had endorsed the US policy.

A Convergence of Interests : The United States and Pakistan

The US-Pakistan relations have been largely characterized by two factors since the day of its inception, first, Pakistan's desire to strengthen itself against India and secondly to get more economic and military aid. Agha Shahi opined as following :

"The US connection has constituted a fundamental factor in Pakistan's foreign policy for much the greater part of its history. Given its historical inspirations and traumatic circumstances attending its birth, the quest for security against aggression has been the foremost preoccupation of Pakistan policy maker in order to safeguard its integrity, followed closely by the pursuit of economic development".²³

India through various policy statements had been emphasizing that Sub-continent would be a unit in matters of foreign relations. It implied indirectly that Pakistan's foreign policy would be subject to its prior approval. Pakistan sought to counter this misperception by tracing out a patron who would support it in diplomatic disputes with India and guarantee its security against any threat from that quarter.²⁴

The search for patron first turned it towards Commonwealth, then to the Muslim states but after being cold-shouldered by both, to the United States. US strategists could never undermine Pakistan's strategic significance in respect of geographical location and proximity to communist China. The obsession of Americans conducive to Soviet Unions' expansionism shaped the course of early relationships between the United States and Pakistan.

Pakistan and United States visualized each other's power augmenting their military capability on Subcontinent.

Shirin Tahir Kheli observes :

... the importance of South Asia to the American policy makers in the early 1950s derived from fear of communism and a perceived threat of shift in the global balance of power in favor of Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China conditioned by Soviet moves in Iran, threat to Turkey and Greece and Berlin crisis. US embarked on policy of containment".²⁵

In early years, Pakistan tried hard to follow the policy of neutralism. It was thought to be in best of its interest not to tie it with apron strings of the Anglo American or to be camp follower of the communist bloc.

In 1951 the first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan stated : Sometimes we agreed with the western bloc and some times with the communist bloc as the situation and the matter under consideration demanded"²⁶

The traumatic experience through which Pakistan passed in the wake concentrations of Indian troops on borders in 1951 made planners to seriously look around for a protector.

"It overtures to Commonwealth and Muslim countries had failed to elicit the desired response and Pakistan was not yet prepared to turn to communist countries because of its ideological differences with them and also because, neither new China nor war ravaged Russia at that time was in position to render any substantial help to others".²⁷ This left US as the only choice. Initially, the US response was not positive. Mr. Dean Acheson, the then secretary of state, and ambassador Chester Bowels opposed the idea to extend any sort of military aid to Pakistan. However, positive gestures were noticed by Islamabad due to assistant secretary of state Mr. Byroads. It is appropriate here to mention that all hopes regarding India's possibility to join western bloc vanished owing to its policy in respect of Korean crisis and Japan Peace Treaty.

Pakistan, at that time, was viewed in contrast to India as staunch supporter of west. Liaqat Ali Khan's visit to America helped crystallize

their version about Pakistan. He addressing Congress declared that no risk of ideological allurements could deflect Pakistan from its chosen path of free democracy. New York Times commented it editorially as a pledge that "Pakistanis will stand and be counted among those who are devoted to freedom, regardless of the cost."²⁸

This visit deepened the wave of suspicion about Pakistan in Moscow. The library Gazette Moscow reviewed it as that Liaquat Ali Khan had been transformed into the Pakistani variety of Chiang Ki Shek or Syngm Rhee. G.W. Chaudhry remarked on increasing alignment posture of Pakistan in these words :

"Pakistan's policy of non-involvement in the west Cold War, a policy initiated by Jinnah and faithfully followed by Liaquat Ali Khan up to 1950, was coming to an end along with the American policy of non-involvement in the Sub-continent. The United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction for different reasons : the United States was guided by its global policy of containing international communism and Pakistan was motivated by problem of national security and defense. In US relations with the Sub-continent, a new phase that had a profound impact on the South Asian triangle had begun".²⁹

EISENHOWER ERA

Alliance System on the Rim Land of Soviet Union

George F. Kennan, in his famous 'X' article: the sources of Soviet conduct" wrote that The "Soviet pressure against the free world of the west is something can be contained by adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shift and maneuvers of Soviet policy"³⁰
Daniel S. Papp comments :

"Containment was criticized as policy, but its fundamental underpinnings that the United States was defending morality,

political liberty and democracy was rarely questioned by any responsible spokesman..... the creation of a global system of security alliances, the US involvement in the Korean war, confrontation with Soviet Union over Berlin and Cuba, armed interventionist in Lebanon and Dominican republic and increasingly large expenditures on defense were considered necessary to prevent expansionism of communism".³¹

After twenty years laps, Republican assumed power when Dwight Eisenhower became the president on January 20, 1953 with a mandate for change. They made fresh assessment of the international situation, but containment of communism remained the priority of US foreign policy. The republican had been very critical of Truman's post war foreign policy being self-defeating.

Johan Foster Dulles the chief spokesman of republicans expressively criticized the failures of containment policy as executed by predecessors. The establishment of communist regime in China, North Korean crisis and East Europe's inclusion in Soviet orbit were the grim consequences of self-defeating failed containment policy. He also asserted that the aim of American policy should not be to coexist indefinitely with communist menace; it should be to eliminate that menace. The purpose of American policy should be rollback of Soviet power. He also opined that the United States had only to proclaim its stand for freedom and announce that, it would never be a party to any deal that confirmed Soviet despotism over alien peoples. Such a declaration would preserve the courage, hope of the Seattleites peoples, and prevent them from accepting the Soviet regime norms.

He further asserted "the United States should make it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur. The mere statement of that wish and expectation would change in electrifying manner the mood of the captive peoples."³²

The Eisenhower administration followed, comparatively a tougher attitude and policy towards containment of communism issue. Therefore, in pursuance of this policy, strategists from Eisenhower Administration decided to draw a clear line or frontier around the entire Soviet bloc in line of the hypothesis of Rimland as expounded by Spykman. The democratic had already drawn such frontier line from Norway to Turkey encapsulated in NATO. Now, the republicans intended to strengthen and extend the pact system to Middle East to Far East region.

The Air power was considered most appropriate means to preserve the sanctity of this global boundary around the rim land of Soviet Union.

The concept of massive retaliation based on air power of America became the core point of US foreign policy of republicans. The mere containment as policy question was abandoned. The reliance on air power was supposed to be a first step towards the reduction of military expenditures on ground forces and conventional weaponry system. The massive retaliation strategy was deemed to work effectively supposing that the communist either from China or from Russia would only dare to cross the line along at the risk of total war with the United States. This assumption left no place for half wars or limited wars, and reasserted the old American doctrine i.e. either abstain or fight all out war. This strategy was carved out in line with the wishes of public who wanted no more Korea type war. This aimed to deter an all out war. The republicans through massive retaliation made it clear that it would not fight local ground wars rather it would prefer to prevent any future limited attack by threatening to retaliate against the Soviet Union or communist China all around the world, as measured by American strategists.³³

It had been opined that Secretary Dulles through this policy reflected his own strong conviction that the only effective means of stopping a prospective aggressor was to give an advance warning of retaliatory blows and that his possible gains would be far outweighed by the punishment he would suffer.

In earlier days of Eisenhower presidency, South Asia had no prominent place on policy parameters. Nehru wrote a letter to his chief ministers expressing the same version : "The new administration in US has not come out clearly with its new policy. All that we know is that it has certain bent of mind which does not take us towards peace".³⁴

South Asia's importance during Eisenhower era seemed engendering from its proximity to Middle East. The US interest in South Asia developed due to a possible Soviet interest in exploiting the geographical proximity of South and Indian Ocean in its favor. Therefore, in that realm of affairs South Asia attained the strategic significance during Cold War era after Europe. It also attracted superpowers for the attainment of their geo-political and geo-strategic goals as operation field. In pursuance of geo-political goals and strategic objectives, Mr. John Foster Dulles proposed to create "A Middle East Organization, comprising Middle Eastern countries."³⁵

On May 9, 1953, John Foster Dulles undertook a fact-finding mission to have first hand information for future policies. This was first of its kind ever undertaken by any secretary. During his visit to Arab countries, He assessed that a Middle East defense organization had no attraction for Arab countries due to their rivalries and differences. He opined that it would be a future rather than an immediate possibility. He also assessed that there was a vague desire to have a collective security system, but no such could be imposed without the consent of Arab countries. It should be designed and grow within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

After Middle East, he arrived in New Delhi where his talks on bilateral relations went well but difference on international issues came up with all its ramifications. The extensive rounds of talks on the American plan of military groupings failed to bring any consensus between both the countries. The probability of inclusion of Pakistan shadowed the visit invariably. Nehru was highly expressive regarding the displeasure over the overtures of Pakistan to join the western alliance system. Nehru rejected the idea of alliance pacts around the periphery of

Soviet Union. He argued that it would violate and harm the fundamentals of India's national interest. Dulles picked up the Delhi's reluctance to go along by his enthusiasm to fight the menace of international communism. He also arrived at the conclusion that India was unprepared to abandon its cherished policy of non-alignment, a policy endorsed in Moscow, accepted in Peking, and embraced by the countries of Asia.³⁶

His next stop was Karachi where he found a congenial environment for pact system. The Pakistani officials were eager to impress their visitor by showing their warmth hospitality in contrast to a chilled reception in New Delhi. A smartly tuned cavalry presented a guard of honor to him and engendered many good wishes for Pakistan. Its unmatched allegiance to anti- communist cause highly impressed him.³⁷

Shirin Tahir Kheli has analyzed Pakistan's willingness keeping in view certain imperatives: "Speculation abounds us to why Ayub Khan was so keen to seek US assistance. Various theories have emerged. For example, it has been conjectured that Ayub had a grandiose plan to propel himself to power. The army was his base he needed to develop that base in order to capture the prize. In other words the 1958 coup was preplanned as early as 1953 and was occasioned by the rapidly deteriorating political situation in Pakistan between 1955-1958. Others have argued that Ayub was a true nationalist who felt that keeping Pakistan weak was courting disaster and who saw the United States as the only logical source of help. Yet others have speculated that Ayub was simply a victim of his early socialization – he was a product of west.... Whatever the case is his hand was certainly strengthened when President Eisenhower announced in February 1954 that the US would provide military assistance to Pakistan."³⁸

Mr. Dulles in various statements emphasized over the importance of strategic position of Pakistan. Once he said :

"Communist China borders on northern territories held by Pakistan, and from Pakistan's northern border one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and Middle East and guards

the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route from the north into the Sub-continent." On returning Washington, Dulles told the national Security Council that Pakistan was a potential strong point, while he portrayed Nehru as "utterly impracticable statesman".³⁹

In the same evening on June 1, 1953, in his nationwide Radio and T.V broadcast, he proposed to establish a "Northern tier defense arrangement as a substitute for MEDO because, he realized that there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near about the danger".⁴⁰

So at that time, US approach was shaped under a desire to see northern tier arrangement working against communist expansionism effectively. Pakistan responding positively signed an agreement of cooperation with Turkey on April 2, 1954 and mutual defense assistance with the US, followed by signing SEATO and CENTO.

Eisenhower and Dulles, however could not ignore the increasing influence of India in Asia, therefore they did not find it plausible to relinquish with their efforts to induce India in global strategy against communism. Dulles chose to highlight the strategic significance of India in the same speech, in which he praised Pakistan for its attitude towards alliance policy sponsored by America; he said :

"India has 7000 miles of common boundary with China. There is occurring between these two a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police methods can survive. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these countries. In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity including ourselves."⁴¹

The alliance policy of Eisenhower era no doubt satisfied Pakistan's desire and needs of security but at the same time, Americans off and on made it public that Pakistan was given arms as part of US global policy of anti communism not to use them against India.⁴²

In short, we can say that successfully resisting US pressure to line up another Asian ally, India pursued its policy of non-alignment and accrued friendship and aid from both western and socialist blocs simultaneously. This policy brought prestige to India as "independent compared with subservient Pakistan".

The new nations of Asia and Africa, seeing the success of Nehru's policy were encouraged to espouse the neutralism to which Dulles was in strong opposition. The soft policy towards India, dictated by the enlightened self-interest of the United States, proved imbalance in American foreign policy and eventually turned allies into neutrals and destabilized regional pacts. In the backdrop of this policy, Pakistan decided to embark bilateralism instead of sticking with alliance policy in late 60's and early 70's.

JOHN F. KENNEDY & JOHONSON ERA : TILTING TOWARDS INDIA.

John F Kennedy, a liberal democrat after coming into power brought some marked changes in global policy of containment, initiated by Truman, intensified by Eisenhower and Dulles, a staunch Calvinist secretary of state.

As a senator, Kennedy had been criticizing Eisenhower's belt of alliances on the rim land of communist world. In an article, published in Foreign affairs issue and in a well-publicized senate speech of March 25 1958, he severely criticized republican attitude towards neutrals. He extended his support for more cooperative relations with the nations of the "Uncommitted world and called for a major boost in economic assistance to neutrals."⁴²

The senate adopted a resolution in 1958 and both houses of congress passed in 1959, which recommended an increase in aid to India. Therefore, after joining American presidency he made fresh assessments of international issues and subsequently revised the previous policy towards South Asia. This revision had favorable treatment patterns for neutrals like India and inherently proved disadvantageous for allies such as Pakistan. He favored nations of the "uncommitted world" based on the argument that the desire to be free and independent did not necessarily carry their intention either of joining west bloc or of averting from it. In his speeches in the congress, he strongly advised to give attention to India "we want India to be a free nation, to be independent and thriving leader of a free thriving Asia."⁴³

Regarding the utility and results of the military alliances, he took very tough stance and in a speech, he said "... provide no long term solutions. On the contrary, they tend dangerously to polarize the Middle East, to attach us to specific regimes, to isolate us very often from significant nationalist movements. Little is accomplished by forcing the uncommitted nations to choose rigidly between alliance with the west or submission to international communism. Indeed, it is our self-interest not to force such a choice in many places especially if it diverts nations from absorbing their energies of real economic improvement and take off."⁴⁴

This aroused a wave of concern among Pakistanis, as Pakistani ambassador in Washington expressed his concern and anxiety and sent frequent reports about the changes in Americans attitude towards South Asia.

Kennedy administration initiated negotiations with the Indian government to provide massive economic assistance for its new Five-Year Plan in the form of "long term Development loans at very low interest. In June 1961, the US administration announced that India would be provided twenty-nine C-119 Flying Boxcar transport planes. In 1961, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson with Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy had good will mission to India and Pakistan. After his return, in press conference he said "at President Kennedy's request I had urged Mr. Nehru to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia". This statement created a wave of resentment among Pakistanis.⁴⁵

Ayub Khan on account of his anxiety sent his finance minister Muhammad Shoaib to America ensuring new president in White House that Pakistan's destiny lies in friendship with the United States. There was a general impression in Pakistan that change in policy occurred due to a group know as "Harvard group" who supposedly held anti Pakistani and / or pro Indian views long before joining Kennedy administration, their closeness to Kennedy administration created an illusion about Pakistan as that it was an unfortunate product of religious fanaticism. Pakistan feared that India, being more successful in maintaining democratic institutions as compared to Pakistan would get considerable amount of economic aid. The US economic aid to India was perceived by Pakistan as a tool enhancing its ability to purchase arms by money as it

received by the United States. India's American friends such as Chester Bowles under-secretary of state, Prof. J.K.Galbrith, an ex-principal advisor to Kennedy and then became the US ambassador in India were all urging Washington to have more closely and friendly relations with India. During this period of history, India figured prominently because of its role in Asia as perceived by these intellectuals. Kennedy himself had keen interest in South Asian affairs. The doors of oval office were open to visitors from India and Pakistan.⁴⁶

Apart from admiration of Kennedy and those around him for India, some other factors also had profoundly influenced the new US South Asian policy of Kennedy administration. There was a global change occurring in super power relations. The competitive coexistence concept started to emerge. Cuban missiles crisis was the culminating point of east west conflict. During this phase of history, the whole world came on the verge of third world war. However, this issue was amicably resolved and resulted in understanding of competitive peaceful coexistence on both sides. Later, President Kennedy announced a new policy for developing countries; namely "New alliances for progress" in lieu of military alliances, under this policy, he intended to deal with them in terms of their own needs rather their place in the bi-polar rivalry. India greatly applauded this policy because President Kennedy seemed determined to make (India) "show piece of what western world do for an Asian country. The most decisive factor that had affected in real sense the foreign policy of United States was the increasing ideological split between the USSR and PRC (China). Americans viewed China as a greater source of danger for free-world more than the Soviet Union. The war in Vietnam became a war against the Chinese pattern of liberation of the third world.⁴⁷

Bhabani Sen Gupta analyzes the USA. USSR d'etente in Asian perspective as under :

"The Indian perception of Soviet-American collaboration in Asia to contain Chinese power and influence does not seem to be based on sound evidence. The D'etente between the superpower is limited to Europe. It does not extend to the third world. The D'etente so far rests on the two powers' common concern to prevent a nuclear war. A common culture

has dictated a cease-fire line in the Cold War in Europe. The center of Cold War has shifted from Europe to Asia. It is no longer the Cold War of the fifties and sixties. There are now "three Cold Wars between the USA-USSR-CHINA, between the USSR and CHINA, and between the USA and CHINA. The center of these Cold Wars is Asia. If each there is some interest between the USA and USSR in keeping China under control, there are also many clashes of vital interests, power, ambitions and ideologies between the US and Soviets".⁴⁸

In 1962, India and China entangled in a border dispute. This clash had wide-spread regional as well as global implications. The United States officials perceiving Chinese communism a greater threat to free world than USSR, overwhelmingly supported India during this war. The acting chairman of the senate foreign relations committee stated in Washington in June 1962 :

"We know right now that India is pressing very hard against communist China. I feel that we ought not to be discouraging India by reducing US aid, at the very time that she is moving in the direction that we have been wanting it to move for a long time". When, China routed the Indian forces in the Himalayas, the United States at last got the opportunity to further its long-cherished wish that India should stand up to China. Immediately a program of military assistance to India was launched. In November 1962 the first US arms shipments arrived at Calcutta in four planes.⁴⁹

In order to assess India's need, a high-powered American team headed by Averill Harriman arrived in India on November 22, 1962. At Nassau, on 29th December 1962, the US and Great Britain decided to give India military aid on an emergency basis comprising 120\$ million, hence the war between India and China had ceased up till then. Later in June 1964, the United States made a fresh announcement to give 500\$ to 525\$ million military aid for next five years. US also pledged that this aid would be included transport aircraft. Spare parts light infantry weapons ammunition, communication, and medical equipments. At that

moment, Russia was also extending considerable and substantial military aid to India for its military build up.⁵⁰

The massive American aid to India generated a wave of resentment among Pakistanis. This was an awful shock for them when specifically it was strengthening a hostile neighbor. However, Americans besides providing military aid to India also endeavored to calm down through various measures. President Kennedy in a press conference said, "in providing military assistance to India we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan...Our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitments to Pakistan. The sole purpose of American Aid to India, he insisted, was to defeat "Chinese communist subversion".⁵¹

It was also reassured by America that the arms and military equipments it receives from the United States would not be used against Pakistan. He also promised that in case the arms were used aggressively, US would take prompt and appropriate action to thwart such aggressor. However, unconvinced Pakistani officials kept on arguing that the arms to India would lead to arms race in South Asia. A similar arms procurement program immediately followed, for the acquisition of arms by one country after the others. Thus, the perception of zero-sum game worked behind Sub-continental ceaseless arms build up. Pakistan feared that the India would use its newly gained advantages to dictate a Kashmir settlement to Pakistan of its own choice.

On July 24, 1963, foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto expressed his concern over the continuing military assistance to India. He objected that despite the normalization of between India and China, the United States had not ceased the supply of arms to India.

He stated in National Assembly that :

"It has been in the interest of peace and security that we maintained some sort of military balance with India. Today that balance is upset ...we have been associates of the west in defense alliances. We have been its comrades all these years. We have been with it through a series of crisis. We have made sacrifices for the west, when the U2 plane, supposed to have taken off from Peshawar, was shot down over Russia,

Mr. Khrushchev did not say that India would be annihilated." He also endeavored to realize west by saying :

"All that, we are doing is to ask the west to appreciate the fact that India's military increased strength can only be directed against Pakistan. India repeatedly said that Pakistan is India's enemy number one....we, on our part, shall maintain our traditional friendship with the western powers. We desire friendship not only with them but also with and between all countries of the world".⁵²

INDQ-PAK WAR : 1965

In September 1965, when war broke out between India and Pakistan, the United States immediately suspended the shipments of arms to combatants. At that juncture of history, India - Pakistan entanglement emerged as determining factors in American policy towards South Asia, it itself found completely failed in its diplomacy. It extended military and economic assistance to both antagonistic parties for a well-versed purpose to contain communism, but they used this assistance to pose security threats for each other. Eventually America chose the path of neutrality as guiding principles avoiding belligerent's wishes.

At a press conference, Ayub Khan appealed to the United States on September 11, to play a decisive role in the conflict. However, a White House spokesperson categorically ruled out possibility of any direct diplomatic or physical intervention in the conflict. He reiterated US policy of neutralism. He stressed that the route to peace was only United Nations.⁵³

The effect of this embargo was much more acute on Pakistan than India because of its dependence on the US's spare parts, and ammunition equipments. Compared to the large US aid flow of the early 1960's, which approximated \$400million annually, average annual commitments after 1965 war fell to a low level i.e. below \$150million. Pakistan strongly felt that its foremost ally the United States had betrayed it in its hour of need.⁵⁴

On September 16, China issued an ultimatum to India demanding to discontinue all sorts of military activities on Skim boundary, or

otherwise be ready to bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences. This ultimatum worked well in favor of Pakistan. On September 20, Security Council passed a more meaningful resolution not only demanding for cease-fire but also promised that as soon as cease-fire and withdrawal of forces takes place, the Security Council would consider "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problems underlying the present conflict. The possibility of Chinese intervention made USA to use its influence to be passed this key resolution. Despite all protests and Ayub's visit to Washington during which he force-fully assured his allegiance to US friendship, the US administration did not do any special thing to redress Pakistan's complaints as regards to military and economic aid to India. It was at this time of disenchantment with the west that Pakistan started thinking about improving its relations with China. In 1962 in the very first session of the National Assembly, a unanimous resolution of condemnation of the USA and UK was passed for their failure to help Pakistan in solving the Kashmir dispute. So, in changing circumstances and in the context of India-China tense relations, the US military aid to India along with Sino Soviet split, the Assembly urged the government to reformulate its foreign policy and to give a fresh look to the question of improving relations with China, the potential power in Asia. The American policy during the war of 1965 and its aid to India ushered an atmospheric change and Ayub Khan claimed 'we want friends not masters'. Later this phrase became the title to his book. President Ayub defended his growing ties with China and described, "America as a power drunk."⁵⁵

In April 1967, US made an announcement through which it refused to resume military assistance to India and Pakistan. The announcement stated that this decision had been taken after reviewing military assistance policy and its motivating factors. Through this, US intended to show that it had no specific objectives to be achieved by contributing arms race between India and Pakistan, it expressed a hope that both countries would make progress in resolving the problems and differences, which had divided them and that they would accord greater priority to the allocation of their resources to agricultural and industrial development. The reaction of both recipient countries varied in intensity and nature. Its attitude and neutrality of treating an ally and non-aligned on same footing hurt Pakistan more than India.

SOUTH ASIA : A LOW PRIORITY AREA; 1969-1978 D'ETENTE & SUPERPOWERS

The opening of 1970's was marked by certain fundamental changes in US worldview. With the oath of President Nixon and appointment of Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor, US tried a new approach to international politics that was, officially labeled as 'D'etente'. Kissinger explained that, D'etente 'sought to create a vested interest in co-operation and restrain, an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to co-operation.

President Nixon in his reports (1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972) to congress on American foreign policy patterns discussed at length the transformation of American foreign relations with both friends and adversaries. According to these reports, the following changes of historic scope and significance took place in US foreign policy. These were :

- An opening to the peoples republic of China (PRC).
- The beginning of a new relationship with Soviet Union
- The laying of a foundation for healthier and more sustainable relationship with European allies and Japan
- The creation of a new environment for the world's monetary and trade activities.

In the words of Nixon, "the heart of our new conception of that role is a more balanced ally with friends--and a more creative connection with adversaries" was D'etente.⁵⁶

To put into practice, the Detente, Nixon, and Kissinger propounded the linkage theory with a hope and expectation that the development of economic, political, and strategic ties between the United States and Soviet Union would bind the two in a common fate. They also advocated that closer linkage would make superpower relations dependent on the continuation of mutually rewarding exchanges. So ultimately would cease the incentives for war. Linkage theory encompassed the entire

range of Soviet-American relations, and ensured cooperation in one policy area (arms control) and acceptable conduct in others (intervention outside traditional spites).⁵⁷

The outcomes of D'etente started unveiling as the Nixon administration moved on through his first few years. Strategic arms limitations talks and negotiations on reducing military forces in Europe (MBFR) began. The US-Soviet trade and cultural exchange were on increase. German border problem was solved and summits between Nixon and soviet leaders took place on regular basis. The US-Soviet cordiality increased so much that a joint space mission flown during the summer of 1972.⁵⁸

US-Chinese relations had been characterized by animosity since the Korean War. However, US embarked on journey of normalization with China during the first thirty months of Nixon administration. On July 15, 1971, Nixon announced that he would visit China in early 1972. With his visit, in February of that year, Sino-American relations entered a new phase. The triangular Sino-American and Soviet-American cordiality not only allowed the United States to improve relations with communist bloc, but also gave an opportunity and certain freedom of action in the air strikes on Vietnam.⁵⁹

The US policy parameters during this period showed minimum concern for South Asia on a proposition that "they can do us little good but also little harm." Therefore, during this period America chiefly remained involved in the Vietnam War. The US strategic planners considered outh Asia a less significant area in terms of US strategic interests. The massive inaction on the part of US administration gave way and a visible chance to Soviet Union that enhanced its influence and expanded its involvement in the region's issues. It reached its acme in 1966, when Soviet premier brokered a peace deal between India and Pakistan at Tashkent after 1965 War.

The US policy of non-involvement was perturbed, to some extent because of two factors. First, General Yahya Khan acted as intermediary to begin an opening to China. This shadowed the US policy during the

war of 1971 between India and Pakistan. Secondly, nuclearisation of South Asia (India's blast in 1974 and Pakistan's desire to acquire nuclear capability) substantially changed its attitude towards South Asia.⁶⁰

BANGLADESH CRISIS

In early December 1971, India and Pakistan went to war. During this brief war, Moscow extended its full cooperation to India with enormous military assistance. A naval demonstration in Bay of Bengal in support of India was undertaken. On political front, its full-fledged support to India was available, it frequently vetoed all UN Security Council's resolutions calling for ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistani land.⁶¹

With this firm military and political backing, India was able to give the severe blow to the Pakistan's military power and achieved a decisive victory over its arc rival. President Nixon spelled out his policy during the crisis in these words : "The United States has had an enduring interest in the security, independence and progress of both India and Pakistan....there have been fluctuations in our political relationships over the years—from our earliest ties with Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, to defense cooperation with India in 1962 border war with China, to the Nixon Doctrine's posture of balance and restraint. But our fundamental interests and ties have been constant."⁶²

He outlined these interests as under :

India is a great country, a free and democratic nation, in whom as a model of progress for the developing world the United States has invested its hopes and resource. India has been by far the principal beneficiary of US development assistance—to the extent of approximately 10\$ billion since its independence. In fiscal year 1971, this administration provided 540\$ million of the net development aid to India. The United States has also long maintained a close ties also with Pakistan. Since its independence we have contributed 4\$ billion in its economic development".⁶³

The United States officially followed the policy of massive inaction in India-Pakistan war of 1971 as it did during 1965 war. Liberals and friends of democracy heavily criticized the tone of US policy as it refused to condemn the military action in East Pakistan by Pakistani forces. America was blamed being standing with the forces of militarism against democracy, democratic senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts charged at President Nixon "watched this crisis in silence."⁶⁴

Kissinger in "White House Years" makes it clear that the secret opening to China was most important factor in shaping Nixon and Kissinger's reaction to 1971 events. In defending their stance, Kissinger explains that, he and Nixon faced the dilemma. "The United States could not condone a brutal military repression in which thousands of civilians were killed and from which million fled to India for safety." He further states "the East Pakistan crisis burst upon us while Pakistan was our only channel to China; we had no other means of communication with Peking." In his *White House Years*, Henry Kissinger made an effort to refute with all his academic and diplomatic acumen that there was not any tilt towards Pakistan. He has several times stated that there was no such tilt but only a logical effort to balance or correct the earlier policy of the United States Government. Nixon and Kissinger adopted the course of national interest of America. He was highly critical of the state department's initial reaction to the crisis, which took the form to stop US military supply to Pakistan and to hold up US economic assistance. He attributed both actions taken with out White House clearance naive in nature based on Departments ignorance of the China initiative and its "traditional Indian bias."⁶⁵

Dennis Kux reviews this tilt by stating that: the impact of Nixon's tilt was, in fact marginal on events in South Asia. During this crisis, there is little evidence that US pressure or advice significantly affected either's India or Pakistan's actions".⁶⁶

As the war ended, South Asia once more became an area of less significance in terms of foreign policy concerns. However, nuclear proliferation of South Asia retained the prime US interest in the region. In addition, Washington became increasingly worried about the risks of

nuclear proliferation as both the countries were speedily moving on their nuclear programs. The US along with the other members of the nuclear club could do little to stop India in this respect, but Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were crippled by the growing American concern. The US government acted to tighten the loopholes in its nuclear exports and decided to undertake some tough diplomatic measures with its allies. In 1978, congress approved the Symington/Glenn amendments that barred aid to any country that the president could not certify that it would not develop nuclear weapons. By these amendments, all aid to Pakistan suspended and lowered the relations between America and Pakistan. Strict measures were also taken against India in this respect. President Carter changed the terms previously agreed to for nuclear fuel deliveries to India, unless India, like other recipients of nuclear fuels, put their facilities under the full international nuclear safeguards. India categorically refused to comply with the demands. Indian officials charged president with having gone back on an international agreement.⁶⁷

COLD WAR II 1979-1989

President Ford's administration ostensibly pursued Nixon's footsteps in foreign policy parameters from August 1974 to 1977. Kissinger represented the continuity, although, an increasing opposition was noticeable during this period.

The criticism came mainly from two quarters: On the part of the conservatives, it found expression in Ronald Reagan's campaign to become the republican presidential candidate in 1976. Reagan felt that D'etente had only benefited the Soviet Union alone. Even though, Reagan lost to Ford, he received widespread support and it was illustrative that the word D'etente was dropped out of the republican's vocabulary. The liberals believed that D'etente was beneficial but the way it practiced republicans, had drawbacks. Too little emphasis was placed on relations with Japan and the allies in Europe as these countries themselves claimed. Moreover, Kissinger and Nixon's policy were not in

line with American ideals. Their policies lacked a moral dimension. Human rights in all these pragmatic policies had no place specifically as regards Soviet Union.

Soviet Union continued to take advantage of D'etente as apparent in its arms build up on both conventional and nuclear levels. Similarly, Soviet arms sales and arms assistance to national liberation movements and third world governments accelerated. Finally, Henry Kissinger himself began accusing Soviet Union of "breaking the rules of D'etente" and many Americans agreed.⁶⁸

Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency in January 1977, with an intention to retain much part of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy. However, slight changes depicting more emphasis on human rights, cooperation with third world and less emphasis on East West issues, were incorporated in his foreign policy agenda. As far as security issues were concerned, his national security advisor showed a conviction to have sharper tone towards the Soviet Union and more cooperation with China and lay emphasis on US self-assertion.

Americans, at that time, had a perception that American military superiority was on decline. A Harris Survey revealed that at the end of 1977, 34 percent believed that US was the most powerful nation in the world whereas by the end of 1978, that figure declined to 18 percent. Although, the so-called side of D'etente—tourism, cultural, scientific exchanges and non-critical trade existed and continued. This also gave D'etente an illusion of vitality.

The final blow to D'etente was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Americans pursued this event as the final proof of Soviet expansionism. The Carter Administration promptly took it as major source of threat to Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf and moved to create the Rapid Deployed Joint Force (RDJF) to counter the Soviet threat.⁶⁹

Since the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, South Asia had not figured significantly in the eyes of US foreign policy experts. The

growing ties with China and Soviet Union became the major source of disenchantment. As mentioned earlier, the US approach towards New Delhi and Islamabad has always been governed more by series of global issues but invasion of Afghanistan quickly moved USA to share up its position along the southern land tier of the Asian continent and Indian Ocean. Mr. Dulles in various statements emphasized over the importance of strategic position of Pakistan from point of view of Soviet Adventurism. Therefore, the administration undertook to send a high-level team to the region in order to discuss the Afghan crisis and solicit views on to deal with it. Arms and economic assistances were, of course, a key element in such talks. A concerted effort was made to reduce tension in the US bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. The tensions, particularly, flowing from the US nuclear non-proliferation policy which had directly affected Washington's relations with two key nations of South Asia.

PAKISTAN BACK IN THE SECURITY FOLD OF AMERICA

The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 together with the overthrow of US backed surrogate regime in Iran—abandon of Shah Reza Pahlvi from Iran—incorporated Pakistan in the US security fold in the form of front line state. It was a unique type of coincidence that both USA and Pakistan had a basic convergence of perceptions regarding Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. However, divergence on national interests was also there. The US analysts in the establishment and outside looked at this event as the continuation of the Soviet's geopolitical movements of 70's.

They regarded it as a springboard not only Soviet hegemony in the region but also over the world. They kept in mind the Soviets' historic and traditional quest for influence and access to the Gulf and warm waters of South Asia. Therefore, Afghanistan could become a significant and alarming step and a prelude towards the achievement of that goal.

The US administration under President Carter chose to use economic and diplomatic sanctions rather than sending troops to deal the matter. The US reaction also included the mobilization of universal

condemnation by the west, the Muslim world, China and Japan, embargo on food grain to the Soviet Union and boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow.⁷⁰

On 30 December 1979, the president's Advisor on National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brezinski in a major policy statement spelled out that the Soviet intervention was a "qualitative new step involving direct invasion of a country out side the Warsaw Pact through the use of Soviet forces. He denied that the US was in an 'eyeball-to-eyeball' confrontation with the Soviet whether in Afghanistan or in Pakistan.

The Carter administration created a Rapid Deployment Force, now a separate area command, The Central Command, to serve US interest in the Middle East and South Asia. The reaction also included an offer of \$400millions economic and security package, which was turned down by Pakistan labeling it "peanut aid". Under President Carter US administration failed to adequately define the threat posed to the US interest due to Soviet in Afghanistan and could not provide sufficient counter-measures. " the basic US policy was that of containment. By the close of Carter's term in 1981, the general feeling in the US was that American inaction on Afghanistan sends a dangerous signal to Moscow, for it could encourage future Soviet adventurism. Iran, Pakistan and other neighboring countries would be demoralized by continued American indifference to Soviet expansionism and tempted to cut their own deals with Moscow" commented by "A Staff Report: Crisis and Conflict Analysis Team, in Afghanistan Crisis : Policy Positions Of Afghanistan, Pakistan, U.S.S.R, U.S, Iran, and India."⁷¹

PAKISTAN : A FRONT LINE STATE

Since independence, Pakistan had not been on cordial terms with Afghanistan due to one or other reasons. The expressive interest in Pushtoonistan movement had mainly created distrust between both these countries; however, this mistrust and low level of hostility could not cause any serous threat to Pakistan's security from its western border.

The prudence of Pakistan's policy planners, in spite of all tensions between both the countries did not bring any drastic change in policy towards Afghanistan. Even they continued to provide transit trade facilities to Afghanistan. The major shift, for the first time, was seen on the eve of April 1978 coup in Afghanistan, which brought into power Nour Muhammad Taraki. This government had communist orientation and tended to revive Afghanistan's claim on some parts of NWFP. This was the time when Soviet's direct intervention started taking concrete shape, and finally in 1979, Afghanistan was stormed by 70-80 thousands Soviet's troops and resultantly Babrak Karmal was enthroned after killing president Haffiz ullah Amin and thousands of others.

These developments added several new dimensions to Pakistan's security environment. The security analysts feared that Pakistan would be next prey to Soviet adventurism. They also assumed that South Asia, as a whole would also become vulnerable to Soviet penetration for the sake of oil resources of Persian Gulf. Another dimension aggravated the intensity of the event that history proved that the emerging power in Central Asia, which consolidated its hold over Kabul, never stopped there. It had compulsorily come down to Sub-continent. Therefore, the element of expansionism in history towards South Asia through the historic gateway of Khyber Pass was unignorable. The communist threat to Islam in international system was also obvious. The domestic political scenario also had its share in compulsions due to which Pakistani government opted for America's side in the game of super power rivalry on the periphery of South Asia. Zia ul Haq regime tactfully legitimized it-self because of this catastrophic event of history. Pakistani Government, while taking position on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could not marginalize the context of Pakistan-Soviet relations and the role of Soviet Government during Bangladesh crisis. Therefore, the Pakistani stance fortunately or unfortunately coincided with American perception of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.⁷²

Although it was never admitted, but in fact a large amount of aid was covertly supplied to the Afghan resistance. The US helped the

Afghans to obtain shoulder-fired, anti-craft and anti-tank weapons. In 1981, President Reagan took the office and by this time, the major consensus in the US was that to ignore the Afghanistan struggle would allow the Soviet to consolidate their gains for a southern expansion and turn Afghanistan a forward base for further expansion. President Reagan keeping in view all the repercussions of this Soviet move brought a drastic change in the policy and shifted policy emphasis from that of "containment to a policy of roll back that is "pushing the communists back to their frontier. Reagan administration took the plea that as the leader of the "Free World" the US had a moral obligation to aid the Afghanistan as this convey a message to nearby states that Washington was able to protect its own interest as well as that of its friends.⁷³

In October 1984, for the first time in history, the congress openly voted to support a liberation movement. The US senate with the House of Representatives concurring unanimously, called for the US "to support effectively the Afghan people in their fight for their freedom and added; 'it would be indefensible to provide enough aid to the freedom fighters to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom. The Reagan administration sought the strengthening of defense of its friends in the area, namely Pakistan two 6-year aid packages as a special case. Officials in US tried hard to provide aid as discreetly as possible, to deny Moscow propaganda that the resistance was only inspired. Only non-combatants supplies such as food, clothing, medicine was overtly supplied through Pakistan. US condemned Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in all ways, but it never considered it an impediment to US-Soviet relations. They signed an agreement in December 1987 on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe and Asia and an understanding to sign a strategic arms reduction treaty in May or June 1988.⁷⁴

INDIAN REACTION TO SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Most of the countries all around the world severely condemned the Soviet military move against an independent and sovereign state violating Un charter. India diametrically went against the world opinion.

Mrs. Indra Gandhi in a statement said :

"We do not want to condemn the Soviets on this issue because we feel similar actions by other countries in other parts of the world have not been condemned". She actually showed her complete adherence to Soviet position i.e Soviets had been invited by the Kabul regime, and that they would leave as soon as outside interference in Afghanistan stopped. India also abstained from voting in all UN resolutions on Afghanistan. No doubt, India did not uprightly condemn the Soviets but on many occasions, the early withdrawal of Soviet troops was favored. The basis of this option was an expressive reality that is Afghan crisis had grave implications for South Asia, and that no government in India could ignore the fact "with Afghanistan having disappeared as a buffer state, would bring a super power in the proximity of Indian border".⁷⁵

Bhabani Sen Gupta has justified India's tacit pro-Soviet policy in the case of Afghanistan after 1979 in these words :

"In no conceivable circumstances could India line up with Pakistan, China and the United States against Soviet Union; this would have gone against the gain of India's foreign policy since independence". India was seeking an opportunity to assert and get recognition for its regional power role and did not want to be left out from the negotiations between the various parties to the conflict in Afghanistan.⁷⁶

The rearming of Pakistan by the United States after Afghanistan crisis was regarded as an obstacle in India's aspiration of seeking allegiance from its smaller neighbors. India attempted to prevent a government in Afghanistan which could be friendly to Pakistan as on March, 21, 1988 speaking to newsmen, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi said ' we would not accept any government in Afghanistan which is acceptable to Pakistan and its allies.'⁷⁷

Indian prime minister also invited Dr Najibullah to pay an official visit to India when the whole was expecting the fall of Dr Najibullah soon after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Pakistan after the invasion tried hard to bring the attention of world community towards the seriousness of problem, it had a clear-cut position from the beginning and demanded mainly two things: (a) the Soviet troops should be withdrawn (b) the refugees should go back to their country voluntarily and honorably (estimated 3.6 million refugees were in Pakistan). Pakistan sought the help of the United Nations and the Geneva process was initiated on the recommendation of Pakistan to the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. United Nations provided full assistance to resolve this regional variance. Under the auspices of United Nations, proximity talks started in Geneva in 1982 and after six years of lengthy talks, the Geneva Accords were finally signed on April 14, 1988. The Soviet troops began their withdrawal as per the Geneva Accords on May 15. So, concluded that the Reagan administration successfully achieved a major policy triumph before the end of its terms.

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Do More Religious People Spend More Time at Workplace?

An Empirical Application of Valeye Asr Model of Human Resource Management

SYED NISAR HUSSAIN HAMDANI

Abstract

The present paper finds that due to variation in moral capital of human resources, with physical capital held constant, their time allocated to wage work, religious activities, volunteering and personal care varies across different groups of workers. The paper used the Divine Economics Framework 2004 and cross section data of 'Religiosity and Economic Survey 2000'. The direction and magnitude of relationship that has been observed among economic variables, behavioral religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, perception of Mahdviat or a religious future, mother's religious education, desire for higher earnings, and some other variables support our earlier conclusion (Hamdani 2004, Hamdani and Ahmad 2002; also see Iannaccone 1990, 2000;), that religiosity is a strong candidate for explaining economic behavior. It is also observed that more truly religious workers allocate their time in a relatively balanced and ethical manner and enjoy more self-satisfaction as compared to less truly religious workers, which points to some implications for governance at workplace.

INTRODUCTION

All economic activities, which revolve around human resources, deal with time allocation decision behavior which has been widely analyzed by economists during last few decades. However, the empirical results of labor supply studies were found surprisingly away from the real world

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situation (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002). It has been realized by economists now that this paradox is attributable to neglecting heterogeneous variables like attitudes and values in economics analysis. Hence, analyzing workplace issues like commitment to duty and good governance or best human resource management involves a clear perspective of both economic and non-economic particularly religion variables. It is now believed that ethical system and centuries old practices of different religions and sects gives rise to a typical form of moral or religious capital that may play role in economic decision making (Iannaccone 1990, 2000).

Using the Divine Economics Framework (2003)¹ and cross section data of 'Religiosity and Economic Survey 2000', the present paper aims at finding whether variation in moral capital, with physical capital held constant, the workers' time allocated to wage work, religious activities, volunteering and personal care varies across different groups of workers? If yes, to which direction and to what extent? In particular, the paper introduces some non-conventional variables in the analysis to observe the interrelationships among economic variables, behavioral religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, perception of Mahdviat or a religious future, mother's religious education, desire for higher earnings, and some other variables introduced in our earlier work (Hamdani 2003, 2004, Hamdani and Ahmad 2002). The paper would help understanding if religiosity can be a source for explaining economic behavior. A systematic difference in time allocation behavior of workers would certainly give useful insights for governance at workplace through religiosity and morality. The paper shall empirically test some propositions of the Value Asr Model of Human Resource Management (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002). Regarding time management practices of employees of any organization.

At the outset, we pose various questions to social scientists particularly economists in order to set an agenda for our discussion in subsequent pages which include poverty, violence, deprivations, and disasters. Religions have predicted the actions and their outcomes for all time to come that include peak of cruelty and injustice when Jesus Christ

and Imam Mahdi will appear to fill this earth with peace, justice and prosperity. With this background it is justified to ask here whether can we deny that perceptions and beliefs formed by religions have no impact on human (economic) behavior? If yes, what religion and what sect is preferable to the other one. If Islam seems the latest and better than all others, when it would be applied in its true shape? And what will be the behavior of economic agents in that time period? A preview of that time period would lead us to a different kind of economic analysis particularly in case of time allocation behavior of individuals. To answer these questions, the rest of the discussion has been based on Valeye Asr Model of Human Resource Management (2002).

In all the above mentioned issues, we assume that religiosity plays an important role. Keeping in view its role in human life, we have questioned the conventional economics and evolved a 'Divine Economics' which is the study of economics and religion in each other's perspective. It analyses the response to the changes in certain economic as well as non economic variables such as prices, income, wages, taxes etc., prayers, and religiosity indicators. It is similar to and different from conventional, Islamic and Christian Economics. However among many common things, one is that it is believed that Divine rules plays all such roles which need to balance the 'extremes' caused by human action to maintain a divinely defined combination of fears and hopes as well as pains and pleasures through blessings and disasters. Divine rule gets itself implemented in every space and time. Hence scope of its 'macro economy' is the whole universe and its 'micro economy' is the smallest indivisible unit of everything, and all in between these two.

During past few decades, importance of both religion and religiosity-level has increased among scholars and researchers. The main reasons are; i) Widening of the scope of research from single disciplines to multi-disciplinary topics, and ii) Ever increasing levels of religiosity even in both East and the West [Finke and Stark 1992; U.S. government's decennial Census of Religious Bodies, 1850-1936; Greeley 1989; Iannaccone (1990, 2000). Economists and social scientists now seem to

agree that empirical aspects of economic as well as non-economic decision making under alternative religiosity conditions of individuals should be brought into the mainstream literature (Iannaccone 1990, 2000).

Iannaccone (1992) and Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) viewed religion as just one of many household commodities, one may analyze religious participation as a standard consumer choice problem. They identified that church attendance is direct function of "afterlife consumption". (Becker 1976:89-114) and others have realized that most religious commodities are non-tangibles and therefore, they fall neither into marketable goods nor services but may be labeled as "household commodities" as meals, laundry or relaxation and love. Like the products of a commercial firm, household commodities are produced with scarce resources--purchased goods, household labor (time), and human skill. (Iannaccone 1992). It has also been observed that individuals' average charity rates, voluntary activities and religious attendance vary over the life cycle depending on socio-demographic and religious variables. Their time allocation to religion or economic activities is not always in any fixed fraction but varies with many factors (yet needed to be identified by economists). The Islamic economics also does not seem to have presented any formal model of time management problem in order to optimize human resources for achieving society which may excel in worldly development from other nations and maintaining the true Islamic spirit also intact.²

Therefore, there is a need for developing a new religiosity-based analytical framework for all disciplines including economics and human resource management. In particular, this may pave the way for management of economy and its human resources in divine perspective.

Is Islam Misunderstood by Economists Including Muslim Economists?

Islam, like other religions, is also subject to a variety of interpretations that may emerge from a verse of the Holy Qur'an or

Hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny). The difference in interpretation may come from either purely intellectual honesty and diversity or due to some vested socio-political or economic interest of the interpreter. These interpretations took two broader forms; one who believe that after the Prophet the interpretation of Qur'an done by divinely guided Imams is more authentic than the elected caliphs or companions of the Prophet. The other who do not discriminate between these two types of interpreters.

However, this is important for a social scientist to note that this difference in authenticity of source of interpreting the revelations is not something that can be overlooked. It has divided Islam into two broad sects; Shiites and Sunnites who extremely differ on some of economic verses of the Holy Qur'an and Hadith of the Prophet. For social scientist to be unbiased and honest there has to be a comparative analysis of the two standpoints and any opinion emerging from such comparative analysis may have a place in scientific study of this religion.

Among accessible work done by economists including Muslim economics, we don't see any significant empirical analysis that fulfils the above criteria. Hence, the scope of such works remains limited only to any one particular sect in Islam. This limitation has created many misunderstanding about Islam and its economic systems.

The other source of possible misunderstanding is the use of extrinsic, alternative or negative religiosity indicators to interpret religious particularly Islamic behavior which can serve nothing else then a superficial and sometimes wrong interpretation of the religion and its interrelationships. We shall elaborate this fact with help of empirical evidence in next pages.

The concept of a savior (Valeye Asr) and its relation to economic behavior

We can observe that social and economic behavior is much likely to be influenced by peoples' perception about future. The concept of a

savoir of the future world is present in almost all religions in some form or the other. Christian and Jews believe in return of Jesus Christ and Muslims believe in both the return of Jesus Christ as well as appearance of the Valeye Asr Imam Al-Mahdi. In the context of the study area (Pakistan which is a Muslim Society), the savoir usually means the Mahdi. The belief and perception about his appearance is therefore termed as 'Mahdavi religiosity' in the present paper. This variable would help understanding the variation in behaviors of people from many dimensions, because people use to perceive some form of a future of the world and relate all the on-going evils, disasters, wars, and other events to that form of future. They sometimes pray for an early return of Jesus and appearance of Mahdi and try to be God-fearing because only then they would be respected in the eyes of these two representatives of God on earth. The method of constructing this variable is discussed in the Section 4 below.³

The Valeye Asr Model (VAM-HRM)

Hamdani and Ahmad (2002a) proposed 'Valeye Asr Model of Human Resource Management' based on Divine Economics Framework which suggests that, other things held constant, a rational firm manager shall maximize firm's benefits more efficiently with religion-embodied human resources as compared to the firm indifferent on that ground. The proposed model is applied via time allocation behavior of human resources. It assumes that :

- (i) city of being 'able to do' or limitation 'not able not to do' some act is to an extent constrained by laws of nature. That means, the capacity of any human resource to perform any act (positive or negative) originates from his endowments for any given space and time.
- (ii) ssumes that efficiency of workers depends on workers' allocation of time between wage-work, leisure, family/society and religion,
- (iii) Everyone can perform positive if the management around him (family, society, state) does not leave him alone to do otherwise.

Hence, a value-loaded Islamic management of human resource has more potential of performing best with best management of its workers' time not only within the firm but also outside it (i.e. in family and society).

The first assumption above implies that since he can not avoid sleeping beyond a period (time for self), can not tolerate longer isolation from others or avoid crying for help from others in the time of need (time for others), this leads him to allocate his limited daily time (24 hours) in way that he is capable to perform all or most of his desired activities in a relatively balanced way.

The model is derived from the traditions of the Holy Prophet (PBUHA) as explained by Imam Moosa Kazim⁴ who advises to allocate one's daily time in a way that four type of activities must get their due share. These activities are; *Mumajaat* (time for religious activities, self recognition and purification), *Mohash* (time for economic activities), *Mohashrat* (time for other than self i.e. family and society), and *Lazzat* (time for deriving pleasure from non-prohibited goods and services which can provide energy for performing the above three functions). The proposed model that covers all these four parts of daily time use, has four components: the utility function (relating to material as well as spiritual goal of individual), production function, the income constraint and a time constraint. The utility function is maximized subject to total available time (24 hours per day), the technology and income/assets at a given time.

The VAM-HRM explains that any individual or management of a firm works under a *given set of conditions* (socioeconomic, religious and moral), uses *physical capital* like purchased raw or semi-processed materials, *human capital* (own-time characterized by education and typical personal skills) and *religious capital* (behavior of individual or organization; which is a sort of real capital to produces commodities i.e. *goods, services and sensations* having some satisfying characteristics) like cloth in a factory, meals in a kitchen, health in hospital, advice in a

consultancy shop, justice in a court, clean environment in a surrounding, a noble personality in a professional development college, so and so forth.

The individual of VAM-HRM is rational in conventional sense. That is, he chooses activities or commodities (good or bad) which maximize his total satisfaction from alternative use of available time (24 hours). He may have some religious and normative characteristics⁵ as it is required to succeed current life or life hereafter. Therefore, he is likely to substitute some part of personal consumption (C) to charitable donations (D) and part of his market time (M) and personal leisure time (P) to religious activities (R) and voluntary activities (V).

The implications of this Model are many; i) The individual or organization maximizes its benefits from producing normatively defined goods, services and sensations, ii) the individual or organization's self interest embodies interest of others too, iii) the second implication also indicate that the redistribution of peoples/firms' time or monetary resources may take place without involving huge public sector departments, and many more. 'This way, every individual is interlinked with the humanity at individual, social or even global level. In other words, all economic decisions of individuals have roots in person, home and society as a whole, iv) Under Islamic management of human resource, all the four components of time allocation need to be positive so that the self, home, society and religion all get due attention so that the purpose of creation of man as 'superb creature' is served.⁶

The Valleje Asr Model of Human Resource Management that embodies the time allocation pattern of Imam Moosa Kazim was tested earlier (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002a) using cross section data of 302 household⁷ of Pakistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir collected through a survey on religiosity level of individuals, their socio economic and community background and pattern of optimizing their time resource. As explained in Hamdani and Ahmad (2002) :

"Under VAM-HRM, whatever commodities are produced by the individual may be divided into 3 uses or parts; (a) own consumption (b)

family's consumption (c) society's consumption (through charity or volunteering). In other words, the production that (may or may not) exceed own needs is available to others on certain monetary or social costs. The model allows considering the socio demographic characteristics such as age, sex, personal endowments, skills, values and social styles in order to optimize human resource in its normative settings"

What is Imam Kazim's Time Allocation Pattern?

All the traditions of Imams of Ahle Bait are believed to be derived from the Holy Qur'an or Prophet Mohammad (Peace be Upon Him and His Progeny). The Qur'an says;

Your engaging in less important activities, diverts you from more important ones. Qur'an 102:1

Yazdi (2004) illustrates this verse as, "...the total indulgence in the material acquisition in this world which, not only degenerates the moral and spiritual aspect of the individual but also takes away all the time more and more, it leaving no time for seeking the higher objects of the real and the permanent value in the life hereafter which is eternal while every material acquisition has only an imaginary and timely value and which one leaves behind when he or she passes away from this world. He continues, "... but spiritual, moral or intellectual acquisition, is inseparable from individual, and goes along with the acquirer when he passes away from this world to the next" (p. 1899-1900).

Relating to these and many other verses of the Qur'an, one can find Imam Moosa Kazim's suggested time allocation pattern that regards due share of different responsibilities of human beings at their home, workplace, society and religion. Hence, in Islam, a more balanced time allocation would be ensured if the total daily time is divided in the following four activities :

- Religious time
- Economic activity time
- Society (family and rest of community)
- Personal care and leisure

(see *Tohful Uqool, guftare-Dilnasheen*).

A details discussion on this type of time allocation pattern is available in Hamdani 2004.

A question, however, needs clarification here that who will determine that what type of allocation would be considered as 'good and bad'. The Holy Qur'an answers to this question that man himself is the best judge of his actions (Qur'an 75:14).

A summary of empirical findings was presented in Hamdani and Ahmad (2002) and is reproduced below for completeness. Then some further findings are discussed. We consider these results only suggestive due to many constraints on sample size and quality of data. Yet the results may be useful in provoking thoughts for a theory of spiritual human capital that may be developed further on the lines of Gary Becker (1965, 1976).

The analysis below presents some further interesting relationships seem to emerge from the present analysis that are supportive to some findings of our earlier studies. For example, it was noted in Hamdani and Ahmad (2002) :

"These results indicate that human resources who differ in their religious characteristics are likely to display a systematically different behavior at workplace. For example, workers with more religious capital and dynamism who do not give importance to income beyond a certain level, especially if it is at the cost of their religious activities, can not be retained for longer hours at work with efficiency. The wise managers, however, can retain them for longer hours by introducing co-work activities of their interest".

Empirical Findings

With the concepts and definitions give above with regard to some non-conventional variables, we now proceed to discuss some of our empirical findings below.

The Table 2.1 indicates the mean values of each variable used in subsequent discussion and also show a difference in mean between government and private workers. It is evident that, on average, largest share of time in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir goes to rest and sleep (36%). The study shows that among Pakistan government employees, highest time is allocated to rest and sleep (36 % of total 24 hours), followed by wage activities (19% and 22% among government and private workers respectively). The mean religious and voluntary time is higher among government worker as compared to private workers whereas the later spend more time in economic activities. However, data tells that a notable difference exists in time allocation behavior of respondents (all) with behavioral religiosity.

TABLE 2.1
Mean Comparison of Government and Private Workers

Variable Code		Pvt. Employees Mean N=69
RP	Worship time (% of 24 hrs.)	7.13
MP	Economic activity time (% of 24 hrs.	22.18
VP	Voluntary Time (% of 24 hrs.	2.48
LP	Personal Leisure Time (% of 24 hrs.	36.74
YHHM	Household Income	11350.21
Desir_Y	Desired additional income (Rs.)	7932.84
MREDU	Mother's religious education	7.33
DI_DZS	Charity/Zakat/Sadaqah (Rs.)	3450.75
RS 72	Behavioral Religiosity	71.94
Rs77 NEG1	Extrinsic Religiosity	39.17
PROBLMS	Community Problems Level	55.75
MAHDVIAT	Mahdavi Religiosity	.55
SS	Self-satisfaction	59.09

TABLE 2.2a
**Mean Comparison of time Allocation Patterns
 by Levels of Behavioral Religiosity**

Behavioral Religiosity		Worship time	Economic activity time	Voluntary Time	Personal Leisure time	Home Production time
Low Religiosity	Mean	265.71	2205.83	48.00	2841.86	522.86
	N	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
	Std. Deviation	312.42	1077.15	92.69	699.07	650.58
Medium Religiosity	Mean	512.88	1808.73	224.84	3465.27	832.20
	N	84.00	84.00	84.00	84.00	84.00
	Std. Deviation	455.84	843.27	268.06	858.91	792.83
High Religiosity	Mean	801.57	1716.88	298.46	3167.46	861.38
	N	198.00	198.00	198.00	198.00	198.00
	Std. Deviation	579.02	775.01	337.40	668.26	832.87
Total	Mean	704.68	1755.42	271.00	3246.13	844.70
	N	289.00	289.00	289.00	289.00	289.00
	Std. Deviation	559.57	804.20	317.97	741.95	816.83

A simple descriptive analysis of time allocation behavior is presented in Table 2.2. It is evident from the Table that more religious people allocate more time to religious, voluntary and home activities as compared to less religious persons who allocate more time to market and personal leisure showing a selfish behavior.⁵

In the above table, small significance values (***) indicate that nonlinear relationships exist. In this table, the significance value is more than .05 for all the variables except market time. However, a stronger

nonlinear relationship could exist between behavioral religiosity and Kazmia Time Allocation Pattern.

Table 2.2 shows the mean time allocation preferences of overall sample with regard to behavioral religiosity levels. An ANOVA results are also given above. Small significance values (***) shows p. less than or equal to 1) group differences. The significance level (***) for religious time (R) and voluntary time (V) indicates that at least some of the religiosity levels differ from the others. Since RS72c is an ordered variable, we can further explore the relationship between the variables. Linearity reflects variation due to a linear relationship between the variables. A small significance value (<.05 or ***) indicates that a linear relationship exists. In this table, the significance value exceeds for H hence no linear relationship exists between RS72c and H. Deviation from Linearity reflects variation due to nonlinear relationships between the variables. Small significance values (** and *** or p.<.05) indicate that nonlinear relationships exist. This table indicates that a non-linear relationship exists between RS72c and R, L and V. Moreover, Eta squared represents the proportion of variation accounted for by the differences among the groups.⁹ In the table, differences between the behavioral religiosity account for 7% of the variation in time allocated to religion, 1 % in market time, 2 % in home time, 4% in voluntary time and negligible in leisure time respectively.

TABLE 2.3a
Mean Comparison of Time Allocation Patterns (Pvt Jobs)
by Levels of Behavioral Religiosity

Behavioral Religiosity		Worship time	Economic activity time	Voluntary Time	Personal Leisure Time	Home Production Time
Low Religiosity	Mean	234.00	2782.50	.00	2476.80	1440.00
Medium Religiosity	Mean	321.16	2115.72	186.37	3270.94	633.47
High Religiosity	Mean	777.19	1770.67	248.65	3242.36	638.37

Mainjob

Table 2.3 shows that private workers with low religiosity are found to spend a major share of their time for earning and sleeping and no time in voluntary work (although we need larger sample size for our results to be reliable) as compared to those with more religiosity whose mean time allocated for this voluntary cause is 284 hours per annum on average and their time spending is relatively balanced as Imam Kazim's time allocation pattern demands

Table 2.4 indicates mixed results about the private workers with reference to their extrinsic religiosity.

The above results support our earlier conclusion (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002a) that :

“...people with higher religiosity allocate time in a way that besides their wage-work, all other activities like personal leisure, home activities, voluntary work and worship get relatively balanced share as compared to the low religiosity people”.

Below we shall see that regression results do also support the conclusions that “...religiosity characteristics do also significantly affect the workers' response”.

WORKERS' SELF-SATISFACTION AND FRUSTRATION

Some regression results in perspective of Imam Kazim's Time Allocation Pattern

The regression results

In earlier works (for example Hamdani 2004 and Hamdani and Ahmad 2002) a number of testable propositions were forwarded although not tested, the aim there was only highlighting how behaviour of human resources in could differ from that usually captured under the conventional economic analysis which is a religion-free framework. The

present paper allows us to test some of such propositions.

Proposition

The individuals having more religiosity are likely to display a systematically different behaviour of allocating time to wage oriented work as compared to the individuals having low level of religiosity.

Using the same set of variables as discussed above, we have estimated some equations to identify the factors affecting workers' self satisfaction.

Model-1

Table 2.6 provides the regression results of Model-1 that contains 12 explanatory variables that might affect workers' satisfaction positively or negatively.

A priori we assume that Worship time (% of 24 hrs.), Voluntary time (% of 24 hrs.) and Personal Leisure time (% of 24 hrs.) should have a positive effect and Economic activity time (% of 24 hrs.) should have a negative (direct) effect on workers' satisfaction. Due to religious rationale, we expected a positive effect of household income, mother's religious education, charity/ *Zakat/ Sadaqa*, behavioral religiosity, and Mahdavi religiosity (see definition above). A mixed effect could be expected of desired additional income (Rs.), extrinsic religiosity, and extent of community problems level, on yet a number of religious and other bases.

The table 2.5 indicates that this comes true in case of economic activity time while we observe an unexpected negative (although insignificant) effect of worship time on workers' satisfaction. One possible reason for Pakistani society may be that if they spend too much time for worship during their office hours, they are usually disliked by their fellows and they tend develop complaining environment in terms of

their work performance, which in turn, may cause some dissatisfaction.

Mother's religious education and behavioral religiosity turned to positive and highly significant, as expected. A negative sign of personal leisure time is unexpected and limiting us too in interpretation. One reason could be that the people who spend too much time in personal leisure sometime feel guilt of missing many opportunities, yet this phenomenon needs more analysis.

A desire for additional income may lead to frustration for some people and source of progressing for others. We observe a positive yet insignificant effect of this variable on workers' satisfaction.

Extrinsic religiosity appeared to have significant negative effect on the dependent variable confirming the religious preaching (see Qur'an) that the worship that could bring peace of mind has to be pure of all selfish intentions.

Before we discuss the results of Mahdavi religiosity, it appears important to explain the method of construction of this non-conventional, non-economic variable. It can be constructed in a number of ways which could ensure that the respondent's perception of Mahdviat has been successfully observed. For the present study, Mahdavi religiosity is an interactive variable constructed by multiplying the daily prayers with the dummy (=1) if the individual also has the belief that although Islam can be understood through the source of companions of the Holy Prophet but the source of Ahle Bayt is more authentic, hence preferable. And it is the AhleBayt version of Qur'anic interpretations that fully explains the concept of return of Jesus Christ and appearance of the Imam Mahdi towards the end times. That's why it may lead to better achievements of the followers in both worlds. The rationale for making an interactive variable is that if a person claims to be a lover of Mahdism but does not offer obligatory prayers is considered to be false in his claim, in the eyes of relevant jurisprudence. On the other hand, if a person is regular in offering prayers, but does not recognize the importance of AhleBayt, he

is also considered to be false in his claim in the eyes of all the Shiites Jurists and a reasonable number of Sunnite jurists too. The variable shows a weaker ($p =$) but positive relationship of workers with their self-satisfaction. One obvious reason for the weaker relationship may be that the study relates to Pakistani society where the concept of Mahdviat is not very well understood by both the main schools of Islamic thoughts. It is not propagated in the way the concept of return of Jesus Christ is propagated in every day media programs in the United States.

The results indicate that Mahdavi Religiosity has positive effect on self satisfaction of workers in the sample. The reason may be that this type of religiosity gives hope for a better future on earth when justice is said to prevail and people would be economically prosperous have no fear of wars and disasters. However, in contrast to a priori expectation, this variable appeared insignificant. The apparent reason may be that in Pakistani society, the concept of Mahdism is not very well elaborated. It is not propagated in the manner the concept of return of Jesus is propagated on US television (for example Catholic TV). Both Sunnite and Shiites lack in real understanding of this concept that has been elaborated in Islamic literature of both the schools of thoughts. Considering Dependent R square ($=.52$) and Adjusted R square ($= .41$), we attempted to drop some variables which resulted in slightly better adjusted R square.

The same models were estimated for government workers and results are discussed in a separate study.

Model-1

TABLE 2.5
Regression Results (Pvt. Workers)

	PRIVATE WORKERS	
	Standardized Coefficients	T-Stats
(Constant)		
Worship Time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.153	-1.180
Economic activity time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.330	-2.853***
Voluntary time (% of 24 hrs.)	.096	.901
Personal Leisure time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.221	-1.861*
Household Income	.097	.725
Desired additional Income (Rs.)	.074	.717
Mother's religious education	.333	3.176***
Charity/Zakat/Sadaqah (Rs.)	-.011	-.081
Behavioral Religiosity	.512	4.703***
Extrinsic Religiosity	-.236	-2.273**
Community Problems Level	.067	.636
Mahdavi Religiosity	.060	.558
	R square = .52 Adjusted R square = .41 F=4.88***	

Dependent = Self satisfaction

Model-2

TABLE 2.6
Regression Results (Pvt. Workers)

	Standardized Coefficients	T
Constant		4.136***
Worship time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.159	-1.457
Economic activity time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.326	-2.919***
Voluntary time (% of 24 hrs.)	.103	1.024
Personal Leisure time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.199	-1.840*
Household income	.090	.836
Desired additional income (Rs.)	.076	.776
Mother's religious education	.328	3.292***
Behavioral Religiosity	.525	5.060***
Extrinsic Religiosity	-.248	-2.523***
Community Problems Level	-.224	-1.938**

Dependent Variable: Self satisfaction R square = .51 Adjusted R square = .43
F=6.70***

TABLE 2.7
Regression Results (Govt. Workers)

	Standardized Coefficients	T
	Beta	
(Constant)		3.227***
Worship time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.046	-.482
Economic activity time (% of 24 hrs.)	.052	.581
Voluntary time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.042	-.478
Personal Leisure time (% of 24 hrs.)	-.078	-.735
Household income	.123	1.166
Desired additional income (Rs.)	-.089	-.954
Mother's religious education	.187	2.029*
Charity/Zakat/Sadaqah (Rs.)	.080	.851
Behavioral Religiosity	.395	4.186***
Extrinsic Religiosity	.045	.483
Community Problems Level	-.131	-1.453
Mahdavi Religiosity	.002	.025

Dependent Variable : Self satisfaction R square = .23 Adjusted R square = .14
F=2.515***

CAN ECONOMIST AND MUSLIM ECONOMIST MISLEAD?

It is sometimes asked whether economists including Muslim economists can mislead. The answer is 'Yes', if their analysis in economics of religion is based extrinsic or alternative or negative religiosity. The extrinsic form of religiosity is the one which is adopted due to its apparent benefits. The alternative religiosity is fitting one's own preferences and habits into a religious verdict to make those practices and habits look like religious. We defined the negative religiosity as 'such religious acts and decisions which very much fall under some religious verdict but do not conform to an on-going situation, hence cause a potential threat or loss, instead of being a source of strength or benefit to the religion. All these forms of religiosity are blindly used in economics and social sciences for deriving conclusions from religious behaviors. We have reservation in using them to serve as proxy for religious behavior.

TABLE 2.10
Commitment to Job by Multiple Religiosity Scales (Government Workers)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Behavioral religiosity	Social religiosity	Religious dynamism	Self satisfaction level	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
1	Low	Low	Low	Low	1563.00	1.00	.
2	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	1723.20	5.00	450.14
3	High	Low	Low	Medium	1935.00	1.00	.
4		Medium	Low	Medium	1965.05	6.00	1000.71
5		High	Medium	Medium	1302.00	1.00	.
6			High	Low	2400.00	1.00	.
7				Medium	1655.27	15.00	763.45
8				High	1722.77	16.00	1030.41

Note: These results are only for insights and should not be taken for strong conclusion because of very small sub-sample in case of certain cases above.

We can notice that commitment to ones job (proxied by mean hours at duty) increases with different forms of religiosity such as behavioral religiosity, social religiosity and religious dynamism. In columns 1 to 3, row 1, all religiosity indicators show the low level of religiosity and also low level of self satisfaction (cell 1:4). Here the government worker spends 1563 hours per annum to his duty. In cell 6:3, all religiosity is at high but self satisfaction is at low (cell 6:4) and the corresponding duty hours appear to be 2400. But as the workers self satisfaction level increases due to any reasons, their time to duty reduces to 1722 hours. We also estimated the results ignoring multiple religiosity indicators and taking only one, that is *social* religiosity. We can found how an economist including Muslim economist can blame religiosity as factor in lack of commitment to one's duty. The mean hours at low level of religiosity are 1728 which reduce to 1668 at high level of religiosity indicating a negative effect of religiosity on workers' commitment. The misleading opinion may emerge here because of taking only one form of religiosity and ignoring that religion particularly Islam requires a complete set of values.¹⁰ And Qur'an demands from its followers to obey the complete set of laws, only then one can be considered as true Muslim.

Another possible reason for a misleading conclusion may be ignoring other negative factors which might offset the positive effect of religiosity on workers commitment. For example, we found that duty hours at low level of frustration are 1714 as compared 1477 hours at high level of frustration.

The New Directions

Based on the above discussion we can conclude that religiosity can not be ignored in economic analysis. And to draw reliable conclusions, one needs all different parameters of religion to bring in analysis. A partial analysis may be concocted and misleading. In the regression estimates above, we used standardized betas (coefficients) and did not report constants in any equation above. However, all equations (when

non-standardized beta were estimated) resulted in all intercept being significant indicating many important variables left out of the equations, that need to be discovered by knowledge of economics, religion, psychology and other disciplines.¹¹ Hence, the role of future economists who would aim at strengthening the 'Divine Economics' would be to identify different factors¹² which might affect workers satisfaction through religiosity-based behaviour at work, in home and in society. The difference in outcome of different religiosity groups indicates a typical importance of religiosity for human resource planning and management, that needs yet to be recognized by conventional economists. One may safely conclude that the more interrelationships of religiosity and work are identified by the economics and management,¹³ then by compatible hiring policy, the better human resources can be hired by an organization to achieve its goals.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The present paper establishes that more (truly) religious people spend more time at Workplace as compared to their counterparts (less or hypocritically religious ones). This paper further strengthens the earlier view that similarities and differences exist in conventional management and Islamic management of human resources, and the time management in the two systems has significantly distinct features causing distinct outcomes also, has been further strengthened. The paper is an empirical application of the Valeye Asr Model of Human Resource Management that originates mainly from time allocation behavior of workers and its interpretation given by the Divine Economics Framework (2002, 2003). Based on the time allocation pattern as suggested by Imam Moosa Kazim (2nd century Hijra) it has been empirically shown that religiosity affects the proportion of time allocated to work, leisure, voluntary services, and religious activities which has implications for workers' self satisfaction level (which in turn is related to the overall performance and achievements of workers). Some empirical findings point to the case that "religious human resource" needs to be distinctly analyzed for the true behavior of workers as opposed to the conventional economics

which does not recognize the systematic difference between 'more religious human resource' and 'less religious human resource'. The paper used the cross section data of 'Religiosity and Economics Survey 2000'. Although the sub-sample available for the present paper was not large enough to make the results generalizable, yet it gives useful insights for re-considering methodology of conventional economics particularly with reference. These results help in understanding the plausibility of the basic assumption of the WAM-HRM that human resources aim at maximizing life-time utility from religious, non-wage and wage activities. The analysis points to the case that both economists as well as human resource development managers need to consider our earlier proposition (2002), that 'the people who believe in some religion reflect systematically differentiable resource allocation pattern'..and they also need to go beyond convention concept of 'human capital' to the concept of 'religious human capital', 'moral capital' and particularly 'Islamic human capital' in order to capture the peculiarities of divine religions. Moreover, they need to consider how far the concept of future defined by *Mahdviat* affects the followers in their time allocation towards job, family, society and religious activities. An important implication emerges for institutions, firms, individuals and especially those who consider themselves to be truly waiting for a just-savoir of humanity; that for improving the time management practices, resource allocation managers should recognize the role of moral capital and the possible role of religiosity in life.

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1. The Divine Economics is a utility maximization model of resource allocation behavior that allows study of economics and religion in each other's perspective.
2. Qur'an guides to alternative ways to lead life; every action is rewarded; give loan to Allah; the good actions will be weighed; remembrance of Allah brings solace; the rizq is proportionate (qadr) according to Allah's wish, etc. These teachings may tempt individuals to live in a way that both material and spiritual dimensions get due proportion of one's time and wealth.
3. The concept of return of Jesus Christ is regularly propagated in Christian churches and very strongly presented in everyday media programs in the United States.
4. Guftar-e-Dilnasheen, Vol-1, 1999.
5. These are measured by a scale between zero and 100.
6. For example, if time allocated to wage activities is zero, the individual may not get dignified livelihood, if time for rest and sleep is zero, the individual will be unable to continue any religious, voluntary or wage activity or his/her performance in the organization will be poor. A zero time for voluntary work showing individual's apathy and alienation from other fellow beings would tempt others to alienate from him causing a frustrated and deprived life for him. If time for religious activities is closer to zero, the individual does not fall under Islamic human systems. If all the five components are positive, this may lead to an individual's balanced growth in both worldly affairs and religious matters... a dream of every Muslim (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002).
7. For simplicity head of house hold is studied who is manager of his own and family human resources. The analysis is, however applicable to organizations also.
8. In an earlier study (Hamdani 2004), it was observed that the major share in illiterate people's time goes to religious, market and home activities.

People with moderate education level give relatively more time to leisure, the highest mean time for voluntary activities was observed among graduate people. Those who do regular voluntary work, allocate relatively less time to market and leisure. This is true especially in case of more religious regular voluntary workers.

9. Eta and Eta Squared do not assume a linear relationship exists between the variables and nonlinear relationships cannot be accurately described by R squared result from nonlinear relationships between the variable. Eta squared is preferred to R squared if nonlinear relationships are present (See Manual SPSS 10.0)

10. "Islam is different, it is not only a religion but also a complete code of life. Its do's and don'ts are based on scientific reasons. It is a different matter that science has not yet unearthed all secrets and the search is still on. Laws and directives, covering social, economic, political, familial and education al life are all as per the needs of human beings. Be it distribution of wealth and property, matters of marriage, issue of human rights all find tacit and clear-cut mention in the Holy Qur'an and Holy Hadith, the original sources of Islam." (Encyclopedia of Islamic Law by Khan, Arif Ali & Khan, Tauqir Mohammad, Eds. 2006.

11. In an earlier work we estimated the relationship of hourly wage rate (W1) that was negatively related with work hours in Pakistani society indicating a backward bending supply curve of labor (significant at 1 %). Having more assets and amenities of life such as own conveyance had positive relation with longer hours of work. The religiosity scale of individual showing his/her adherence to some prescribed ways of life had positive relation whereas a similar other scale showing religious dynamism had negative and significant effect on ours of work. The human capital variables such as education of respondents and labor market experience both were found positive. However the former was not significant. The religious human capital i.e. experience of being a worshipper, had negative and significant relation with working hours.

12. For example, in an earlier empirical test of the Valley Asr Model (Hamdani and Ahmad 2002), it was found that a significant positive relation exists between religiosity level and early start of day, which has important effect on a person's daily performance. It was also observed that religiosity promotes harmony of views and goals within family members. This may lead to better

performance of workers with more religiosity as compared to workers frustrated at home. Religiosity level has also positive and significant relation with regularity of workers' voluntary work. This list of interrelationships may expand with the volume of economists' efforts in this direction.

13. Such as time allocated to market, religious and voluntary activities is relatively higher among those people having religious and social harmony at home.

Book Review

M. H. BUKHARI

*The Self Guiding Society, Warren Breed, Macmillan Co.
New York 1971.*

This book first published in 1971 is based on the scholarly, albeit voluminous book, the *Active Society* by Amitiai Etzioni. The book is simplified version and about one sixth of the original. The nature of the subject *i.e.* guided social change is such that the book has of necessity to be more empirically grounded than ideological. Covering an immense volume of behaviour in many countries and over long periods of time it sketches social change under a variety of conditions. It finally emerges not only with the ideal king of future society (not a utopia of Course). The mechanics of achieving this goal have also been analyzed in detail. Indicators of a transition in a self-guiding direction, and suggestions about how this transition may be initiated, advanced, or blocked, have been analysed. The book draws its significance from the unusual combination of erudition, analysis and orientation towards an authentic society, a society which is active, but not tyrannical.

In the introductory Chapters (Chapters 1-3), the writer discusses the background of the 'post modern' period which started in 1945 *i.e.* with the end of World War II. The trends of the modern period *i.e.* the period before 1945 ended with the radical changes in communications, knowledge and energy. These trends have posed great challenges to the primacy of the human values. In the post-modern period one of the two alternatives *viz* either further decay of these human values or their greater realization to enhance the quality of life is inevitable. The author is hopeful about the second alternative. He bases his optimism, on the

fact that the new discoveries in communication, knowledge and energy present him with option and new freedom to choose his destiny. The man thing to do is to avert the danger of choosing to destroy every thing, even freedom itself.

The remaining 16 Chapters of the book can be divided into two main sections. The first, Chapter 4-10, deals with the administration of groups and societies as practiced by elites. The focal idea is knowledge, the increasingly vital element of modern society. Treatment of criticism of elites opens the way to second section, which turns to non-elites, mainly groups challenging the elites and outworn institutions via political action. In this section the focal ideas are public consciousness in the minds of the individuals, commitment to cherished goals and values, and mobilization.

Mobilization the crux of competition involves converting assets towards the gaining of power for groups. When these groups, especially "have-not" units, express the aspirations of their members, they gain greater justice, equality and the other classic goals of man. Successful mobilization in a society whose elites are moved to permit flexibility, the author believes, can lead to Active Society. This is a society in which leaders not only are responsive to their members, but work towards building an authentic structure that facilitates the individual in realizing his full potential.

The subject matter and thought content in the book is such that all efforts at reviewing it are seriously precluded. Keeness of observation, maturity of thought, mastery of language and sophistication of style are the notable features of the book. Students of behavioural science, and laymen alike, will find this book highly readable.

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcome.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

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